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1 Introduction 
More than at any point in history, international agreements1 govern our lives. Deciding 
which country may possess nuclear weapons (NPT 1986), the future of the world’s climate  
(UNFCCC 1992), which species of plants and animals are protected from international trade 
(CITES 1973), the amount of fish to be taken out of international waters (UNCLOS 1995), or 
which goods may be subjected to which tariff levels (e.g. GATT 1994), international 
agreements shape not only the landscape of states’ relations with one another, but also have 
an immediate impact on the daily lives of their citizens. 
Their importance is reflected in numerous academic studies on the subject. In addition to 
research on specific thematic fields, such as Human Rights (see e.g. Camp Keith 1999 or 
Lutz/Sikkink 2000), weapons (see e.g. Müller 2005), trade (see e.g. Tussie 2005), or the 
environment (see e.g. Bernauer 1995, or Tamiotti/Finger 2001), research is being conducted 
on the phenomenon of international agreements in general. A large amount of literature is 
concerned with their legitimacy, studying both how international agreements can fit into 
democratic structures, as well as alternative sources of legitimacy (see e.g. Franck 1988, or 
Kumm 2004). Other researchers are concerned with the effectiveness of international 
agreements (see e.g. Kingsbury 1998), asking how these agreements are enforced (see e.g. 
Koh 1998), under what circumstances states are more likely comply with the agreements 
(see e.g. Simmons 2000), and what the agreement itself actually changes from the status quo 
(see e.g. Hisschemöller/Gupta 1999). The negotiation of international agreements is a field 
of study in its own right, and is often looked at separately from the effects of agreements. 
Strategic concerns for state representatives, such as how to negotiate effectively for their 
own interest (see e.g. Mastenbroek 2002) and more general questions on how negotiations 
are conducted (see e.g. Jönsson 2002, or Zartman 1994b) are subjects of investigation. So is 
the way in which international agreements interact with domestic politics (see e.g. Putnam 
1988). International organisations are considered as to their impact on the negotiation 
process and implementation of international agreements (see e.g. Alvarez 2006). The study 
of international norm dynamics also features a significant overlap with the study of 
international agreements (see e.g. Finnemore/Sikkink 1998). The research on regimes 
incorporates aspects of all the fields of study listed above, additionally studying the interplay 
                                                          
1 In the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is defined as “an international agreement, 
concluded between States [sic] in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied 
in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation” 
(Vienna Convention 1969: Art. 2). I follow this understanding, but use the term ‘international 
agreement’ to avoid confusion with treaties among individuals or corporations. 
2 
 
of different agreements (see e.g. Charnovitz 2003) as well as their development over time 
(see e.g. Steffek 2005). 
The language in which international agreements are formulated underlies all these areas 
of study. Some studies, such as Bhatia et al. (2003) and Olsen et al. (2009) address issues of 
translation. Beaulac (2004) dedicates an entire book to the implications of a single word 
(sovereignty), its origin and its meaning in international agreements. Handbooks for 
negotiators offer detailed guidelines on how to draft international agreements (see e.g. Aust 
2000). Wessel (2010) has even proposed to understand International Law (IL) as a language. 
Vagueness2 is a phenomenon at the intersection of language and international 
agreements which is often referred to in passing but rarely expanded upon. Starting with 
Morgenthau (1954), International Relations (IR) scholars have made claims about the 
provenance and effects of vagueness in international agreements. They assert a correlation 
of the precision of an international treaty with its legitimacy (Franck 1988: 741, Stokke 2001: 
16), use the precision or specificity of a treaty as an indicator for its effectiveness, (see e.g. 
Goldstein et al. 2001, Wettestad 1999), or postulate that vague provisions may be a chance 
for a treaty to come into existence in the first place (cf. Abbot/Snidal 2000). 
To be able to know whether these claims are true, it is necessary to systematically 
compare the vagueness of international agreements. At present, such comparisons are 
commonly ad-hoc and unsystematic, which weakens their conclusions and can lead to 
confirmation bias in their results. Very few authors elaborate on indicators that might be 
used to assess the relative vagueness of a treaty. Most merely describe some international 
treaties as vague and others as more precise, and from this draw conclusions about their 
effectiveness or legitimacy. While readers generally have intuitions about whether a treaty 
is vaguely formulated or not, the lack of a systematic method of comparison is unacceptable. 
The research question driving this dissertation is therefore: How can the vagueness of 
different international agreements be systematically compared? 
In this thesis, I will introduce a method to reliably compare instances of vague language 
in international agreements. By systematically applying the same set of criteria in the same 
way to multiple agreements, the results will be consistent, reproducible, and directly linked 
to linguistic theory. 
Identifying these criteria is a major part of this study. It requires insights from IL and 
linguistics, as well as the perspective of IR. While I incorporate indicators drawn from 
                                                          
2 Vagueness is a complex phenomenon which eludes easy definition. Section 2.1 is dedicated to a 
discussion on this topic. 
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literature on vagueness in everyday language, the research focusses on collecting and 
analysing empirical data, because the assessment of experts IL experts is part of what 
determines its meaning. Based on this data, I conduct several statistical tests to find out 
which possible indicators of vagueness are relevant in the field of IL. Through the tests, I 
establish four criteria which indicate that a sentence in a legal agreement will probably be 
perceived as vague. 
I then apply these indicators to a total of seventeen international agreements - six under 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and eleven under the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). They are used as examples to present comparisons of vague 
language within and across regimes. In a final step, the developed method is tested by 
comparing the results of its application to the independent assessments of international legal 
experts. 
There are limits to the scope of this study. A systematic comparison of vagueness in 
international agreements is a necessary first step to be able to test claims on its effects or 
causes, but it is only the first step: I do not actually investigate the motives that negotiators 
had nor do I consider the consequences of vagueness. Additionally, the indicators used in 
the tool are strictly quantitative and should be supplemented with qualitative analyses in 
order to gain a more nuanced picture. Finally, the application of the tool is currently limited 
to those agreements which were used in its development. 
Once the method is established, it can give much more detailed and targeted practical 
advice for the drafters of the agreements who wish a provision to be read as precise or vague. 
Researchers can assess the theories on causes and effects of vagueness in international 
agreements, and the results may provide relevant insights for the study of vagueness in 
general. The method also allows to check for the development of vagueness in regimes over 
time and to see if agreements of different status are also written in more precise or vague 
language than others. While the perspective of this dissertation remains firmly anchored in 
the field of IR, it provides insights relevant for several other disciplines, most notably 
linguistics and IL. Ultimately, a deeper understanding of the type and degree of vagueness 
present in international agreements will lead to a better comprehension of the effects of 
vague agreements on international cooperation. 
 
This dissertation proceeds as follows: The second chapter differentiates some key 
concepts this thesis is working with and situates the thesis in the philosophy of law. 
Discussing the differences and similarities of vagueness, vague language and indeterminacy 
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enables both a more in-depth understanding of each of the concepts, and also gives some 
insights into the variety of disciplinary perspectives. The second part of the chapter focuses 
on one of these disciplines, namely legal theory, by giving an overview of the indeterminacy 
debate. In doing so, the chapter also clarifies some of the assumptions underlying the 
premise of this thesis: that there is vagueness in international agreements, and that it can be 
there to differing degrees. 
In the third chapter, I provide the theoretical framing of this thesis. It anchors the 
question of vagueness in international agreements in IR theory and gives the theoretical 
background on the setting in which international agreements are negotiated and (not) 
complied with. To this end, it briefly discusses regime theory, the negotiation and 
implementation of IL, its mechanisms and functions as well as some general characteristics 
of rules. The second part of the chapter provides a detailed look at the causes and effects 
that vagueness in IL is thought to have according to scholars of IR. On the basis of this 
literature, I argue that a means to compare the vagueness of international agreements is 
needed: Without one, how could it be possible to ever actually study its causes and effects? 
The fourth chapter emphasizes the linguistic aspects. It outlines current methods of 
identifying vague language in different contexts. Since this literature is usually concerned 
with finding vagueness in everyday speech, chapter 4.1 briefly departs from the legal context 
established in the previous chapters. The vast majority of these methods defines some 
indicators of vagueness and then looks for it in the text. Section 4.2 then seeks to re-
incorporate the international legal context by discussing legal language as a specialized 
language. Finally, section 4.3 briefly discusses the very few instances in which indicators for 
vagueness have been already sought out specifically in the field of IL. By its very scarcity, the 
section demonstrates the need for further work on the subject. 
The fifth chapter is the methodological heart of the study. It introduces and defends the 
original methods used to find out how to compare vagueness in international agreements. It 
also presents the results of this inquiry. Part 5.1 explains the methods used to conduct a 
survey among professionals of IL. It gives some detail on the criteria that were important to 
the study, and discusses compromises between conflicting goals of the survey. Part 5.2 
presents the results and discusses comments of the respondents. The third part of the 
chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the data gained by the survey. Eight characteristics are 
tested as to whether or not their presence leads legal language to be perceived as 
particularly vague or precise. In the end, the indicators which proved to make a difference in 
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the perceived vagueness are assembled to form a tool for the detection of vagueness in 
international agreements. 
In the sixth chapter, the insights gained in the previous part of the thesis are used to study 
two international regimes: The United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Applying the developed method 
to seventeen different agreements yields insights into strength and weaknesses of the 
method and points to possible further refinements. Seeing how the results play out in the 
variety of agreements presented – including differences in legal status, development over 
time, and of course regime – supports these insights. The chapter incidentally also provides 
new insights into the agreements and regimes themselves. In a last step, a comparison with 
previous assessments of IR scholars shows that the results of the new method largely 
correspond to their judgements. 
The conclusion highlights the results generated by the tool development process: The 
presence of hedge words, a low number of determiners, the presence of weak explicitly 
performative verbs and the absence of strong explicitly performative verbs make it more 
likely that a sentence will be perceived as vague. When applied to the sentences of a UNFCCC 
or NPT agreement, these four indicators are fairly reliable in matching expert opinion on 
whether that agreement is vague or not. According to my analysis, the NPT and the Kyoto 
Protocol are the most precise of the documents, while the NPT RevCon decisions of 1995 and 
the Delhi Ministerial Declaration (2002) are the vaguest. In general, legally binding 
documents are more precise than decisions or declarations.  
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2 The legal perspective: concepts and background 
This chapter provides the conceptual background and introduces the terminology to the 
empirical findings which will be discussed further on. In the first part of the chapter, I 
disambiguate three key concepts of this thesis: vagueness, vague language, and 
indeterminacy. The three terms represent their respective disciplines of provenance: 
vagueness is a philosophical concept, vague language is a phenomenon discussed in the field 
of linguistics and indeterminacy is a term used specifically in legal theory and philosophy. By 
discussing the three concepts individually and jointly, I hope to show the different aspects 
the disciplines bring to the foreground, and in turn provide a multifaceted view of the 
concepts themselves. 
The second part of the chapter will provide an overview over the so-called ‘indeterminacy 
debate’. In doing so, I will be led by two main questions: Is there indeterminacy in the law? 
And if there is, what are the possible sources and consequences of this indeterminacy? In its 
entirety, the chapter is aimed at equipping the reader with the conceptual foundations and 
terminology for the theoretical and methodological concerns of the following chapters. 
2.1 Key concepts 
The first part of this chapter is aimed at disambiguating three key terms, which are at the 
core of the following thesis: vagueness, vague language, and indeterminacy, as well as 
showing important connections and differences between them. This not a trivial 
undertaking, because each of these terms in themselves encompass many facets and are not 
easily defined. Adding in the substantial overlap between the concepts means that the 
disambiguation, while all the more important, becomes quite challenging. 
Authors are generally agreed that vagueness is not an easily defined term (see for 
example Cheng/Warren 2003: 382, Eklund 2005: 27). However, the reasons given for this 
difficulty are varied. Burns (1991:3) attributes responsibility to many different conceptions 
of vagueness, as no two authors generally have the exact same definition in mind when 
talking about vagueness 
“Vagueness is not easy to characterize or define. One reason for this difficulty is 
that there appears to be a number of different conceptions of vagueness, and it 
is not clear just what they have in common”. 
Ullmann (1962: 118), on the other hand, refers to characteristics inherent in the concept 
of vagueness as a reason for difficulties with defining the term. 
“If one looks more closely at this vagueness one soon discovers that the term is 
itself rather vague and ambiguous: the condition it refers to is not a uniform 
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feature but has many aspects and may result from a variety of causes. Some of 
these are inherent in the very nature of language, whereas others come into play 
only in special circumstances”. 
Most likely a combination of these factors is at play. In order to nevertheless 
disambiguate the terms of this thesis, I will describe different facets of each of the three key 
terms, while also devoting some time to exploring what does not fall inside the boundaries 
of the concepts. 
2.1.1 Vagueness 
Vagueness is a linguistic and logical concept, and it is a property of language and/or 
thought. It is problematic in epistemological, ontological and methodological dimensions, all 
of which will become relevant in the course of this thesis. 
I will proceed to clear up the concept by first providing an overview on what vagueness is 
by going into more detail of four of its characteristics: Sorites-susceptibility, immeasurability, 
incommensurability, and higher-order vagueness, and then distinguish the phenomenon 
from several related, but distinct concepts, namely context-dependency, ambiguity and 
incompleteness. By doing this, I intend to clarify the concept so that further uses in the article 
can be more easily understood, as well as disambiguate the phenomenon from others that 
it can easily be confused with. This is especially necessary as the actual use of the concepts 
is by no means standardized, and each author discussed in this chapter may have his or her 
own conception of the terms used. 
 
The Sorites Paradox 
The Sorites Paradox (which can also be translated as the paradox of the heap, from the 
Greek word Soros, the heap) is based on a puzzle often attributed to Eubulides of Melitus 
(Hyde 2014). Nowadays, it is used to explain the logical conundrum of vague words and 
concepts. 
In a nutshell, it explains the paradoxical relationship between a difference of one grain of 
sand and a heap. If you have one grain of sand, what you have is clearly not a heap. If you 
add one grain of sand to it, you still do not have a heap: one grain does not make a difference. 
However, if you repeat the exercise often enough, at some point you will end up with 
something that clearly is a heap of sand. It is a paradox because, while there are two clear 
states at either end, there is no point on the continuum that could be found to clearly mark 
the distinction between the two states. No one grain of sand that clearly makes the 
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difference between ‘this is a heap’ and ‘this is not a heap’. Heap, therefore, is a vague 
concept.3 
Sorites susceptibility is related to the presence of borderline cases and the lack of clear 
boundaries (Keefe 2000: 6): There will be collections of sand which will not be classifiable as 
being a heap or not being a heap, and reasonable competent language speakers with all the 
information about the case can disagree on the categorization. These cases, where no clear 
classification seems possible, are called borderline cases. The possibility of borderline cases, 
in turn, is what makes concepts have unclear or fuzzy boundaries (Keefe 2000: 7). The 
existence or even possibility of vagueness poses a problem for formal logic, because the 
premises depend on binary truth values: either a proposition is true, or it is not true, and if 
neither of these states apply, the proposition becomes merely senseless. Neither of the three 
is the case when it comes to vague concepts. 
While it may appear at first glance that the number of words and concepts susceptible to 
the Sorites Paradox is relatively limited, this is not in fact the case. In fact, most concepts 
used in everyday language have unclear boundaries and borderline cases (Goguen 1975: 
325). Nor is the phenomenon limited to nouns (as the example of the heap might suggest): 
Sorites susceptibility can equally occur in verbs (how fast does someone have to move to be 
considered hurrying?), adjectives (a favourite example is bald, see i.e. Greenawalt 2001: 
434), and correspondingly, adverbs. It also (or especially) applies to normative concepts like 
good (see Endicott 2001: 43). 
There are several different attempts to solve the Sorites Paradox (see Manor 2006: 172). 
An epistemic solution has been proposed by Williamson (1994). In a nutshell, the approach 
suggests that “vagueness consists in our ignorance of the sharp boundaries of our concepts” 
(Williamson 1994: xi). Basically, the argument is that vagueness is not an ontological but an 
epistemic phenomenon, i.e. all concepts have sharp boundaries, the problem is that we do 
not know what they are. A supervaluation solution has been proposed by Fine (1975: 265): 
“Very roughly, it says that a vague sentence is true if and only if it is true for all ways of 
making it completely precise.” Another approach has been put forward in the context of 
fuzzy logic, and is basically concerned with a particular modification of traditional logic to 
suit inexact concepts (which occur in ordinary live but not in settings of traditional logic) 
                                                          
3 The Paradox has been described and explained in different ways by many authors. Particularly 
enlightening examples include a legal iteration in Endicott 2001: 57-8, Hyde 2014, Keefe 2000:6, and 
(in logical terminology, and also for a succinct differentiation between a true paradox and a fallacy) 
Manor 2006: 171-2. 
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(Goguen 1975: 326) with the aim of eventually extending it to encompass all natural language 
(Goguen 1975: 372). Manor herself proposes a pragmatic resolution to the paradox, which 
“assumes that the meaning of vague terms is determined by their use” (Manor 2006: 172). 
The number of proposed solutions itself suggests that the Sorites Paradox is far from 
uncontroversial. While it sets the basic of understanding the phenomenon and captures the 
core of the problematic concept of vagueness, two other important characteristics will be 
discussed in the next two sections. 
 
Immensurability 
When faced with the Sorites Paradox, one simple answer may be to arbitrarily fix 
numerical values to specific concepts. To stay with the example of the heap, a person, or 
group of persons, could decide that, for a specific context, that ‘heap of sand’ is something 
that consists of 1000 or more individual grains of sand (all touching each other and forming 
a conical shape). While the distinction would be arbitrary, in that there is nothing 
substantially different about a 999 grains of sand arranged in the same way, it seems at least 
a possibility to introduce such a distinction, and thus escape the Sorites Paradox – at least 
for technical areas, if not for everyday language. However, this solution ignores the very real 
possibility that some concepts cannot be measured at all. 
“We can invent the term ‘immensurate’ to describe criteria of application that do 
not correspond to a scale. ‘Immensurability’ is the property that something has 
if and only if it can be assessed in some respect in which it cannot be measured” 
(Endicott 2001: 46). 
He gives the examples of humour and imagination (Endicott 2001: 46) but the same is 
true of many key concepts of human lives such as morality (it would seem absurd to claim 
that, for something to be considered moral, it must contain a specific amount of units of 
morality), kindness, responsibility, redness, tastiness and so on. 
 
Incommensurability 
A related phenomenon to the one termed ‘Immensurability’ (Endicott 2001: 46) above is 
the concept of incommensurability. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Oberheim 
and Hoyningen-Huene (2013) define: “The term ‘incommensurable’ means ‘no common 
measure’, having its origins in Ancient Greek mathematics, where it meant no common 
measure between magnitudes.” In the sense used here, it describes objects and concepts 
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with different characteristics, which cannot be compared to each other. Endicott gives the 
example of weight and strength in a rope: 
“But if some rope is slightly stronger and slightly heavier than another, and if 
weight and strength are incommensurate, then the way in which the formula 
ranks the two ropes will be stipulative: there is no answer to the question that a 
good formula will reveal” (Endicott 2001: 42). 
It may seem like the concept of Immensurability could be subsumed under the 
phenomenon of Incommensurability. For example, I mentioned before that the term 
‘redness’ could be seen as immensurable. One could argue that ‘redness’ simply consists of 
at least two characteristics – like lightness and shade, for example – that are by themselves 
measurable, but incommensurable when taken together. However, while this explanation 
might be applicable to some terms, others (like the above-mentioned morality or kindness) 
have no units and cannot be quantified at all, showing that this explanation does not cover 
all concepts (see Endicott 2001: 46). The distinction between incommensurability and 
immensurability thus seems relevant, and both concepts are important to fully appreciate 
the complexity of the problems that the phenomenon of vagueness entails. 
 
Higher order vagueness 
One of the reasons vagueness is such a tricky concept is that it includes higher order 
vagueness. Even when considering the implications of immensurability and 
incommensurability, it might still be relatively easy to deal with the problem of ‘simple’ 
vagueness by introducing a middle category – there are clearly positive cases, clearly 
negative cases, and here is a clearly delineated space of borderline cases, which are neither 
fall clearly inside nor clearly outside the boundaries of a certain concept (see Sainsbury 1991: 
167-8). However, as Sainsbury (1991: 168) continues to explain, this characterization only 
describes the lowest level of vagueness. He goes on: 
“However, with most or even all vague predicates it soon appears that the idea 
that there is a sharp division between the positive cases and the borderline ones, 
and between the borderline cases and the negative ones, can no more be 
sustained than can the idea that there is a sharp division between positive and 
negative cases”. 
This exercise can be continued ad infinitum, such that the introduction of ever more 
categories can never keep up with the actual vagueness of the concept. 4 
                                                          
4 Because Sainsbury’s point in his 1991 article is on the inadequacy of applying classical logic to real-
world problems, he suggests to do away with the distinction between simple and higher-order 
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Taken together, the characteristics described in the previous sections make vagueness 
such a theoretically interesting and problematic phenomenon. The previous sections were 
aimed at describing four core properties or characteristics which constitute the phenomenon 
vagueness. To fully grasp the concept, and to disambiguate it from other terms that will be 
mentioned over the course of this thesis, I believe it useful to spend a few paragraphs 
describing what vagueness is not. In the following, I will briefly differentiate vagueness from 
context-dependence, ambiguity and incompleteness in turn. 
 
Epistemic and ontological vagueness 
One fundamental distinction between different conceptions of vagueness is whether one 
believes vagueness to be ontological or epistemic. If vagueness is ontological, the paradox of 
the heap means that it is actually unclear when a collection of grains of sand constitutes a 
heap. If it is an epistemic phenomenon, this is not so: there is be a precise point when adding 
a grain of sand will turn the collection from not-a-heap into a heap, we are simply not capable 
of knowing when exactly this point occurs. This has been discussed as a possible solution to 
the Sorites Paradox above: it is not really a Paradox, we just cannot know the exact solution. 
Endicott points out some of the problems with this second approach: 
The epistemic theory has the attraction of simplicity. It also has the attractions 
of vindicating classical logic, of maintaining a simple relationship between 
classical logic and the meaning of words in a natural language, and of doing 
nothing obviously innovative with the notion of truth. Its problem is that it makes 
a bizarre claim about the correct application of vague words: it claims that their 
meanings determine sharp boundaries, which we cannot locate. The epistemic 
theory has the consequence that you could lay a hair on the ground so that, all 
along its length, half of it is close to New York and half of it is not. Or you could, 
except that you have no way of knowing where the boundary is. The theory solves 
the paradox at the price of an apparently outlandish account of the meaning of 
words” (Endicott 2001: 100). 
I tend to agree with Endicott’s arguments here: it does not seem likely that there would 
be a predetermined rule in the universe of how many grains of sand constitute a heap, which 
humans simply cannot grasp and therefore resort to vague language. However, it is actually 
quite possible to remain agnostic about the nature of vagueness and still research its 
                                                          
vagueness altogether, and proposes boundarylessness as an alternative way of conceptualizing 
classifications. I do not disagree, but I do believe that the distinction still serves a purpose in explaining 
the full scope of the problem that the phenomenon of vagueness poses. He also states “On my view, 
the phenomena which those of classical inclinations classify as ‘higher-order vagueness’ are real 
enough; it is just that there is no real hierarchy here. Nothing gives rise to substantive issues about 
the level of vagueness appropriate to our familiar examples of vagueness, and there is no 
multiplication of sets” (1991: 179), indicating that his issues are with the terminology and use of the 
concept rather than its existence itself. 
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practical implications. As long as it is truly unknowable where a boundary is, the effects of 
vagueness in many cases will still be the same as if there truly were no clear boundary. 
 
Vagueness vs. ambiguity 
While the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness may seem similar at first glance, they are 
actually quite easy to differentiate. Solum (2010: 97-8) defines both terms: 
“In the technical sense, ambiguity refers to the multiplicity of sense: a term is 
ambiguous if it has more than one sense. [...] The technical sense of vagueness 
refers to the existence of borderline cases: a term is vague if there are cases 
where the term might or might not apply”. 
As it is, a word can be both ambiguous and vague, as exemplified by the word cool: it is 
ambiguous because it can refer to style, mannerism or temperature, and it is vague because 
there is no clear boundary between a room with a cool temperature and a room with a non-
cool temperature. Ambiguity is almost always solvable by context: Saying ‘that is a cool 
poster!’ is unlikely to be taken as a comment on its temperature. 
 
Vagueness vs. context-dependence 
Bosch (1983) has argued that vagueness can be reduced to context-dependence and 
properly defined terms do not pose a problem for formal reasoning. However, while many 
terms are both vague and context-dependent (it may well be argued that no language can 
have any meaning when taken entirely out of context), the two phenomena are not the 
same. Keefe (2000: 10) explains: 
“Vagueness must not be straightforwardly identified with context-dependence 
[...], even though many terms have both features (e.g. ‘tall’). Fix on a context 
which can be made as definite as you like (in particular, choose a specific 
comparison class, e.g. current professional American baseball players): ‘tall’ will 
remain vague, with borderline cases and fuzzy boundaries, and the sorites 
paradox will retain its force. This indicates that we are unlikely to understand 
vagueness or solve the paradox by concentrating on context-dependence”. 
Moreover, Bosch’s attempt does not adequately address the problems posed by 
immensurability and incommensurability. While some of the problems of vagueness and 
context-dependence can be related in practice (namely when the exact context is unknown 
or itself under debate, which, as we will see, can happen in legal contexts), and while – also 
in practice – lots of the conundrums posed by vagueness are in fact solved by context 
(because for most ordinary purposes, it tends not to be of immediate importance if a certain 
assembly of grains of sand is clearly a heap or not, as long as all participants in the 
conversation get a close enough picture of what is being talked about), some problematic 
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areas persists, and one of the areas where problems still arise, and may be of huge practical 
significance to individuals is the sphere of jurisprudence. 
 
Vagueness vs. open texture 
As Frederick Schauer (2011: 3) points out, open texture means 
“the possibility of vagueness – the potential vagueness – of even those terms that 
appear to have no uncertainties with respect to known or imagined 
applications”. 
Open texture is used to cover the fact that we can never have complete certainty over 
what happens in the future, so that our language can never be precise with regards to it even 
if we have somehow perfectly defined everything in the present. 
 
Vagueness vs. incompleteness of information 
The problem of incomplete information is closely related to that of context dependence. 
The reason why I include it here is that in everyday usage, vagueness is often equated with 
incompleteness of information. 
“Ordinarily, people use ‘vague’ to describe not expressions or concepts, but uses 
of language, such as promises, allegations, descriptions, threats, and 
insinuations. ‘Vague’ in this sense means something like uninformative or 
incomplete: wanting in useful details” (Endicott 2001: 32). 
I will further address the problem of philosophical and ordinary use of the term vagueness 
in section 5.2.3, and I consider it very important for the empirical purposes of this thesis. 
However, it is not generally the sense which theorists and philosophers5 mean when they 
speak of vagueness. Rather, they refer to the concept in the technical terms described above. 
 
Vagueness vs. generality 
While many communalities exist, generality is also distinct from vagueness. As Bennett 
explains 
 “Vagueness is also sometimes confused with generality. If I say ‘I shall see you 
again later this month’, this is an example of generality, since the claim can be 
fulfilled in many alternative ways. However, it is not vague, since ‘later this 
month’ refers to a precise period of time (I assume all relevant events take place 
within a single time-zone). But if I say ‘I shall see you in a few weeks’, this is vague 
(as well as general) since there is no hard and fast definition of what periods of 
                                                          
5 By this I mean theorists and philosophers of vagueness. In legal theory, this is not always the case, 
see for example Singer (1984: 17/18) 
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time can be described as ‘a few weeks’. Generality per se poses no real problems 
for the logician, since it is handled perfectly well by classical logic” (Bennett 2001: 
190). 
This distinction perhaps illustrates most clearly the difference between the word 
vagueness as used in everyday discourse, and the philosophical concept. Bennet’s first 
example is not vague in the philosophical sense, but may well be called vague in casual 
conversation. This distinction will be important in chapter 5, when considering how experts 
in IL understand vagueness. 
2.1.2 Vague language 
Vague language has been an important topic in the study of linguistics (for a brief 
overview, see Xi 2013: 1596). While semantic studies on tend to be concerned with the more 
philosophical concept of vagueness, in this section I will focus on the field of pragmatics, 
which is concerned with what I call here vague language. There are some characteristics that 
most of the authors on this topic have in common. For one, the vast majority of studies is 
concerned with spoken language6. This is a marked difference to both the philosophy of 
vagueness, which is mostly concerned with made-up, out-of-context example sentences and 
legal conceptions, which are primarily concerned with written legal documents. Another 
characteristic of the study of vague language is that it is mainly concerned with the practical 
applications of the findings. Emphasis has been laid on the question how vague language 
affects language (see Drave 2001, Lin 2013), as well as why people employ vague language 
in everyday conversations. Common areas of interest here are politeness and face saving7 
measures (cf. Ruzaitė 2007). 
Since it is a more practice-oriented discipline, less emphasis is placed on definitions and 
disambiguation and more on application and testing. This is very helpful when it comes to 
actually devising measurements of vagueness and deciding which words, phrases and 
characteristic of language are considered more or less vague. I will elaborate on these 
features in section chapter 3. On the other hand, it is sometimes less helpful when trying to 
describe the theoretical distinctions between different but related phenomena. This is why, 
after a very brief initial definition, I will contrast vague language to related terms and 
concepts, noting along the way which authors see them as different parts of the same 
phenomenon, and which draw more cutting distinctions. 
                                                          
6 See for example Channell 1994, Cutting 2007b and Zhang 2015. A notable exception is Cutting 2012. 
7 “Your face, in pragmatics, is your public self-image. […] Whenever you say something that lessens 
the possible threat to another’s face, it can be described as a face-saving act.” (Yule 2014: 135) 
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One of the standard texts on linguistic approaches to vagueness appears to be Channell 
(1994). The classifications of what makes language vague are taken on (sometimes with slight 
modifications) by Cheng/Warren (2001) and Drave (2001), among others. She uses the term 
vague language to differentiate from vagueness as a philosophical concept (8). Her definition 
of vague language reads as follows: 
“An expression or word is vague if: a. it can be contrasted with another word or 
expression which appears to render the same proposition; b. it is ‘purposely and 
unabashedly vague’; c. its meaning arises from the intrinsic uncertainty’ referred 
to by Pierce”. 
However, for all its popularity, it is not at first glance clear what vague language is 
according to Channell. Nevertheless, her definition establishes several benchmarks upon 
closer examination. For one, it clearly distinguishes vague language from the existential 
proposition that all concepts and all language in the world is always vague. While that may 
or may not be the case, studies of vague language focus on instances where the vagueness 
is at least to some degree intentional, i.e. another expression exists that would make the 
utterance less vague. Part of the core interest of the study of vague language is then to see 
for what reasons the vaguer version was uttered. The definition itself also underscores the 
desire to identify vague words rather than explore the phenomenon for its own sake. 
Channell’s importance in the field of vague language notwithstanding, her work is a 
starting point rather than the final conclusion. Building on her theories, Cheng and Warren 
propose another definition: 
“Vague language functions to signal to the listener that the utterance, or part of 
it, is not to be interpreted precisely. Vague language consists of a closed set of 
identifiable lexical items that can be interpreted without recourse to judgements 
based on the particular context in which they occur” (Cheng/Warren 2001: 82). 
Again, the definition is based on the assumption that vague language is intentional and 
emphasizes its functions. Interesting with regards to this definition is the inter-contextual 
dimension of vagueness posited: Cheng and Warren claim that vague language can be 
identified across linguistic contexts. 
 
Generality 
As I have shown in section 2.1.1, generality is seen as distinct from vagueness. The 
question how generality and vague language interact is more debated. Some authors clearly 
distinguish the two. Zhang, for example, defines generality as: 
“The meaning of an expression is general in the sense that it does not specify 
certain details; i.e. generality is a matter of unspecification” (Zhang 1998: 16). 
Generality is a property of a word or sentence to refer to a broad category rather than a 
specific, clearly defined concept (Zhang 1998: 16). For instance, “bird” is more general than 
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“robin”, while “robin” could be specified by saying “male robin”, “robin sitting on a fence”, 
etc. Very nearly all of the language used in everyday life is general, in the sense that it could 
be made even more specific by adding another detail. As discussed above with regards to 
the effectiveness of language, different levels of detail are appropriate for different 
situations. The distinction to vague language becomes clearer in the following quote: 
“There are two types of general expressions: one is context-resolvable and the 
other is not. For example, things is a general word, usually referring to a vague 
inferential meaning and not context-resolvable. The pronoun she is also general, 
but once it is put in ‘she is John’s wife, and her name is Jane`, the unspecified 
meaning is contextually resolved. Things is both general and vague; she is general 
but not necessarily vague” (Zhang 2014: 24-5). 
On the other hand, the indicators used for vague language often include categories for 
generality. For instance, Cutting (2012: 283-4) discusses 
“vague language (VL), defined as forms that are intentionally fuzzy, general, and 
imprecise, have a low semantic content and are heavily dependent on shared 
contextual knowledge for their meaning”. 
More specifically, three of her main categories when analysing vagueness are general 
nouns, general verbs and general extenders (Cutting 2012: 285). The term general extenders, 
in turn, has been coined by Overstreet and Yule and refers to expressions which “have 
nonspecific or ‘general’ & reference, and they ‘extend’ otherwise grammatically complete 
utterances” (1997: 250-1). So while the concepts of vague language and generality may be 
seen as distinct, the practical orientation of studies of vague language tend to blur these 
differences when it comes to identifying them. 
 
Elasticity 
Zhang (2015: 5) makes an argument distinguishing vague language from elastic language 
(abbreviated VL and EL, respectively, in the quote): 
“The definition of EL is developed from that of VL., which has been in use for 
decades [....] While EL and VL are similar linguistic phenomena, the differences 
are twofold. First, they carry different connotations, with the term ‘EL’ seeming 
more positive and VL more negative. Second, they have different focuses: VL 
gives prominence to the uncertainty and under-specification of language, EL to 
its fluid and elastic nature”. 
Contrary to Zhang herself, I do not consider the differences important enough to classify 
vague and elastic language as different phenomena. The first reason she gives seems more 
of a rebranding – which may be understandable given that several authors mention the bad 
reputation of vagueness, but it does not in effect alter the content of the concept of this 
study. Zhangs second point seems more persuasive at first glance, but since she really does 
base her definition heavily on vague language, and as it merely accentuates the differences 
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to philosophical vagueness and indeterminacy that is already inherent in the concept of 
vague language, the difference is negligible for the purposes of this study. 
 
Hedge words 
The relationship between hedge words and vagueness is also quite complex. According 
to Lakoff (1973: 471), who coined the term, 
“some of the most interesting questions are raised by the study of words whose 
meaning implicitly involves fuzziness words whose job is to make things fuzzier 
or less fuzzy. I will refer to such words as ‘hedges’”. 
For him, hedges do seem to be words that convey vagueness. However, Zhang argues 
that hedging is not quite the same thing as vagueness. According to her, 
“VL and hedging may serve similar functions and purposes, but hedging can use 
language forms in addition to VL, while VL is not just about hedging but has many 
other functions” (Zhang 2015: 21). 
In this view, hedges and vague language are more like different circles that overlap to a 
certain extent. As with some of the other concepts discussed here, hedge words are 
nonetheless often used as indicators for vagueness. The question on which indicators are 
best used to measure vagueness is discussed in chapter 3. 
 
Indirectness and implicitness 
The Connection of vague language to these to phenomena stems from its focus on every-
day, spoken language. In the words of Searle indirectness is described as follows: 
“But notoriously, not all cases of meaning are this simple: In hints, insinuations, 
irony, and metaphor – to mention a few examples – the speaker’s utterance 
meaning and the sentence meaning come apart in various ways. One important 
class of such cases is that in which the speaker utters a sentence, means what he 
says, but also means something more. For example, a speaker may utter the 
sentence I want you to do it by way of requesting the hearer to do something. 
The utterance is incidentally meant as a statement, but it is also meant primarily 
as a request, a request made by way of making a statement. In such cases a 
sentence that contains the illocutionary force indicators for one kind of 
illocutionary act can be uttered to perform, IN ADDITION, another type of 
illocutionary act. There are also cases in which the speaker may utter a sentence 
and mean what he says and also mean another illocution with a different 
propositional content. For example, a speaker may utter the sentence Can you 
reach the salt? and mean it not merely as a question but a request to pass the 
salt” (Searle 1975: 59-60). 
The example above shows that indirect or implicit sentences can often be completely 
explained by their context, which is not the case with vague language. Cutting (2007a: 4) 
makes the difference explicit in the following quote: 
“First, I must differentiate between the terms ‘VL’ [vague language] and 
‘implicitness’. Studies of VL look at language that is inherently and intentionally 
imprecise, describing lexical and grammatical surface features themselves that 
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may refer either to specific entities or to nothing in particular. Studies of 
implicitness mention whole bodies of underlying meaning, and language 
dependent on context, based on unspoken assumptions and unstated meaning”. 
While she focusses on the intentionality of vague language, she also mentions context as 
a key difference. 
 
Uncertainty 
A last concept to discuss in relation to vague language is uncertainty. While it is not a 
linguistic concept, it can be a reason to use vague language. 
“Vagueness should be sharply differentiated from uncertainty, which is a distinct 
(though interacting) phenomenon. Uncertainty arises from lack of exact 
knowledge about an object or situation, and is thus an epistemic state rather 
than a feature of language” (Bennett 2001: 190). 
In other words, while speakers may use vague language to express uncertainty, the 
uncertainty is a reason for employing vague language, not vague language itself (see also 
Cheng/Warren 2001: 89). 
2.1.3 Indeterminacy 
The academic debate on Indeterminacy and its counterpart determinacy is controversial 
and often heated. It is therefore difficult to provide an account of their meaning without 
already adopting a theoretical direction. I will nevertheless attempt to at least clarify it 
enough to establish a common concept of what will be talked about here. 
As opposed to vagueness, indeterminacy – in the sense it is used in this thesis – is a legal 
concept, which is only applicable to legal situations. It has been the subject of academic 
debate because it touches on some of the core foundations on what law is and how it works, 
as well as the relationship between law and democracy. In the following, I will briefly outline 
what it means if a rule is indeterminate and what it means if a legal system is indeterminate, 
before moving on to disambiguate the concept from a few others it might be confused with. 
 
Indeterminacy of a rule 
A (legal) rule is determinate, if, when someone knows a rule, and also knows the 
circumstances of a case, they will then be able to determine with certainty whether the rule 
applies to the case or not. Any uncertainties come from insufficient information about either 
the rule or the case at hand, and can be eliminated by finding out that information. 
Indeterminacy means the opposite: if all relevant information is available and yet it is not 
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certain whether or not the rule applies to a certain case, the rule is indeterminate with 
regards to that case. Endicott (2001: 9) defines indeterminacy thus: 
“Legal theorists say that the law is indeterminate when a question of law, or of 
how the law applies to facts, has no single right answer”. 
While this may pose immediate and in some cases crucial problems – if one is on one side 
of a lawsuit and it is not clear what the law says about it, for example – it is still an issue 
which is localized to one or some specific rules, and could thus be dealt with on a case-by-
case basis. 
 
Indeterminacy of the law 
When it comes to the indeterminacy of an entire legal system, the problem gains a new 
dimension. Analogous to the premises of formal logic, law can easily be perceived as being 
bivalent (see Madry 1999: 581). Either an accused is guilty or she is not. Either a case falls 
under a certain legal provision or it does not. If indeterminacy is present, this bivalence is not 
possible anymore. 
In legal systems, the issue is even more complex because determinacy is often associated 
with normative conceptions on how law should be: predictability, coherence and objectivity 
are all values that legitimize the existence of law, and all of them are called into question if 
indeterminacy comes into play. The issue of indeterminacy of the law is further discussed in 
section 2.2. 
 
Indeterminacy vs. discretion 
Some legal texts include provisions that enable other actors to make decisions on some 
parts of the law. This can be called delegation or (judicial) discretion. While the outcome may 
seem to be the same, the theoretical implications of the two cases are very different. For 
one thing, this sort of intentional granting of discretion is easily preventable when unwanted: 
The law simply needs not to grant it. The difference is also sometimes perceived as the 
difference between legitimate (since expressly granted by a democratic institution which has 
the right to do so) and illegitimate decision-making power. 
 
Indeterminacy vs. contestability 
In modern legal systems, most rules do have an inherent contestability: appellate courts 
exists specifically for the purpose to solve problems arising when a legal rule – or the 
application of a legal rule to a case is contested. The claim that legal rules can be contested 
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is much less controversial than the claim that they can be indeterminate. In a way, every case 
that comes before the law is contested, at least by the two opposing lawyers. That in itself, 
however, would not undermine the responsibility and/or capability of the judge to find the 
one answer the law has determined. Besson makes the distinction that contestability refers 
to “normative disagreement, i.e. disagreement about the moral values underlying the law” 
(Besson 2005: 67). 
 
Indeterminacy vs. contradictions 
The difference between these two concepts are best thought of as the difference 
between source and outcome. Contradictions in law can be one source of indeterminacy: If 
two rules contradict each other, it is then indeterminate which one will be used, thus making 
the law indeterminate even if each rule by itself would be clear in the case at hand. For a 
discussion on contradictions in international agreements, see Ranganathan (2014). 
 
Indeterminacy vs. underdeterminacy 
Solum (2010: 480-1) distinguishes the three phenomena of determinacy, 
underdeterminacy and indeterminacy. 
“The law is determinate with respect to a given case if and only if the set of legally 
acceptable outcomes contains on and only one member. The law is 
underdeterminate with respect to a given case if and only if the set of legally 
acceptable outcomes is a nonidentical subset of the set of all possible results. The 
law is indeterminate with respect to a given case if the set of legally acceptable 
outcomes is identical with the set of all possible results”. 
This nomenclature is a little different from how the terms seem to be commonly used in 
the jurisprudential discourse. In fact, most authors call indeterminacy what Solum describes 
here as ‘underdeterminacy’. To keep with the dominant terminology, I will use the term 
‘indeterminacy’ to mean the second of Solum’s possibilities, and speak of ‘radical 
indeterminacy’ if I want to refer to the concept that Solum here calls indeterminacy. 
2.1.4 Comparing vagueness, vague language and indeterminacy 
After having given a brief overview on the three concepts central to this chapter, this 
section is meant to very shortly describe the relationship between vagueness, vague 
language, and indeterminacy. 
The relationship between vagueness and vague language has already been hinted at 
above and is relatively straightforward. I will understand vague language as the way in which 
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vagueness is expressed through language. Waldron (1994: 512) takes indeterminacy to be 
an umbrella term comprising ambiguity, vagueness and contestability. I agree with this 
definition only in part: As I have shown above, indeterminacy is a legal concept while 
vagueness is a linguistic or logic phenomenon. I take their relationship to be one of source 
and effect: when vague language is present in legal texts it can lead to indeterminacy of the 
legal outcome (for a similar argument, see Solum 2010). 
It is possible to imagine the three concepts as forming a simple variation on a Venn 
diagram8: 
 
Figure 1: Relationship of vagueness, indeterminacy, and vague language 
The intersection of vagueness and indeterminacy occurs when vague concepts cause a 
legal rule to be indeterminate. Vagueness can be expressed in vague language, and when 
vague language occurs in a legal setting this can in turn lead to indeterminacy. 
In this thesis, I am interested in the intersection of the three concepts: vagueness 
interests me in so far as it is a source of legal indeterminacy, and I focus specifically on those 
legal provisions whose (possible) indeterminacy is caused by vague formulations of language. 
Within the intersection of vagueness, indeterminacy, and vague language, I understand 
vagueness as an ontological9 phenomenon, indeterminacy as that vagueness directly related 
                                                          
8 See Venn 1880:6, here called Eulerian circle. It is a variation because I want the mental image to 
signify not that in the cases of interest here, vagueness is indeterminacy, but simply that there 
occurrence overlaps. 
9 As explained in section 1.1.1, while there is a large philosophical difference between understanding 
vagueness as an ontological or epistemological phenomenon, the distinction actually does not matter 
in the context of this thesis. Whether the world itself is vague or vagueness stems from our incomplete 
understanding of it, the consequence when vagueness enters our consciousness is still the same.  
Vagueness
Vague 
LanguageIndeterminacy
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to the propositional content of legal norms and provisions, and vague language as linguistic 
means and language features through which this vagueness is expressed. This intersection 
includes some of the most interesting features of all three phenomena. 
The relationship is also invoked by Endicott (2001: 1) when he explains why he focusses 
on vagueness in his book: 
“The reason for that focus is that vagueness is a paradigmatic source of 
indeterminacy in law, and a very important source. Along with express grants of 
discretion and Conventions giving judges power to develop the law, it is one of 
the most important sources of judicial discretion. And unlike other sources of 
indeterminacy such as ambiguity, it is a necessary feature of law”. 
In the remainder of this chapter, it is not possible to exclusively focus on the 
indeterminacy in law that is caused by vagueness, or expressed in vague language, simply 
because some theorists important for the discussion and exploration of indeterminacy base 
their accounts mainly or in part on other sources. However, I will take note in particular of 
those who combine the ideas. 
2.2 Indeterminacy debate 
In this section of the paper, I will attempt to present a debate on indeterminacy in legal 
philosophy. In order to make the complex debate more easily accessible, I will use this 
section to present two rather extreme – but nonetheless important – positions at the ends 
of the indeterminacy debate. Each of them will start with a simplistic caricature to outline 
the general direction of the argument before adding in the complexities which make them 
actual arguments proposed by academics. Each section is followed by a discussion of the 
problems and inconsistencies the respective positons face. This should outline the general 
scope of the debate, as well as show the main arguments under contention. 
During this and the next section, it is useful to keep in mind two key questions which are 
asked and answered in some way or another by all the authors discussed here: Is there 
indeterminacy in the law? And, if indeterminacy is present, what kind of consequences does 
that have for the concept of law? The range of possible answers to question one spans from 
‘no, none’ over ‘some’ and ‘sometimes’ to ‘yes, always’. For the second question, answers 
range from ‘indeterminacy, if it exists, has no relevant consequences on the law as such’ to 
‘if law is indeterminate, it is illegitimate and self-defeating. Indeterminacy is a fatal flaw for 
all legal systems’. Authors can potentially be arranged on a coordinate plane according to 
where on the spectrum their answers to these questions fall. 
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To understand the controversial and heated character of the debate, it is very important 
to keep in mind that the question of indeterminacy in law is almost always accompanied by 
normative consideration. As Kress (1989: 285) so succinctly puts it: “Indeterminacy matters 
because legitimacy matters.” 
2.2.1 There is no vagueness in the law: formalism and the ‘Right Answer 
Thesis’ 
On one extreme of what has been called the ‘Indeterminacy Debate’10, Dworkin maintains 
that law is completely determinate, and that each legal case has only one right answer. One 
of the cornerstones of this argument is made in his 1963 essay ‘Judicial Discretion’. The 
caricature of his argument is provided by himself: 
“To the layman a lawsuit or a trial is an event in which a judge determines a 
controversy by application of established principles, rather than new principles 
invented to dispose of the case. He knows that individual judges may fail this 
ideal of justice; but he believes such failures to be aberrations, their occurrence 
marking injustice rather than its opposite. To him judges should and in general 
do, in the words of the admittedly metaphorical maxim, find the law and not 
make it. The layman’s respect for law is founded in large part on his view that 
this is a fair method of deciding controversies” (Dworkin 1963: 624). 
The view that the law consists of a system of rules that only need to be mechanically 
applied by a judge – who functions essentially like a judging machine – has been called ‘vulgar 
formalism’ and “it is not a view to which anyone today cares to subscribe” (Leiter 2010: 111). 
But while Dworkin rejects the argument such as described above, according to him “the 
layman’s opinion, while deceptive insofar as it may suggest that adjudication is simple, is, so 
far as it goes, closer to the truth” (Dworkin 1963: 625). 
Before delving straight into his argument, I would like to note three important areas he 
excepts from this early version of his argument: decisions of the supreme court, what 
happens when judges are explicitly granted discretion by the law, and most interestingly and 
problematically, the question of interpretation of the facts of the case – i.e. whether or not 
judges may or do interpret and how much information the can have about the case they are 
applying their rules and standards to (Dworkin 1963: FN 6). 
That said, Dworkins argument proceeds by first distinguishing rules from standards. Rules 
are like game rules, and like the legal rules imagined by the layman invoked above: rigid, 
hopefully clear, only certain events are touched by rules, and if two rules conflict, there is no 
                                                          
10 For example by D’Amato 2010 (189), or Solum 2010 (481). 
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real resolution to the dilemma because rules aren’t weighted (Dworkin 1963: 629). 
Standards, according to Dworkin, are another matter. Anything may become of relevance 
under a standard, and most importantly, they do have relative weight – although that weight 
is often a matter of current public opinion. (Dworkin 1963: 632) He states: 
“My purpose thus far has been to challenge the unarticulated premise of the 
argument from hard cases: the assumption that the only true standards are rules 
and that, if the explanations given by judges in hard cases are to be regarded as 
standards at all, they must be regarded as rules manques, deteriorated versions 
which cannot be applied without a measure of discretion. I suggest, although I 
cannot here demonstrate, that hard eases are decided in law, as in Policies, by 
the application of standards other than rules” (Dworkin 1963: 634). 
He does acknowledge the complexity of the decision-making process, but nonetheless 
contends that while this makes the job of the people charged with applying the law harder, 
it neither absolves them from the responsibility to find the right answer, nor does it deny the 
possibility of doing so (1975: 1082). An important point shining through in Dworkins work is 
that although laws as expressed in language will be vague – since language can sometimes 
be vague – but there are other sources of law that are actually independent from language, 
which can provide the formerly missing clarity. Therefore, vagueness in the language need 
not lead to indeterminacy in the law. 
The legal reasoning required from the judge allows him or her to draw from three types 
of public standards (as opposed to private prejudice, which would turn their legitimate 
decision-making process into illegitimate choosing). Old sources are standards which “have 
already been used in a variety of cases” (635). New sources mean standards introduced by 
competent institutions of the community. Dworkin goes on: 
“But [the judge] must sometimes recognize a third source: judgments of the 
community at large or some identifiable segment thereof. The court refers to 
such judgments when it rejects a particular result or rule as unjust, as well as 
when it more explicitly invokes the ideals of the society. To acknowledge this 
source is not to say that all legal standards must be popular, for it is only one 
source; nor to say that widespread community opinion must become law, for 
other standards may conflict which must prevail. There are two crucial questions 
that any society must face as to this source of law: How great a consensus is 
required before partisan position becomes community judgment? Shall any 
segment of the community be competent, on the basis of special interest, special 
ability, or special privilege, to form standards for the whole?” (Dworkin 1963: 
635-636). 
The core of Dworkin’s thesis is not only descriptive, but also normative. He claims that 
legal doctrine must be determinate because the people bound by the law have the right to 
a right answer. In an example invoking the imagined judge Hercules, he illustrates his ideal 
version of adjudication: 
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“He knows that the question he must decide is the question of the parties’ 
institutional rights. He knows that if he decides wrongly, as he would do if he 
followed the ordinary man’s lead, he cheats the parties of what they are entitled 
to have” (Dworkin 1975: 1108). 
It is plain that this ‘rights thesis’ is a normative statement, although it is not always 
completely distinct from the descriptive claims Dworkin makes. The normative nature of his 
project becomes even more apparent when he concludes his 1963 paper by admonishing 
the reader: 
“The layman’s conception of law depends upon the principle that the judge is 
never entitled to offer private prejudice rather than public standards as 
justification. If the profession and the public should be led on the one hand not 
to attempt, and on the other not to expect, adherence to this principle in difficult 
cases, that conception would be defeated. The misdescription in question is 
dangerous because it has the power to correct itself, by changing the thing 
described” (Dworkin 1963: 638). 
To critically assess – and ultimately reject – Dworkins thesis, I will develop a fourfold 
argument: I contend that while Dworkin talks about indeterminacy, he ultimately ignores 
vagueness. I also argue that his account creates an epistemological problem which he does 
not sufficiently address. On more of a side note, a critical critique of his argument could read 
that he treats rationality as a completely uncontested concept. A fourth and final 
problematic aspect is the reliance his argument places on the collective identity of the 
community under the legal system in question. 
Even though his arguments are about indeterminacy, Dworkin ignores the paradox of the 
heap that vagueness creates. The problem is not that the law does not attempt to be 
determinate, the problem is, that since it is based in language, it can never be completely 
determinate because all vague concepts are susceptible to the Sorites Paradox and all 
language contains at least some vague concepts (or, some might argue, all concepts 
expressed in language are vague)11. When invoking the proposition that standards, unlike 
rules, can be weighed against each other, he fails to acknowledge the twin problems of 
immensurability and incommensurability as described above. 
When Dworkin talks about ‘very hard cases’, he contends 
“Judges often acknowledge decisions to be hard, and sometimes, though usually 
extracurricularly, admit that some decisions are based on ‘guesses’ or ‘hunches’. 
I understand such a judge to mean that at times he believes one decision to be 
the right decision, but has difficulty in stating his reasons for so believing and has 
no great confidence that such reasons would convince others. This does not mean 
that he has abandoned the attempt to reach the right decision and is now simply 
reporting his personal preference” (Dworkin 1963: 637). 
                                                          
11 See discussion on ontological versus epistemic vagueness in section 2.1.1. 
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If no one, not even the judge himself, can know whether a decision made is ‘the’ right 
decision, how does this differ in practice from judicial discretion (and legal indeterminacy)? 
In a way, Dworkin here lets what he believes normatively right take over the description of 
what happens in reality. 
One interesting point to keep in mind, that I will come back to in the next chapter, is that 
for a lot of his analysis, Dworkin seems to imply a strong collective identity, in the sense that 
he posits 
“[Even when his decision is difficult or debatable, the iudex] intends his reasoning 
to be based on public, not private, standards of good argument, and the 
community receives and criticizes his decision on that basis” (Dworkin 1963: 632, 
see also page 635). 
This is one of the features which plays an even greater role in the international sphere 
than the national one, because the existence, and even the possibility of an international or 
global collective identity remains highly contested.12 
2.2.2 All law is vague: radical indeterminacy and the Critical Legal 
Studies 
On the other side of the debate, academics belonging to the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) 
are often said to defend an argument of radical indeterminacy. I hope to show in the 
following that while their conclusions may be radical, the indeterminacy thesis they purport 
actually is not as fundamental as it may seem. However, even though I found no one actually 
making the claim, the radical indeterminacy thesis is an interesting thought experiment in its 
own right. 
Endicott (2001: 7) writes that the law is radically indeterminate if “no question of the 
application of a linguistic expression has a single right answer”. He rejects the claim of radical 
indeterminacy, but more interestingly, he also proposes that no one actually makes that 
claim. Solum goes even further: as we have seen above, he claims that “[t]he law is 
indeterminate with respect to a given case if the set of legally acceptable outcomes is 
identical with the set of all possible results” (2010: 481). This last formulation, I think, is the 
one that goes too far even for the proponents of the critical indeterminacy claim. 
This ‘Indeterminacy claim’ tends to be part of a broader deconstructivist/critical agenda: 
most articles are not exclusively or predominantly concerned with legal indeterminacy, but 
                                                          
12 See e.g. Greenhill 2008: 251, critically Abizadeh 2005. 
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use it as only one of several examples for logical inconsistencies and legitimacy issues in the 
law. 
The closest formulation to the radical indeterminacy argument – the one that is usually 
cited to illustrate it – comes from David Kairys (1983: 244). He writes: 
“The starting point of critical theory is that legal reasoning does not provide 
concrete, real answers to particular legal or social problems. Legal reasoning is 
not a method or process that leads reasonable, competent and fair-minded 
people to particular results in particular cases”. 
It is perhaps not surprising that this strong statement has incited debate, even though it 
still falls short of what Endicott (2001:7) defined as radical indeterminacy above. The 
following summary of the critical agenda by Singer (1984: 5) is slightly more cautious: 
“Those of us associated with Critical Legal Studies believe that the law is not 
apolitical and objective: Lawyers, judges, and scholars make highly controversial 
political choices, but use the ideology of legal reasoning to make our institutions 
appear natural and our rules appear neutral. This view of the legal system raises 
the possibility that there are no rational, objective criteria that can govern how 
we describe that system, or how we chose governmental institutions, or how we 
make legal decisions”. 
However, when looking specifically at his indeterminacy argument, he is certainly on the 
same page with Kairys. It reads like this: 
“[W]e have shown that legal reasoning is indeterminate and contradictory. By its 
own criteria, legal reasoning cannot resolve legal questions in an “objective” 
manner; nor can it explain how the legal system works or how judges decide 
cases. [...] If legal reasoning is internally contradictory and therefore 
indeterminate, there are no objective limits on what judges or other government 
officials can do” (Singer 1984: 6-7). 
These sweeping statements need a bit of unpacking to fully understand and appreciate 
them, as well as to show how they fit into the problems posed by vagueness and 
indeterminacy. 
According to Singer, 
“A legal theory or a legal rule is determinate if it tells us what to do. A completely 
determinate theory or rule will leave us no choice; a relatively determinate theory 
or rule will constrain our choices, more or less narrowly, within boundaries. The 
claim that a legal doctrine is indeterminate means that the doctrine allows choice 
rather than constraining or compelling it” (Singer 1984: 11). 
He goes on to identify four criteria legal doctrine13 must fulfil to be completely 
determinate: Comprehensiveness, consistency, directivity and self-revision (1984: 14). He 
continues to go through the criteria and explains why legal doctrine habitually meets none 
                                                          
13 Legal doctrine is defined by Singer (1984: 11) as including both legal rules and arguments, including 
standards and principles. I will use the term in the same way in the course of this thesis. 
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of them. It is important to note that much of the indeterminacy Singer identifies does not 
have its root in vagueness. When he invokes the concept (without clearly distinguishing 
between vagueness and ambiguity), he also seems to be referring more to the common uses 
of the terms (like generality and incompleteness) instead of the technical sense laid out 
above. 
Crucially he also clearly distinguishes ‘indeterminacy’ from ‘arbitrariness’, which is how 
the argument is often understood by critics of the Critical Legal Studies. 
“Indeterminacy does not mean that the choices that are made by individuals are 
arbitrary or capricious. It also does not mean that all outcomes are equally likely 
to be considered or chosen by the decisionmaker [sic]. The indeterminacy of 
arguments is logically distinct from the arbitrariness of choices [....] Saying that 
decision-making is both indeterminate and nonarbitrary simply means that we 
can explain judicial decisions only by reference to criteria outside the scope of the 
judge’s formal justifications” (Singer 1984: 20). 
This comment highlights the crucial distinction between legally inherent context and 
extra-legal context. Dworkin’s argument above was not that legal determinacy depends 
exclusively on the written text of laws, but that the determinacy of them comes from 
circumstances which are inherent in the legal system and through and with it legitimized. 
The difference in position here is that Singer explicitly includes in the decision-making 
process of the judge what Dworkin calls private prejudice. 
This then has effects on the predictability of legal outcomes, which also no longer 
depends on the notion of legal reasoning, but simply on personal convictions and patterns 
of behaviour. “Custom, rather than reason, narrows the choices and suggests the result” 
(Singer 1984: 25), or, in other words: 
“Legal doctrines are always potentially indeterminate. Judges can move the line 
between rules and exceptions. [...] Ultimately, judges always have the power to 
revise rules. That judges may do these things, however, does not mean they will 
do them. Because judges participate in a legal culture that suggests how they are 
to act as judges, we can often predict how they will act” (Singer 1984: 22). 
In contrast to the above straw version of the argument, however, Singer does not actually 
claim that all legal doctrine is radically indeterminate, but rather that what he calls traditional 
legal theorists need too much determinacy in the law for their theories to be consistent. 
“Legal doctrine is far more indeterminate than traditional theorists realize it is. If 
traditional legal theorists are correct about the importance of determinacy to the 
rule of law, then – by their own criteria – the rule of law has never existed 
anywhere. This is the real bite of the critique” (Singer 1984: 14). 
Here it can be seen that the indeterminacy thesis actually put forward by CLS scholars is 
not actually as radical as it may seem at first glance with regards to the actual indeterminacy 
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of law. For the critique to work, law does not need to be so indeterminate as to be senseless, 
nor does all law need to be indeterminate in all cases. In fact, Kennedy (1997: 169) argues 
that the proposition that law is determinate or indeterminate only makes sense with regards 
to a specific case, in a specific context. However, context dependence alone is not the 
solution to the critical indeterminacy problem, as Peller points out here: 
“One response to the inadequacy of author’s intent as a source of meaning is to 
conclude that meaning is contextual and can be determined by specifying the 
context of a text. This approach supposes that the context “exists” around the 
text, to be discovered by the interpreter as the source for the meaning of the text. 
But the problems of indeterminacy are not avoided by this approach. Any 
attempt to fix the meaning of a text by the specification of context runs up 
against the problem that any given context is open to further description. Context 
does not exist somewhere. Context is constructed by the interpreter according to 
her calculus of relevance and irrelevance. A particular description of the context 
involves screening the text through representational terms used by the 
interpreter” (1985: 1173). 
Peller here points out quite a large flaw in the attempt to solve the indeterminacy debate 
by contextualization. Since the relevant context is as liable to differing interpretations as the 
text itself, the question of which bits of context to take into account will become all the more 
difficult the more indeterminate the law itself is. 
It is easy to show in which way the most radical version of the indeterminacy claim falls 
short. Solum does it by finding simply one case in which one outcome of a specific case is 
definitely not legal (2010: 482). Endicott (2001: 10) goes another route when he says that 
radical indeterminacy claims about language are nonsensical, since they ultimately apply to 
themselves as well, meaning that the claim ‘no language has any kind of determinate 
meaning’ is nonsensical in and of itself, because as soon as someone can understand what it 
says, it has been proven false. 
Arguments put forward by most proponents of CLS are much harder to criticize 
substantially within the scope of this thesis, because their argument relies on much more 
than indeterminacy caused by linguistic vagueness. Luckily, however, there is also no need: 
if the critical argument is not that language (and with it, law), is radically indeterminate, and 
thus completely meaningless, then the problem on which legal provisions are clear and which 
are indeterminate – and to what degree – is as relevant as ever. As it turns out, the radicalism 
of the critical argument seems to lie not in absolute indeterminacy but in their critique of the 
existing legal doctrines. 
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2.2.3 Looking for the middle ground 
After I have shown the determinacy claim by Dworkin and the supposed ‘radical’ 
indeterminacy claim often attributed to CLS, I now turn to more moderate versions of the 
argument. Specifically, I will discuss the Core/Penumbra distinction introduced by Hart 
(1961: 123), and then show some of the debate on the differences between law and 
language, which is evidently of particular interest in the context of this study. 
 
The core/penumbra distinction 
Postema (2011: 226) identifies several axes along which indeterminacy claims may be 
more or less accurate: they can be global (meaning touching all areas of law) or local in scope, 
they can be limited or radical in their indeterminacy (touching on the difference between 
underdeterminacy and indeterminacy pointed out by Solum in section 1.2.2.5), and they can 
be counter-factual or narrow in relation to their imminence: counterfactual indeterminacy 
claims hold even “when [law] is determinate under existing conditions, if it would become 
indeterminate, if certain (relevant) conditions, supposed to be external to the law itself, were 
to change” (Postema 2011: 226). In this section, I will mainly be concerned with the limited 
versions of indeterminacy, because this is the one where the phenomenon of vagueness are 
most relevant and it is also the main focus of the existing debate. 
Most famously, Hart (1961: 123) suggested the idea of a ‘core of certainty’ and a 
‘penumbra of doubt’. He starts by describing the premise that law based on precedents is 
indeterminate, while law based on general rules is determinate to a much higher degree. He 
then sets out to dismantle the distinction: 
“Much of the jurisprudence of this century has consisted of the progressive 
realization (and sometimes exaggeration) of the important fact that the 
distinction between the uncertainties of communication by authoritative 
example (precedent), and the certainties of communication by authoritative 
general language (legislation) is far less firm than this naive contrast suggests. 
Even when verbally formulated general rules are used, uncertainties as to the 
form of behaviour required by them may break out in particular concrete cases” 
(Hart 1961: 123). 
Already, he makes clear how indeterminacy in law is inseparably interwoven with the 
language it is expressed in. His position on the issue gets even clearer as he continues: 
“In all fields of experience, not only that of rules, there is a limit, inherent in the 
nature of language, to the guidance which general language can provide. There 
will be plain cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to which general 
expressions were clearly applicable … but there will also be cases where it is not 
clear whether they apply or not” (Hart 1961: 123). 
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He then goes on to make the well-known assertion that rules have a ‘core of certainty’ 
(123) and a ‘penumbra of doubt’ (123). Explaining the former, he makes an interesting 
observation on the dependence of rules on the social context they are conceived in: 
“the plain case, where the general terms seem to need no interpretation and 
where the recognition of instances seems unproblematic or ‘automatic’, are only 
the familiar ones, constantly recurring in similar contexts, where there is general 
agreement in judgements as to the applicability of the classifying terms” (Hart 
1961: 123). 
However, Harts deliberations on vagueness in the law do not stop at the positive level. 
He ascribes a normative value to vagueness, possibly in response to widespread 
understandings that all uncertainty in law undermines it legitimacy: (“Put shortly, the reason 
is that the necessity for such choice is thrust upon us because we are men, not gods” (Hart 
1961: 125)). Complete determinacy is impossible, but also normatively undesirable, because 
of ‘ignorance of fact’ and ‘indeterminacy of aim’. Trying to formulate exact laws as a ‘vice’ 
(126), arguing for balanced approach (127), according to varying degree of possibility to 
predict future in different areas. 
Hart even touches on the existence of higher-order vagueness: 
“Canons of ‘interpretation’ cannot eliminate, though they can diminish, these 
uncertainties; for these canons are themselves general rules for the use of 
language, and make use of general terms which themselves require 
interpretation” (Hart 1961: 123). 
This is the level of detail he goes into on this subject though, so the more intricate 
complexities of the phenomenon remain somewhat unclear in his work. 
Greenawalt (1992: 34) formulates his own version of the indeterminacy claim in the 
following way: 
“many legal questions have determinate answers that (1) would be arrived at by 
virtually all those with an understanding of the legal system, and (2) are 
unopposed by powerful arguments, consonant with the premises of the system, 
for contrary results”. 
While this version is certainly not contradictory to a moderate indeterminacy thesis, the 
emphasis clearly lies on the argument that actually, most legal rules are ‘determinate 
enough’ for all practical accounts. 
Endicott equally endorses a ‘middle position’ in the question of whether law is 
indeterminate or not. But he also offers a more nuanced perspective on the desirability of 
indeterminacy in the law. 
“We cannot say in general that even a very vague legal rule represents a deficit 
in the rule of law. But vagueness is a deficit when it enables authorities to exempt 
their actions from the reason of the law, or when it makes it impossible to 
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conceive of the law as having any reason distinguishable from the will of the 
officials” (Endicott 2001: 5). 
According to an argument he makes in a 2005 article, it is the not the vagueness, but the 
arbitrariness of a norm that has to be minimized. There have to be clear reasons why a norm 
should be obeyed, and with implemented and accepted norms, these reasons are inherent 
in the norm itself. The interesting part is that according to him, arbitrariness can in some 
cases be reduced by vagueness, while other cases are better served with precise norms. This 
perspective is interesting because it elevates vagueness above the status of a necessary evil 
to a feature of law with a value of its own. According to his argument, precision has guidance 
value (i.e. the advantage of people knowing exactly what they are allowed to or have to do) 
and process value, which means that executives of the law also are bound by precise 
standards they cannot bend according to their own preferences. Vagueness, on the other 
hand, has what Endicott calls private ordering value, meaning that people can judge on their 
own whether or not it is reasonable for them to apply a certain law, power allocation value, 
which enables law enforcers and judges to execute a law in a way corresponding to its 
purpose, and fidelity value, which designates the capacity to regulate issues that are 
impossible to order through precise provisions (Endicott 2005: 45). 
 
The differences between law and language 
One more recent area of investigation within the context of the indeterminacy debate 
concerns the relationship between law and the language the law is written in. 
Schauer (2011) asks whether there is an extra quality of indeterminacy – different from 
the vagueness or open texture of all language – in the law. He comes to the conclusion that 
“The open texture of language thus produces open texture in law, but this 
conclusion is neither startling nor particularly interesting. Insofar as language is 
open-textured, it follows that any use of language is pro tanto open-textured. 
Law is thus open-textured, but so too are novels, theatrical productions, everyday 
conversations, restaurant menus, and the instructions I give to the automobile 
mechanic” (Schauer 2011: 7-8). 
He does not convincingly, or indeed at all, make the case why, to be of interest, legal 
indeterminacy must be different from the linguistic one. On the one hand, I disagree that 
there is no indeterminacy of law which, in Schauer’s words, “exist[s] within the area of 
linguistic determinacy” (2011: 14). The fact that far from all of the indeterminacy invoked by 
the arguments of Dworkin and the CLS described above is linguistic should be a first hint in 
that direction. Endicott goes even further when he proposes (though later comes to reject 
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the position) that legal indeterminacy may be completely detached from linguistic 
vagueness: 
“But once Hart admits the distinction between the application of the words of a 
rule and the application of the rule, he seems to have conceded what Dworkin 
claims. Given the distinction, it seems that no claim about indeterminacy in the 
law follows from the vagueness of, for example, ‘serious distress’. Linguistic 
indeterminacy does not entail legal indeterminacy” (Endicott 2010: 163). 
But even more interestingly, even if we were to accept Schauer’s proposition, that would 
not make indeterminacy uninteresting for legal theory. Because law has certain features that 
distinguish it from general language, and those make the vagueness inherent in all language 
more problematic when it is found in legal texts. The consequences can be very different. 
Even though all language is performative, legal language is so in a very immediate way (see 
section 4.2.2 for further discussion of this). That is to say, even if the indeterminacy of law 
and language were the same, the consequences of this indeterminacy would still very likely 
be extremely different. As Liebwald (2012: 392) observes: “Unlike every day conversation, 
the impact of vagueness in law is a different one, due to the legally binding force and the 
associated legal consequences.” 
Solum (2010) strikes at the heart of this issue when he talks about the 
interpretation/construction distinction. He distinguishes semantic content from legal effect 
(2011: 111) and points out the differences between the two concepts. According to him, 
language can be interpreted, while legal effect must always be constructed. There are 
certainly cases when semantic and legal content overlap: these cases are then seen as 
determinate, or ‘easy’ cases. But “[w]hen a legal provision is vague, then semantic content 
underdetermines legal content.” (Solum 2010: 117). 
2.3 Conclusion: the importance of vagueness for legal theory 
As I have shown in his chapter, legal theories on indeterminacy are concerned with very 
global, absolute problems. Theorists and philosophers are asking deep questions about the 
nature and legitimacy of all law. But when it comes to a head, and I have successfully 
established, that yes, vagueness exists in (any) legal system, and no, the legal system is not 
utterly undermined and delegitimized by this fact, the question now becomes: so what? If 
vagueness is an inevitable fact of (legal) language, but does not fatally hurt the system, why 
think about it at all? 
Here we come to a set of smaller questions concerned with the role of vagueness *within* 
more or less functioning legal systems. I argue that while no legal system can ever be 
completely vague (then it would not exist at all) or completely determinate, legal systems as 
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well as legal rules or provisions can vary in the degree to which they are vague. And these 
differences, with which the empirical part of this thesis will concern itself, can have 
important consequences, even if they are below the level of ‘complete loss of legitimacy’ 
that was so often invoked in the arguments this chapter is concerned with. But while the 
exposition in this chapter is first and foremost meant to provide a conceptual background 
and some context for the empirical questions addressed below, I do think that they, too, 
could profit from a confrontation with empirical studies even though these are by necessity 
much more limited in scope. I will provide at least some insights into which theoretical 
assumptions are supported or made more plausible by my empirical findings, and perhaps 
suggest a small alteration in some cases. 
3 The IR perspective: why is there vagueness in international 
agreements? 
In this chapter, I will discuss the causal assumptions that have been made by scholars in 
the field of IR about the effects and causes of vagueness in international agreements. In order 
to do so, I will first briefly sketch some aspects of the setting in which such agreements are 
made. I will not cover any of these topics in all their scope and complexity, as this would by 
far exceed the possibilities of this thesis. Instead, I will focus on those aspects that affect the 
causal assumptions made about vagueness which I will describe and assess in detail in the 
second part of this chapter. I will show that they can only be assessed in any meaningful way 
by putting them in their respective theoretical contexts. While I borrow from several IR 
theories in this chapter, the central focus lies on Regime Theory. It is well suited to provide 
the main theoretical framework of this thesis because it emphasises actor’s interests and the 
dynamics of cooperation. I see regimes as constituted by and providing a background for the 
international agreements whose language I analyse in the context of the dissertation.  
This chapter is aimed at two things: First, give an overview over the literature that has 
touched on the topic of vagueness in the field of IR and IL, and place it in a wider theoretical 
context. Second, I intend to show that (1) there are numerous important assumptions made 
about the vagueness in international agreements which (2) cannot be embraced or refused 
if it is unclear when a legal document is actually vague or not. While the postulated causes 
and effects of vagueness are diverse, they all have in common that in order to sustain or 
refute them, it must be possible to compare the vagueness of treaty texts. 
35 
 
This chapter proceeds in two steps. First, I provide contextual background in four different 
areas: characteristics of regimes, the two parts of the international legal process – 
negotiation or the making of IL and its implementation, mechanisms and functions of IL as 
well as the different characteristics of rules. After a brief note on causality and some remarks 
about the normativity of vagueness apparent in much of the literature, I then proceed to 
discuss causes and effects of vagueness as proposed in the relevant literature. I conclude by 
putting the causal claims in the broader context of this dissertation. 
3.1 Providing context for international agreements 
This section is aimed at providing theoretical background in four different areas essential 
to the understandings of causal claims about vagueness in IR. Regimes provide the 
conceptual framework in which international agreements are written. The twin processes of 
negotiating and implementing – and therefore interpreting – international legal agreements 
produce and use the agreements. Understanding them can provide critical insights into 
which, and why, language features in them. A broader picture on how IL works is necessary 
to understand the effects that vagueness may have on it. Finally, rules themselves have a 
particular relationship to language – and therefore to vagueness – which will be touched on 
briefly. 
3.1.1 Regimes 
Regime theory tries to explain why and how cooperation in the international system 
emerges. The question of how to define regimes has not been uncontroversial. Krasner 
(1982: 186) understands regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations”. Hasenclever et al (1996: 178) have argued that the phrase around 
which actors’ expectations converge does not describe how we can identify a regime in a 
given issue-area and identify three different approaches to do so. According to Keohane 
(1993: 26-29), regimes should be treated as existent if an explicit rule is agreed upon by 
actors and is embodied in a formal treaty or document. Regardless of the exact definition, 
all of these authors argue that regimes establish and shape the context in which international 
agreements are negotiated, adopted, and implemented. Therefore, they play an important 
role in understanding these agreements. 
In the following, I will illustrate some characteristics of regimes. While it is impossible 
here to summarize the enormous amount of literature on regimes inside and outside of 
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regime theory, I will draw attention to some of the characteristics central to international 
regimes which provide pertinent background to the causal assumptions made about 
vagueness in international agreements. In particular, I will briefly outline issues related to 
the stability and development of regimes over time, their inherent complexity, their issue 
specificity, the role regimes play in providing forums for communication and the sharing of 
information as well as the specific problems they face with regard to principal-agent issues. 
 
Regime Development 
Once regimes have been established, one characteristic which distinguishing them from 
other forms of state cooperation is their continuity over time. Hasenclever et al. (1997: 185) 
claim that one of the basic functions of international regimes is that they “stabilize mutual 
expectations”. According to liberal theorists, that is one of their main assets: By rendering 
any form of cooperation into a repeated pattern, the incentive to cooperate grows as trust 
is built and the potential of defections becomes more easily detect- and punishable. 
According to game theoretic models, (indefinitely) repeated interaction solves many central 
problems like the prisoner’s dilemma (Goldsmith/Posner 1999: 1125). By institutionalizing 
interactions, transaction costs are reduced as the amount of information that has to be 
collected and reviewed before each decision to cooperate decreases (Keohane 1982: 339). 
The continuity of regimes also has other, sometimes less intentional effects. For one, once 
issues become institutionalized, they develop dynamics of their own. Levy et al. (1995: 287) 
get to the heart of this effect when they write 
“We can show that once established, regimes display a persistence and 
robustness that cannot be explained fully in terms of the conditions under which 
they formed in the first place”. 
Additionally, repeated interaction may become normative in character over time: 
“Patterned behavior, originally generated purely by considerations of interest or 
power, has a strong tendency to lead to shared expectations. Patterned behavior 
accompanied by shared expectations is likely to become infused with normative 
significance: actions based purely on instrumental calculations can come to be 
regarded as rule-like or principled behavior” (Krasner 1982: 202). 
Since every institution has an interest in persisting, there is a lot of incentive to stabilize 
and expand the existing communication and actions taken within the system (Levy et al. 
1995: 290). 
A related, but distinct consequence of the longstanding nature of regimes is that they 
develop to be seen as institutions in their own right by the public. The accountability 
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becomes at least slightly removed from the individual participating states towards the 
regime itself, including all news coverage and PR questions. In that way, regimes can both 
spiral out of the control of their principals (see Zürn et al. 2006: 11) or become a smokescreen 
for inaction on the part of their member states. At the same time, this dynamic can be 
beneficial for the solving of issues the regime is supposed to address. 
A third feature concerns the timing of progress – or measures taken in regimes – over 
time. For Setear, regimes have the advantage of adding stability to state interactions by 
making repeated, institutionalized exchanges possible. He discusses the specific case of the 
‘Convention-Protocol approach’, stating 
“an initial “convention” identifies the subject matter of the relevant discussions, 
creates an administrative and procedural machinery, and sets forth vague 
substantive principles to guide future negotiations. In later treaties (the 
“protocols”), the parties, under the general framework erected by the 
convention, undertake the specific obligations that constitute significant limits 
on their behavior” (1996:84). 
He also gives reasons for the effectiveness of this approach: 
“In the framework conventions, the parties therefore Seek [sic] a cooperative 
solution to a problem with respect to which they have not cooperated much 
previously. The evolution of cooperation in international relations does not occur 
overnight, and the unfamiliarity of the issue area may mean that the substantive 
outlines of a solution are unclear–especially when the scientific or engineering 
information underlying rational policymaking is absent or rapidly changing” 
(Setear 1996: FN 316). 
These examples show that regimes develop and change over time, affecting the 
interactions and behaviours of their members in the process. 
 
Complexity 
Another feature of international regimes is their complexity (Young 1982: 278). It results 
not only from the often large number of member states, but also from the range of issues 
discussed. Krasner (1982: 196) illustrates that complexity can be both a cause and a 
consequence for regimes, which are “designed to manage complexity and complexity 
increases with interconnectedness”. 
While regimes are organizationally separated from other thematic issues, its member 
states are not – and it is not unusual that conflict between states originating elsewhere will 
also have a bearing on the regime (for a discussion on the complexities of intersecting 
international regimes, see Alter/Meunier 2007). The Complexity of regimes often surpasses 
the ability of individual negotiators to overview all at once. From this fact can arise 
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interesting dynamics none of the participants could have foreseen. As Young (1982: 287) 
puts it, 
“In very large systems, it is hard for the participants to play a meaningful role in 
the negotiation of regimes, and eventually even the idea of explicit consent will 
begin to lose significance”. 
Therefore, the issue of complexity also relates to the question of unintentional outcomes 
of international negotiations. Even assuming a high degree of rationality among negotiators, 
which of course is the case from several, but by no means all theoretical perspectives, 
complexity can lead to consequences – and treaty formulations – unintended by any of the 
negotiators. Additionally, it creates problems for states with less resources – both in 
personnel and in finances – because to try and keep track of all the issues and under–issues 
experts may be needed in many fields at once. 
 
Issue Specificity 
One of the core characteristics of the current systems of international regimes is that they 
are issue specific. According to Levy et al. (1995: 291): “International regimes commonly 
emerge in response to particular problems”. 
This creates an interesting governmental structure, because when different regimes issue 
conflicting legislation, there is no clear legal way of deciding which rule has precedence. The 
growing importance of issue-specific regimes has led to the international legal structure 
being described as fragmented (see for example Dupuy 1999: 792 and Fischer-
Lescano/Teubner 2004). This issue may be amplified by the fact that membership in regimes 
can vary – even though there is substantial overlap, not all states are represented in each 
regime and thus outcomes can vary even more widely. In practice, certain regimes are 
usually given precedence and others will then amend their provisions accordingly. Still, 
conflicting legislations can potentially exist for a long time until the discrepancies are noticed, 
especially when relatively minor issues are concerned (Ranganathan 2014: 5-6). 
While the broad theme of a regime stays stable over time, goals can certainly evolve. For 
example, the non-proliferation regime may be seen as having extended its original intent by 
becoming the forum in which the abolition of all nuclear weapons is discussed. Other times, 
under-issues may gain importance and break away into a regime of their own. Most 
commonly, regimes gain in scope as they grow older (see Levy et al. 1995: 290) 
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Communication, Learning, and Information 
One of the main functions of international Regimes is that they can be forums of 
communication for their members. 
“Another means of reducing problems of uncertainty is to increase the quantity 
and quality of communication, thus alleviating the information problems that 
create risk and uncertainty in the first place” (Keohane 1982: 346). 
Since the interaction already takes place in an institutionalized setting, potential conflicts 
may be discussed directly and without much additional cost. Over the course of negotiations 
within a regime, a sort of internal language develops – with shorthand and acronyms and 
slang that may make it harder for outsiders to understand what exactly is going on, but it 
also facilitates communication between the initiated14. Describing problems in a shared 
language can be an important factor in finding a solution, and some of it is definitely 
happening in most regimes. As Haas (1989: 377) puts it, 
“Regimes are not simply static summaries of rules and norms; they may also 
serve as important vehicles for international learning that produce convergent 
state policies”. 
This feature of regimes can be understood in conjunction with the acculturation 
mechanism of IL discussed below. 
On a more technical level, regimes vastly facilitate the exchange of information between 
parties (Keohane 1982: 344). Most regimes actively collect the information relevant to their 
causes from member states, but the states also get the opportunity to exchange information 
through topical, institutionalized channels, and, most importantly, a relatively impartial 
organization overseeing the information, so they can be relatively sure it is correct. 
 
Two-level games 
Putnam (1988: 427) argues that domestic and international politics are entangled. He 
suggests two-level games as a metaphor for the central dynamic of international regimes: 
„At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national 
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, 
while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of 
the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their 
countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign“(Putnam 1988: 434).  
                                                          
14 As illustrated by some aspects of the nukespeak debate, see for example Hilgartner et al. 1982. 
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This dynamic accounts for some of the complexity discussed above, as one actor may 
have different sets of interests within the same regime. 
According to Zangl (1994: 281-2), two-level games underlie not only the functioning, but 
also the emergence of regimes. Interest groups within a state influence the creation of a 
regime just as much as shared interests of the states do. Müller has emphasized that cultural 
differences and the character of international politics as a two-level game hamper the 
emergence of a shared life world (Müller 2004: 419–425), which could in turn foster 
cooperation. Because of their mediated decision structures, international regimes also give 
rise to the principle-agent problematic. The government of a state is technically acting on 
behalf of its people (the principle) but may well pursue diverging interests (for a detailed 
discussion of international organizations in the principal-agent Framework see Elsig 2011: 
498).  
In summary, regimes provide stable environments for state interaction and negotiation 
over time. They create complex structures while at the same time helping to manage 
complexity. While usually issue-specific – and sometimes quite focused – regimes interact 
and overlap on account of their often similar membership. In addition to their formal 
outcomes, they provide a valuable space for developing shared understandings and 
languages, not lastly by means of the exchange of information between members. Due to 
their mediated decision-making structures, regimes are also prone to principal-agent 
problematics. All these characteristics shape the environment in which international 
agreements are negotiated and concluded, and they impact the causes and effects of the 
language which is used to write them. I will draw on the background sketched above when I 
discuss the causal assumptions made about vagueness in international agreements in the 
second part of this chapter. 
3.1.2 Negotiation and implementation of IL 
IR as a discipline is particularly interested in two aspects of IL: Negotiation, when 
international agreements are conceived of and IL is made, and implementation, which covers 
the time after the conclusion of the treaty and the main concerns are compliance and the 
incorporation of international into national law. Since assumptions on the causes and effects 
of vagueness in international agreements vary significantly according to the part of the 
process they relate to, I will in the following briefly outline a few of the most pertinent 
characteristics of each of them. 
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Negotiation 
The negotiation phase of international agreements involves the actual drafting and 
creation of international treaties, which usually happens at international conferences. 
According to Jönsson (2002: 217), “In the international arena, dominated by sovereign 
states, negotiation is the primary and predominant mode of reaching joint decisions”. When 
looking to understand how treaties are drafted, and which sort of language is used in a treaty 
and why, it is therefore crucial to study international negotiations. Even though international 
negotiations can potentially include many types of actors, like NGOs, corporations, or 
intergovernmental actors, in the context of this thesis I focus on regimes in which state 
representatives are the only official participants of negotiations. 
While international negotiations have been understood in terms of fairly simplified 
models where rational actors try to maximise their clearly defined interests (see e.g. Fearon 
1998: 269-70), the reality tends to be much more complex. For example, the negotiators’ 
interests are not always clearly defined or coherent (see section 3.1.1 for a discussion of two-
level games). The possibility of norm development (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998), or the effects 
of different institutional settings (Underdal 1983: 193) are other examples of areas where 
simpler explanations struggle, because they fail to include imperfect rationality and are 
based on too few variables. 
For Zartman, complexity even is the defining quality of multilateral negotiations (see 
section 3.1.1 for a discussion on complexity in regimes): 
“If the basic analytical question for any negotiation analysis is ‘How to explain 
outcomes?’, the question is answered for multilateral negotiations in the form of 
another question: How did/do the parties manage the characteristic complexity 
of their encounter in order to produce outcomes?” (1994a: 222). 
This complexity is rooted in their nature as multi-party, multi-issue, multi-role 
negotiations with values, parties and roles capable of varying throughout the negotiations 
(Zartman 1994b: 4-6). 
In an attempt to reduce complexity and increase their own negotiating power, parties 
often form coalitions. Pěchouček et al. (2000: 161) 
“define a coalition as a set of agents, which agreed to fulfill a single, well-
specified goal. Coalition members committed themselves to collaborate on the 
within-coalition-shared goal”. 
42 
 
In the international sphere, some coalitions, like the G-7715, or AOSIS16, are well 
established and stable, working together in several different regimes. Other coalitions fit the 
above definition more closely and are built more spontaneously around specific issues. 
Dupont (1996: 49) points out that while coalitions may well be useful, they also bear the risk 
of increasing polarization. For Zartman, not only state parties can be said to form coalitions: 
“But coalition is a mechanism not only available to the many parties but also 
applicable to the many issues. Because the goal of negotiations is to arrive at 
decisions on issues, it is necessary to reduce their complexity and make them, as 
well as the number of parties, manageable. Packaging, linkages, and trade-offs 
– the basic devices of the negotiation process – are all ways of making coalitions 
among issues, interests, and positions” (Zartman 1994b: 6). 
In essence, multiple issues are often discussed in relationship to one another, in order to 
enable compromises. This can, as Zartman states here, reduce complexity, but it can also 
heighten the bar for new negotiators who do not necessarily know all the issues at stake. 
Framing and Agenda-setting are methods often employed by NGOs and other non-state 
actors in order to influence negotiations in which the only formal participants are state 
representatives. “The concept of framing captures the processes by which actors influence 
the interpretations of reality among various audiences” (Fiss/Hirsch 2005: 30). Initially, the 
concept of frames was developed by Erving Goffman who described them as “schemata of 
interpretation” used by individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” events in people’s 
life and in the world (Goffman 1974: 21). 
The relationship between diplomats and the governments who employ them can lead to 
an additional layer of complexity. As Pfister et al. (unpublished paper) have shown, 
negotiators, especially in long-standing regimes like the climate regime, develop a deeper 
understanding of the issue at hand that can often differ significantly from the position of the 
country they are representing. This can lead to several problems: a discontent among 
negotiators, making them less likely to come up with creative solutions, or the need to repeat 
all the preparatory work they do when the heads of states arrive at the last stages of a 
conference. 
A lot of the negotiation takes place over very specific instances of language. Disputed 
provisions or formulations of a negotiation text are usually put into brackets, and negotiators 
then work together to alter the formulations such that everyone can agree on it (FIELD 2006: 
46-7). Negotiation chairs often play a central role in these drafting procedures (Tallberg 
                                                          
15 Group of 77 
16 Alliance of Small Island States 
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2010: 242), attaching influence to roles that might be considered ceremonial by some. When 
the bracketed texts are available to the public, they can provide valuable insights into the 
current state negotiation process (see e.g. Depledge 2000). 
 
Implementation and compliance 
After negotiations have ended and an agreement has been concluded, the second part of 
the international legal process begins. The question then is about the implementation of or 
compliance with the agreement: Are the concluded agreements actually changing the 
parties’ behaviour? This question presents major conceptual and methodological challenges, 
which I will briefly address in this section. First, I will attempt a disambiguation of several 
terms which intersect with each other in the implementation phase of an international 
agreement. These are compliance, implementation, effectiveness and enforcement. I will 
then briefly touch on the methodological challenges researchers face when trying to tackle 
the implementation of IL empirically. 
On the subject of compliance, Young (1979: 104) states that 
“Compliance can be said to occur when the actual behavior of a given subject 
conforms to prescribed behavior, and non-compliance or violation occurs when 
actual behavior departs significantly from prescribed behavior”. 
This definition seems relatively straightforward. However, Kingsbury (1998: 346) makes 
the argument that 
“the concept of ‘compliance’ with law does not have, and cannot have, any 
meaning except as a function of prior theories of the nature and operation of the 
law to which it pertains. “Compliance” is thus not a free-standing concept, but 
derives meaning and utility from theories, so that different theories lead to 
significantly different notions of what is meant by “compliance”. 
The question of whether states comply with IL has been a crucial one, even leading 
scholars to dispute that IL is actually law. This claim is made especially often from the 
perspective that to be considered law, rules must possess the capacity to be enforced (see 
D’Amato 1984: 1293). Regardless of whether or not one believes IL to be law, the question 
of enforcement seems inextricably linked with questions about the nature of law in general. 
Oppenheim (2005: 4), for example, states that “the characteristic of rules of law is that they 
shall, if necessary, be enforced by external power”. 
When scholars describe the enforcement possibilities of IL, it is not unusual for them to 
start with an account of the deficits: 
“International law has no international police force to oversee obedience to the 
international legal standards to which States agree or that develop as 
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international standards of behaviour. Similarly, there is no compulsory 
enforcement mechanism for the settlement of disputes” (Stratton 2009: 2). 
According to Chayes and Handler Chayes (1995: 2), enforcement in the realm of IL can 
consist of either economic or military sanctions. They take a critical view of assessing IL 
primarily in terms of its enforcement capabilities. As we shall see in section 3.1.3, the 
significance of enforcement depends on the mechanism by which one believes IL to function. 
Implementation means the incorporation of IL into domestic law. The process involves 
many challenges, because international agreements are written in a specific environment 
that is different from domestic legal systems. It might be necessary to translate the text into 
another language, with all the challenges that entails. Moreover, the larger context of the 
specific legal system will be different from the international legal system. Implementation 
may or may not be a prerequisite for compliance – it is possible for a country to comply with 
IL without incorporating the specific provisions into domestic law, although usually at least 
some measure of implementation takes place. 
The effectiveness of an international regime may well be related to its rate of compliance, 
but the two terms nevertheless should not be confused. Mitchell (2001: 221-2) illustrates 
the scope of the term effectiveness by saying that some authors understand it to mean 
compliance, others efficiency, and yet others as reaching the objective of the agreement. He 
goes on to argue that 
“The question ‘Is this regime effective?’ is often simply a shorthand for ‘Did this 
regime accomplish certain goals?’ Answering the question, therefore, requires 
the analyst to define, implicitly or explicitly, the goals against which she will 
evaluate the regime’s performance”. 
Depending on which goal is taken as the baseline, a regime could have very high rates of 
compliance and yet not be especially effective, simply by not demanding much. On the other 
hand, even when compliance is relatively low, the effectiveness could theoretically still be 
on the high side if the terms of the regime are extraordinarily demanding (though there must 
still be some compliance). 
Even after disambiguating and narrowing down the definitions of all these terms, the 
question of compliance with IL remains a challenging one, not least because of the extreme 
methodological difficulties of empirical research in the field. 
“Theoretically it is possible to demonstrate the agreement or coincidence 
between a certain state behaviour and a certain rule of international law. […] it 
would be difficult to demonstrate that the state adopts a particular policy 
because it intends to comply with the rule of international law” (Onuma 2003: 
129). 
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The effectiveness of international agreements can only be approximated by contra-
factual reasoning as well, since once an agreement is made, it becomes impossible to know 
what the world would have looked like without that agreement. Of course, information can 
be gained by looking at similar cases and parallel developments, but in the complex world of 
IR that is no easy or certain undertaking. 
To summarize, the two parts of the international legal process – the negotiation phase 
and the compliance or implementation phase – differ significantly both in their subject 
matter as well as in the ways they are usually approached, theorized and researched. In light 
of these substantial differences, and often segregation in research, it is important to keep in 
mind that they represent two sides of the same coin and are extremely interrelated. 
Negotiators draft agreements with a view to their implementation, and just because an 
agreement or international rule exists does not mean the negotiation about it ends – far 
from it. It is equally fallacious to posit a differentiation in terms of a political and a legal part 
of IL. The making of law is a deeply legal issue and questions of compliance and 
implementation are often highly political. Nevertheless, the different perspectives in 
theoretical approaches highlight important characteristics of both parts of the legal process, 
which I will use in sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 to put the causal claims about vagueness into 
context. 
3.1.3 How IL works: mechanisms and functions 
To determine what kind of impact vagueness may have on an international agreement – 
and what it may be caused by – it is essential to be clear on one’s perspective about how IL 
works. Depending on the point of view, language in general and vagueness in particular may 
play very different roles. In this section, I will first take a look at four different functions IL 
may fulfil, and then pay attention to four mechanisms by means of which it can accomplish 
them. Of course, functional approaches or those based on mechanisms are by no means the 
only perspective one can use to examine IL. However, I contend that they do, one, present 
an adequately broad spectrum of ideas on how IL may work and, two, are significant for the 
question of vagueness in the law. 
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Functions of IL 
In a first step, I will look at the functions IL is supposed to fulfil. Onuma (2003: 108) 
identifies four of them: “the binding, communicative, value-declaratory, and justifying and 
legitimating functions.” 
The binding function is perhaps the most obvious one: that the rules made by the law will 
be binding to, and thus complied with by the signatories. Onuma himself declares it law’s 
primary function, although he does note a point of contention, namely that bindingness is a 
property, not a function of law (Onuf 2010: 317). The difference between the two is that in 
the first case, non-binding rules may also be legal, while in the second case they would not 
be. In any event, the issue of bindingness is clearly central to the concept of IL. 
The communicative function of IL mirrors the function of international regimes as forums 
for communication (see section 3.1.1). The communicative function, 
“is to embody and express shared ideas and understandings of the constitutional 
structure and legitimate aspirations of international society to its diverse 
members” (Onuma 2003: 134). 
For Sunstein (1996: 2024), the expressive – what Onuma calls value-declaratory – 
function of law is the “function of law in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling 
behavior directly”. Van der Burg (2001: 41) elaborates on this point: 
“Because legislation expresses certain values and communicates them 
effectively, these values can be taken as a common point of reference in 
interpretation and communication processes”. 
Going from a mere communicative to a sort of socializing function, Wessel (2010: 136) 
argues: 
“International law is but one important way in which the process of socialization, 
and the formation of intersubjective agreement, occurs amongst the speech 
community of diplomats. In the same way that communication is one of the 
leading factors of socialization of the individual in his state, the communicative 
medium of international law socializes the state vis-a`-vis other states”. 
Lastly, the justifying function is the most openly political function of law, which is in this 
case serving as an instrument to legitimize state practice (Onuma 2003: 136). In 
Koskenniemi’s terms, this may be seen as the apologetic character of IL (Koskenniemi 1990: 
11). 
 
Mechanisms of IL 
As we have seen, IL can be said to have different functions. It may fulfil these functions 
predominantly by means of four mechanisms. Ginsburg and Shaffer (2010: 11) identify them 
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as reciprocity, coercion, persuasion, and acculturation. Goodman and Jinks (2004: 630) make 
similar distinctions, but only recognize three mechanisms: coercion, persuasion and 
acculturation. Reciprocity follows the ultimate logic of bargaining: Parties to an agreement 
can trade legal provisions between themselves, or comprise on issues until they find a 
solution advantageous to all. Coercion is the means by which law is most often presumed to 
fulfil its purpose. It relies on sanctions for any behaviour that is not conforming to the law. 
Persuasion, according to Goodman and Jinks (2004: 635), is “the active, often strategic, 
inculcation of norms.” Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 914-5) explain when persuasion is likely 
to happen: 
“The persuasiveness of a normative claim in law is explicitly tied to the “fit” of 
that claim within existing normative frameworks; legal arguments are persuasive 
when they are grounded in precedent, and there are complex rules about the 
creation of precedent–such as which judgments trump which and how the 
accretion of judgments is to be aggregated over time” 
Acculturation is defined by Goodman and Jinks (2004: 638) as 
“the general process of adopting the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the 
surrounding culture. This mechanism induces behavioral changes through 
pressures to assimilate– some imposed by other actors and some imposed by the 
self”. 
The mechanism through which one presumes IL to function has consequences for one’s 
view of compliance. 
“in fact, powerful states sometimes find they can make more progress through 
measures to build capacity and otherwise assist weaker states in their efforts to 
implement the terms of international regimes than they can through threats or 
sanctions intended to force weaker states to comply with the terms of 
international regimes” (Levy et al 1995: 283). 
Summing up, IL may well have functions beyond binding states to its statutes, and it likely 
functions through mechanisms other than coercion. According to the functions and 
mechanisms one focusses on, causal assumptions about the sources and effects of vagueness 
in international agreements change (see sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4). 
3.1.4 Rules 
A last topic I want to sketch in this overview are the different conceptual types of rules 
that make up IL. They are important because different types of rules may serve different 
functions or rely on different mechanisms of IL. Additionally, different types of rules may call 
for different languages. Finally, it is entirely possible that different types of rules become 
more or less important during different stages of a regime life-cycle: 
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“International Rules are prescriptive statements that forbid, require or permit 
some action or outcome. One of the three deontic operators – forbid, require, 
permit – must be contained in a statement for it to be considered as a rule” 
(Ostrom 1990: 139). 
The quote clearly shows the relationship between performative language (as discussed in 
section 4.2.2 and rules. Rules that forbid are usually what we think of first when we hear the 
word ‘rule’. It may be persuasive to imagine that especially in the context of IR, everything is 
allowed that is not expressly forbidden, in which case it may seem like the only rules which 
make sense are prohibitive rules. In the context of international regimes, however, rules that 
require parties to an agreement to do a certain thing might be even more common. And that, 
also makes sense from a certain point of view: The most common enforcement mechanism 
of laws in the international arena is recognition (‘blaming and shaming’), and it is often easier 
to find out that parties have not done something they were required to than that they have 
done something forbidden. This is because in the former case, the burden of proof lies on 
the party: If it has obeyed the request, it then needs to show that it did so. In the latter case, 
the burden of proof lies with the other parties: they need to show that the party in question 
did something they were not supposed to. 
Permissive rules may seem redundant in the international context, but they are actually 
crucial for the functioning of international cooperation, since they provide a framework of 
action for the parties. They may contain new ideas on how to interact, and provide novel 
means of mutually beneficial compromises. They also do not require any kind of 
enforcement mechanism, but they can still shape actor’s behaviour significantly. 
Ruggie (1998: 871) differentiates regulative from constitutive rules, exemplifying them 
with the correct side to drive on the road and the game of chess, respectively. Onuf (2014: 
3-4) argues against the this distinction, making the case that 
“all rules regulate conduct by definition and, in doing so, constitute the social 
arrangements within which they function. Thus the regulative function of rules—
all rules—serves to connect agents to an ever-changing world, the structure of 
which is constantly being remade as those same rules simultaneously perform 
their constitutive function”. 
According to him, rules can be directive-rules, instruction-rules and commitment-rules. 
Directive rules are “the kind of rules that we associate with law (and fear as a motivation for 
compliance with the law)” (2014: 3). These rules could be said to be in line with the coercion 
logic of IL discussed in section 3.1.3. On the topic of instruction-rules, he continues: 
“If we do not follow instruction-rules, it will be harder for us to accomplish what 
we had hoped to. [...] If we ignore these rules, people will remind us of the value, 
indeed the need, to do what these rules tell us to; we are likely to feel ashamed 
when we are reminded” (2014:3). 
And finally, 
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“Commitment-rules are like contracts reciprocally undertaken to assure a 
mutually desired result. When generalized to the society as a whole, they create 
what we ordinarily call rights and duties. Rules of this sort reflect an emphasis on 
exchange; disputes over rights and duties are typically referred to third parties 
for resolution; failure to perform one’s duties can elicit a feeling of guilt” (2014: 
3). 
As mentioned in the quote, the mechanic of reciprocity – discussed in section 3.1.3 – 
seems the closest fit for commitment-type rules, although of course international 
agreements may also follow different logics. Treaties – or agreements – are an 
exemplification of that last kind of rule, and are of course what we are concerned with here. 
Rules are central to our understanding of law, language and social cooperation and they 
underlie and weave through all of these concepts. One could argue that they are the central 
building block of all social understanding. It may not be too much to say that rules are the 
common denominator of all the key concepts discussed in this thesis. 
3.1.5 International agreements in context 
In the sections above, I have outlined several theoretical considerations which put 
international agreements into context. All of them interact to shape the drafting and 
implementation of international agreements, and they influence how their language is used 
and interpreted. I have discussed some of the implications of the fact that much of IL is 
organized in regimes, the dual dynamics of negotiation and implementation of law, both of 
which have implications for the language used in international agreements, the mechanisms 
and functions of IL and some characteristics of rules. On the one hand, all of these 
characteristics put in context the way language – including vague language – is used and 
understood in international agreements. On the other hand, it also provides the theoretical 
underpinnings for how academics conceptualize the causes and effects of vagueness. The 
theoretical considerations outlined here are therefore crucial to understand the second part 
of this chapter. 
3.2 Debating the causes and effects of vagueness 
In this part of the chapter, I will discuss the hypotheses made about the causes and effects 
of vagueness in international agreements. Most of the authors discussed below are not 
primarily concerned with vagueness or indeterminacy, but touch on the issues – more or less 
briefly – while developing broader ideas about the form and function of international 
agreements. Going forward, I will refer to their hypotheses on the causes and effects of 
vagueness as causal assumptions to differentiate from the more operationalized hypotheses 
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I will present in chapter 5. At first glance, some of the causal assumptions appear to 
contradict each other fundamentally. By laying them out against the background of different 
perspectives on IL outlined above, I will try to show that they simply follow different logics 
or emphasize different aspects, and could as such also be seen as complementary. 
3.2.1 A note on causality 
In the following, I will discuss a number of causal claims that have been made about the 
vagueness in international agreements. However, as Kratochwil (2006: 14) points out, when 
human agency is in play, causality is not as simple as it may first appear: 
“I have used the two examples above to suggest that the recursivity problem 
arises particularly clearly in the social sciences, because the actors’ 
understanding influences the world. Therefore, the causal arrows run from our 
(or the agent’s) understanding to the world and not from ‘the world’ to our 
understanding or theory”. 
It cannot simply be assumed that an event that occurred first is the cause of an event that 
occurs later. This will become clear when talking about some of the causal claims about 
vagueness. Sometimes, the fact that a negotiator assumes vagueness to have a certain effect, 
they will be more or less inclined to draw up a vague agreement. The temporal order is clear 
– but the cause that vagueness then appears – or not – may actually lie in the later event, or 
at least in the assumption on the part of the actor that it will occur. I will go into more detail 
of the phenomenon as it becomes relevant throughout the chapter. 
3.2.2 The normativity of (theories on) vagueness 
In the literature, vagueness is often perceived as ‘less than’. This seems natural, as one 
possible definition of vagueness is the absence of precision, and as such the phenomenon 
may by its very nature be a negative. 
“In the absence of transaction costs, the parties to an agreement would specify 
the precise conditions under which they would (or would not) perform. 
Agreements would list every possible state of the world and the obligations of 
the parties in each state” (Guzman 2002: 1856). 
Citing vagueness as one of the factors which making it so, Jackson (1992: 399) states that 
“like all human endeavor, and perhaps all national legislation, many treaty rules will not be 
perfect”. Equating precision with perfection and vagueness with imperfection is a fairly 
common implication, which also underlies Guzman’s point above. 
In the previous chapter, my own conclusion was that vagueness is a very common 
phenomenon. For quite a lot of the following discussion, authors assume that it is an 
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exception, if not in frequency then in acceptance. The underlying question quite often seems 
to be ‘Why on earth would treaty parties allow vagueness to appear in their agreements?’ 
and proceed from there. It is from this vantage point that the question ‘Why is there 
vagueness in treaties?’ is most often asked – although this evidently only describes a trend, 
and by no means all the discussed literature. A different understanding of the functions of 
rules may lead to different value of vagueness. In so far as agreements between states are 
seen as creating new possibilities (of cooperation, communication etc.) the functioning of 
the rule may not rely as much on being obeyed, as by simply being there it gives the option 
to cooperate. If on the other hand rules are regarded as primarily prohibitive, the logic of 
coercion and possibilities of enforcement become much more immediately relevant, which 
also leads authors to regard vagueness as more negative. As a subjective impression, it also 
seems like authors who are the least concerned with vagueness – only mentioning it in 
passing in their paper – often have the most critical view of it, perceiving it as an imperfection 
at best. This is of course not to say that authors who are primarily concerned with the study 
of vagueness are not critical about the concept – far from it – but they do tend to at least 
adopt a more nuanced view, citing some positive aspects of the phenomenon in addition to 
what they view as problematic features. 
3.2.3 Theorized causes of vagueness in international agreements 
In the first part of this sub-chapter, I will describe the suggestions on causes for vagueness 
in international agreements found in the literature. This is section is shorter than the next 
one, because more causal assumptions have been made about the effects of vagueness in 
international agreements than their causes. Nevertheless, there are also notions in why 
vagueness appears in agreements in the first place. The propositions discussed in this part 
are mostly relevant in the context of the negotiation of IL (see section 3.1.2), because that is 
when the actual texts of agreements are written and thus vague or precise phrases are used. 
However, as discussed above in section 3.2.1, causal timelines can get inverted when human 
intentions come into play. Therefore, some of the causal assumptions also touch on the 
parties’ or negotiators preconceptions as to what will happen in the implementation phase 
of these agreements. 
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One hypothesis found in the literature is that the conclusion of precise agreements has 
prohibitively high transaction costs17 (see for example Abbott/Snidal 2000: 433). Therefore, 
vague treaties will be concluded even if they would otherwise be less optimal. Guzman 
(2002: 1856) sums this position up as follows: 
“In practice, however, substantial transaction costs prevent international 
agreements from specifying every possible future contingency”. 
Sunstein (1996: 16-7) makes a similar point when talking about the minimalism of courts 
when faced with decision costs. Taking a closer look, the assumption here is clearly that 
vagueness on the part of negotiators requires less effort – of communication, research, 
formulation – and thus less cost than precision, which is seen as an unattainable ideal. While 
not explicitly spelled out, this proposition fits well into the logic of the coercive or reciprocal 
functions of IL. It contends that vagueness is largely undesirable for all parties and thus likely 
to be unintentional, but accepted as an inevitability. It also suggests that key parts of treaties 
– the ones especially important to one, some or all parties to it will be more precise than 
those parts considered less important by the negotiators. Guzman (2002: 1855) goes on to 
specify four reasons for these high costs: the impossibility to predict every possible future 
state of the world, the even greater impossibility of knowing what their probability is at the 
time of treaty conclusion, the different interpretations varying parties may have of any given 
state of the world and the difficulties of ratification faced by treaties containing long lists of 
exceptions and conditions. This last reason will be discussed in more detail in section 3.2.4, 
as it pertains more to an (assumed) effect of vagueness. 
The first two of these reasons are made out to be causal assumptions in their own right 
by Maley (1987: 41), writing: 
“However, a just law may need to accommodate to changing times and 
unforeseen circumstances, so a certain amount of flexibility is desirable for some 
legislative rules. Hence rules with VAGUE meanings, using judgment words”. 
Both Maley and Guzman thus agree that uncertainty of the future is a central cause of 
vagueness in international agreements. The normative implications of their respective 
propositions is very different, however: while for Guzman precision, where possible, is 
always and unquestionably preferable, Maley has a more nuanced view of the value of 
vagueness. 
                                                          
17 According to Johnson (2005), transaction costs are “[t]he costs other than the money price that 
are incurred in trading goods or services”. Dahlman (1979: 148) elaborates that “search and 
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs” fall under the term. 
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Guzman’s third reason relates to the hypothesis that the diversity of parties to the treaty 
leads to vaguer agreements. The more diverse the parties, the less common ground they will 
have – and the more diverse their interpretation of the world – leading to more varying 
interpretations, more difficult communication and thus vaguer treaties. With regards to 
vagueness in particular, Jackson (1992: 399) explains the connection in the following way: 
“[C]hances are that treaties will be more ambiguous than national laws (because 
of the difficulty of reaching consensus), and that vague treaty norms will 
therefore be used to challenge national regulations”. 
This causal assumption could be understood either as an unintentional consequence born 
out of more complexity due to larger differences between parties (see section 3.1.1), or as a 
more reflected approach by parties to effectively deal with their differences. 
Continuing on the theme of differences, a smaller-scale hypothesis takes into account 
differences in opinion of diplomats and the countries they negotiate for. As in the previous 
example, the suggestion is that diversity and differences lead to vagueness. Hisschemöller 
and Gupta (2001: 166) reflect on the reasons for vague outcomes of negotiation processes 
and conclude that vague treaties result when negotiators have different views on a topic 
than the public in the country they represent. 
A fourth hypothesis is that parties may push for vague treaties if they believe a vague 
treaty would be advantageous to them. The difficulties with causal directionality discussed 
in section 3.2.1 definitely apply in this case. At first glance, the observation that parties will 
do what is of benefit to them may seem very obvious, but the clue here is that it might pass 
more easily and frequently than usual interest-based modifications of treaties because both 
parties may think it is advantageous to them in different ways. This means that treaties will 
be vaguer than is rational (because all parties overestimate the advantages), and the 
hypothesis mostly works if the underlying assumption is that vagueness is an irrational 
feature in otherwise rational actors and circumstances and thus somewhat of a puzzle. 
Karrer (2005: 97) elaborates that sometimes parties to treaties can opt for imprecise 
formulations because they both hope that the underspecified treaty text is closer to their 
own advantage, underestimating the opportunity costs. Incomplete agreements thus may 
feed the wishes of both contracting parties who tend to underestimate costs and risks and 
overestimate the probability of positive outcomes. 
Attributing slightly different reasons to the negotiating parties, Schachter (1977: 298) 
supports the general causal assumption: 
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“[I]f the text or circumstances leave the intention uncertain, it is reasonable to 
consider vague language and mere declarations of purpose as indicative of an 
intention to avoid legal effect”. 
This assumption will be discussed in more detail in its reversed form – that vagueness 
leads to less legal effect – in section 3.2.4. It is worth noting, however, that this causal 
assumption leans firmly on the side of attributing intentionality to vague formulations, as 
opposed to them being mere side effects or inevitable consequences. This stands in contrast 
– or complement – to the first causal claim discussed in this chapter, namely that 
prohibitively high transaction costs lead treaties to be vague whether the negotiators want 
them to be or not. 
One hypothesis which breaks out of the parameters I set for them here, but nonetheless 
is important to mention is that conflicting rules lead to indeterminacy (Ranganathan 2014). 
The claim is important especially since the fragmented nature of IL lends itself to conflicting 
legal rules, which cannot readily be pressed into any one consistent hierarchical order. 
However, as can be taken from the formulation of the hypothesis, conflicting rules lead to 
indeterminacy of legal texts, not to vagueness in their formulation. Therefore, while 
extremely significant when studying the indeterminacy of international legal texts, the line 
of thought is only tangentially relevant when concerned with the way (textual) vagueness 
leads to indeterminacy in IL.  
Summing up, four main causal assumptions have been made about the causes of 
vagueness in international agreements: high transaction costs, differences between treaty 
parties, differences in opinion between countries and the diplomats negotiating for them 
and finally the belief of parties or negotiators that vagueness will be advantageous to them 
are all hypothesized to lead to vaguer treaty texts. Out of the four, the first one appears to 
be the most common in the literature, while the last is most closely related to expectations 
about the effects of vagueness in international agreements, which will be discussed in the 
following section. 
3.2.4 Theorized effects of vagueness in international agreements 
This section is aimed at describing the causal assumptions about the effects of vagueness 
made in the literature. While the caveat that most of these claims are made in passing and 
not usually the focus of the articles they originate from still applies, the potential effects of 
vagueness in international agreement have been more widely studied than its causes. The 
lack of dedicated research on the topic, given its potential consequences, is surprising. Of 
course, both sets of claims are related in important ways, and often made by the same 
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authors. Most notably, if negotiators belief in the causal effect of one of the claims made 
here, that may lead her to push for more or less vagueness in an agreement, depending on 
her interests. Like the propositions discussed in the previous section, the causal assumptions 
explored here relate to the framework given in section 3.1 in various significant ways. 
The most commonly asserted effect of vagueness in international legal agreements is that 
it reduces compliance and makes treaties less likely to be implemented (see for example 
Stokke 2001: 16, Franck 1990: 53, or Mitchell 2001: 228). According to Guzman (2002: 1875), 
“when possible, countries that wish to increase the level of commitment prefer more formal 
and detailed agreements”, because such agreements are harder to violate. Werksman and 
Herbertson (2009: 2) also contend that 
“Lessons from other treaties tell us that international agreements with binding, 
specific content backed by robust review procedures are generally more effective 
than those with vague content or limited review procedures.” 
Unfortunately, they do not specify which other agreements they refer to. Staton and 
Vanberg (2008: 504) make the case that this proposed effect applies to court rulings, stating 
“[v]ague rulings decrease the likelihood of compliance”. In fact, most of the proposed causal 
connections that follow can be drawn more or less directly from this main statement. And 
while we have seen in chapter 2 that not all legal philosophers support the claim that 
indeterminacy of rules leads to lower rates of compliance, this certainly appears to be the 
majority opinion of legal philosophy as well. According to Mitchell (2001: 228–9) Compliance 
with a regime corresponds to clarity in three ways: 
“Compliance problems arise from failures of three types. The first type is a failure 
of obligational clarity. The regime needs to provide clarity with respect to “who 
must do what.” This requires the regime to minimize ambiguities about what 
behaviors must be undertaken and what outcomes must be achieved, as well as 
about who is responsible for undertaking or achieving those standards and who 
is responsible if they are not achieved. A second type of failure involves 
performance clarity. The regime needs transparency—that is, knowledge about 
what behaviors relevant actors actually undertook and what environmental 
outcomes resulted. Reporting, monitoring, and verification provisions seek to 
address this potential source of implementational failure. A third type of failure 
involves response clarity. A regime’s success depends on the expectations actors 
have about how other actors, both within and outside the regime, will respond if 
it fulfills or fails to fulfill the regime’s rules”. 
While the difference in terminology may lead to doubts if clarity is meant as the opposite 
of vagueness here, it seems likely that this should be at least partly the case. Others authors 
certainly do seem to interpret Mitchell in this fashion (see Stokke 2001: 16). 
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However, while most authors agree that vagueness leads to lower compliance, their 
explanations for why that is the case can differ substantially. In the following, I will expand 
on these arguments. 
A first line of reasoning is that vague rules simply communicate less input about what 
behaviour is expected and therefore can lead even those actors who actually wish to comply 
with the rule to inadvertent non-compliance. Putting it another way, 
“The determinacy of a rule affects its compliance pull because ‘due process’ 
requires a clear message about what is expected of those addressed by the rule” 
(Stokke 2001: 16). 
Another reason found in the literature focusses on those actors whose non-compliance is 
at least somewhat intentional. The reasoning is based on the lack of hierarchically organized 
enforcement mechanisms in the international sphere, and therefore main sanction for non-
compliance with IL is considered to be the loss of reputation. Parties in this perspective have 
an interest in understanding and interpreting the contract in a way suitable to their own 
advantages (Morgenthau 1954: 255; Abbott et al. 2000). The following quote illustrates this 
explanation: 
“Not only do indeterminate normative standards make it harder to know what is 
expected [...] indeterminacy also makes it easier to justify non-compliance. To 
put it conversely, the more determinate a standard, the more difficult it is to 
justify non-compliance. Since few persons or states wish to be perceived as acting 
in flagrant violation of a generally recognized rule of conduct, they may try to 
resolve a conflict between the demands of the rule and their desire for interest 
gratification by ‘interpreting’ the rule permissively. A determinate rule is less 
elastic and thus less amenable to this strategy than an opaque one” (Franck 
1990: 53–4). 
Relatedly, vague agreements are seen as less likely to be implemented because they are 
understood to give parties more room for (diverging) interpretations. In the absence of a 
central ruling authority like a court this could lead to significant hindrances in the 
implementation of treaties. A similar argument to this has come up in the discussion of 
indeterminacy in legal philosophy, here enhanced by the fact that in the international arena 
there does not tend to be an impartial judge but rather the treaty parties themselves 
interpret their own agreements. 
The causality of this claim is disputable, however, when considering the parallel 
proposition that diversity in negotiation parties leads to vaguer treaty provisions. Taken 
together, one might as well skip the intervening variable of vagueness and say that 
agreements concluded between parties with strongly diverging values will less likely be 
complied with. 
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Another reason given for this hypothesized lack of compliance again shows a reversal of 
the timed directionality of causality discussed in section 3.2.1 above: Vague rules are less 
likely to be complied with because it is assumed that the writers of the rule did not intend 
for the rule to be binding. Abbott et al. (2000: FN 36) spell this out: 
“The State Department’s Foreign Relations Manual states that undertakings 
couched in vague or very general terms with no criteria for performance 
frequently reflect an intent not to be legally bound”. 
In this, the assumptions made about the causes and effects of vagueness may be said to 
have come full circle. Nevertheless, while it is important to be aware of the difficulties 
causality presents in cases where human intention comes into play, this does not mean that 
all of the assumptions made must necessarily be false or senseless. After all, the same people 
who draft agreements are often charged with interpreting them, and they are the ones 
knowing most about their own intentions during the drafting process. 
The main reasoning why vague agreements lead to less complete implementation 
appears to be that enforcement mechanisms are less likely to be effective or put into place 
at all. This strand of thinking follows the coercion logic of the mechanism of IL. The reasoning 
is clear: if agreements spell out exactly what kinds of behaviour will be met with which 
consequences, this makes it more likely that those consequences will come into force, and 
thus increases the force of coercion of the agreement in question. Abbott and Snidal claim 
that legalization, which is comprised of the three components obligation, precision, and 
delegation, “increases the costs of violation through normative channels” (Abbott et al. 
2000: 428).The question of enforcement is difficult in IL even under the most favourable 
circumstances, so much so that it has been used as a reason to doubt whether IL is law at all. 
When combined with another factor which calls into question the legality of legal rules (see 
void for vagueness doctrine), the proposition that vague international agreements will likely 
not be complied with does not appear to be far-fetched. 
Franck discusses the implications of indeterminate rules on the legitimacy of treaties and 
regimes. For him, while vague rules have the advantage of allowing flexibility when reacting 
to new developments, “Indeterminate normative standards not only make it harder to know 
what conformity is expected, but also make it easier to justify noncompliance“(1988: 714). 
He goes on: 
“The degree of determinacy of a rule directly affects the degree of its perceived 
legitimacy. A rule that prohibits the doing of “bad things” lacks legitimacy 
because it fails to communicate what is expected, except within a very small 
constituency in which “bad” has achieved a high degree of culturally induced 
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specificity. To be legitimate, a rule must communicate what conduct is permitted 
and what conduct is out of bounds” (Franck 1988: 716). 
Legitimacy, in turn, increases the “compliance pull” (1988: 712) of a rule and thus 
supports the claim that vague rules are less likely to be implemented. 
Building on Franck’s theories, Abbott et al. (2000: 413, FN 26) take up precision as one 
indicator for the degree of legalization of a rule. While they hedge that vagueness does not 
necessarily have to come at the cost of impact of the rule, 
“Nevertheless, for most rules requiring or prohibiting particular conduct–and in 
the absence of precise delegation–generality is likely to provide an opportunity 
for deliberate selfinterested interpretation, reducing the impact, or at least the 
potential for enforceable impact, on behavior”. 
This reasoning relates to the reasons given for lowered implementation of vague rules 
discussed above. Reus-Smit (2003: 592) expands on the matter, calling into question the 
legality of a vague rule: 
“A regime that incurs strong obligations, has precise rules and delegates 
authority is said to be highly legalized, and one that involves weak obligations, 
has vague rules and confines decision-making to the contracting parties is legal 
only in the most general sense of the word”. 
Adding a twist to this, Michael Byers (2004) argues that vagueness or ambiguities of a 
document (in his case, of a Security Council Resolution), while potentially reducing the 
legitimacy of the legal rule itself, can actually help to preserve the legitimacy of an institution 
or regime. When the document can be legitimately interpreted in more than one way, it may 
enable one party to do what it wants in spite of objections by other parties, while the other 
parties can claim that they do not condone the action. All this can happen without either 
party explicitly violating the terms of the regime, which would otherwise lead to a significant 
decrease of its legitimacy. 
In conjunction with the presumption that more precise treaties have higher transaction 
costs at the negotiation stage, this idea assumes that vague treaties are more likely to be 
concluded. However, in a sort of parallel to the lower transaction cost at the negotiation 
stage, the transaction cost for implementing vague agreements may be higher. Posner (2009: 
110-1) calls these costs “ex-post costs”. Both hypothesis follow the same logic: There is a 
cost of rendering legal clauses precise enough so that they may be transferred to material 
situations and allow their implementation which remains the same no matter when it is 
addressed and which must be paid at some point. If they are taken care of in the negotiation 
phase of an agreement, then that phase is more costly and/or difficult but the 
implementation phase becomes easier, while in the reverse case the cost of clarification 
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must be met in the implementation phase. “In short, precision (1) increases the difficulty of 
reaching agreement ex ante but also (2) promotes compliance ex post” (Goodman/Jinks 
2004: 681). In fact, Abbott (2001: 142) even argues that those transaction costs are higher in 
the implementation phase than in the negotiation phase of an agreement: 
“For several reasons, ex ante bargaining costs of reaching a precise agreement 
are likely to be lower than ex post bargaining costs over the terms of an imprecise 
agreement, particularly in the absence of delegation of decision making 
authority regarding implementation of the agreement to standing institutions”. 
Most of the propositions above follow some variant of the logics of coercion or 
reciprocity, where vagueness is seen as unfavourable for implementation. If following the 
acculturation logic, however, vague treaties may actually lead to better implementation. 
Goodman and Jinks (2004: 681) make the case that the causal claims discussed above only 
hold when viewed in the context of the coercion or persuasion mechanism of IL. 
“Under the acculturation approach, however, these effects are potentially 
reversed: precision that outstrips existing preferences might propel agreement, 
and imprecision will sometimes help to produce behavioral conformity. In other 
words, precision is potentially beneficial ex ante and costly ex post”. 
They explain this in terms of the different role played by norms in the context of 
acculturation approaches: “Conformity depends less on the properties of the rule than on 
the properties of the actor’s relationship to the community. Because the Convention or norm 
is associated in general terms with the identity of the group, rules best foster conformity by 
“establishing] broad hortatory goals with few specific proscribed or prescribed activities” 
(Goodman/Jinks 2004: 683). 
It is worth noting that this is a very minor avenue of literature, the vast majority of authors 
tends at least in large parts to the opposite causal claim. 
From a slightly different angle of view, causal claims have also been made about the 
temporal progression of vagueness in precision. Predominantly, scholars argue that vague 
treaties are more a phenomenon of young regimes and interstate relationships, while more 
precision develops over time. 
The assumption is that states’ interests diverge to a great extend at the beginning of 
negotiations on a certain topic, and when they get together for the first time, they can only 
agree on very broad and general terms, leaving all of them room to continue on basically the 
same lines as before. Then, however, by meeting regularly, discussing the matter and 
exchanging opinions, as well as more and more availability of scientific evidence and 
increased public opinion on the matter, more clear-cut treaties become possible, ultimately 
resulting in better outcomes for the community of states. Steffek (2005: 50) points out that 
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“in the short term, incomplete agreements may provide new, even innovative solutions to 
political problems“. While according to him, ambiguous agreements can become a 
foundation for later, more specific and effective treaties, this does not have to be the case, 
and is likely to take a long time (2005: 50). Wettestad (1999: 237) implicitly agrees with this 
assessment when he writes about “the generally diffuse character of international 
environmental politics, with [...] quite vague and general regulatory yardsticks”. And 
Goldstein et al. (2000: 386) state that 
“Legally binding environmental treaties have proliferated in recent years. These 
agreements often trace their lineage to hortatory political pronouncements but 
often become closer to hard law over time”. 
Staying in the context of the UNFCCC, Bode (2004: 82) proposes that the problems of 
vagueness only become clear in subsequent negotiations and therefore are not addressed at 
the outset, but rather in later agreements: 
“After the United Framework Convention on Climate Change entered into force 
remarkably quick, it turned out at the first Conference of Parties that the 
nonbinding targets in the Convention for the year 2000 were too vague and 
inadequate to address the global and long-term problem of climate change”. 
To fully appreciate the logic behind this temporal causal claim, it is necessary to view it in 
combination with some of the other propositions and frameworks discussed above. As we 
have seen, vague agreements are often considered more likely to be concluded. In section 
3.1.1, I have also outlined that regimes, once established, foster communication and mutual 
understandings about issues. Taken together, these characteristics form a coherent picture: 
Great initial differences are glossed over by vague language in agreements, which are mainly 
aimed at fostering communications. This initial phase then follows the acculturation 
mechanism of IL. Over time, parties discover similarities or areas of compromise, and more 
precise agreements become possible and desirable, because when confronted with more 
specific issues the outlook then switches to a coercion approach. 
While a certainly a majority opinion, this view is not shared by all International Relation 
scholars – Morgenthau (1954: 255) reasons the opposite: 
“Thus the lack of precision, inherent in the decentralized nature of international 
law, is breeding ever more lack of precision, and the debilitating vice that was 
present at its birth continues to sap its strength”. 
Similarly, Whalley/Walsh (2009: 279) could be interpreted in a way supporting this claim: 
“As such, the imprecision of the mandate can be a major factor in preventing a 
successful conclusion to the negotiation simply because of the ambiguity of what 
is being negotiated on”, 
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because the mandate to further negotiations is usually given in the previous or 
constitutive agreement. So if a vague mandate is given, for example in the form of an 
indeterminate framework Convention, further negotiations would in this context prove 
unsuccessful. 
This diversity in proposition shows both how important it is to acknowledge different 
perspectives as the backgrounds for all the arguments made here and a distinct need for 
empirical research. 
In this section, I have attempted to show the range of causal claims made about the 
effects of vagueness in international agreements. The most common proposition is that 
vagueness hinders compliance. Reasons given for this include lack of communicated 
information, lack of enforcement opportunities, diverging interpretations, and lower 
legitimacy and legality of vague rules. However, this claim is not entirely uncontested – when 
following the logic of acculturation, vagueness may actually be helpful in the implementation 
of international agreements. Another claim about vagueness in international agreements is 
temporal in nature: the majority of authors proposes that vagueness in agreements generally 
decreases during the span of existence of a regime. Here, too, researchers arguing the 
opposite exist. In the end, empirical evidence is needed to confirm which hypothesis proves 
reliable in which circumstance. 
In the previous two sections I have given an overview over the causal claims about 
vagueness in international agreements that exist in the literature. I have attempted to show 
that both theorized causes as well as effects of vagueness have to be seen in the context of 
the broader theoretical framework they originate in. Most prominently, scholars have 
argued that vagueness is caused by the high transaction costs of precision, that its presence 
in agreements hinders compliance with them and that its presence within a given regime 
decreases over time. However, none of these claims are uncontested. 
3.3 Conclusion: The case for measuring vagueness in international 
agreements 
It is interesting to note that very few of the causal assumptions try to get at differences 
of the scale of vagueness in international agreements. Most often, they are formulated in 
absolute terms: ‘vague treaties will be harder to implement than precise treaties’, for 
example. In chapter 1, I have attempted to show that all language – and therefore all law – 
is at least a little vague, and differences must necessarily be a matter of degree. It seems 
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curious that this is most often not the case. On a side-note, considering the place that 
vagueness has in the dismantling of binary logic, the dualistic nature of those formulations 
could appear somewhat ironic. 
The main argument I make in this thesis is that while, when put in their theoretical 
contexts, all of the causal claims discussed above are theoretically plausible, none of them 
are yet hypotheses in the sense that they are operationalized enough to be tested 
empirically. This fact also explains their variety and how sometimes claims that are 
contradictory – at least in their unqualified states continue to coexist. The few hints authors 
give on what exactly they mean by vagueness and how they recognize it in an international 
agreement will be discussed in the methodology section (4.3) of this paper, but most of the 
authors seem to simply take for granted that everyone would recognize vague treaties in the 
same way, without elaborating on it. And one of the main challenges that such an empirical 
test would face is the question of an intersubjective method of measurement to detect the 
differences in vagueness in international agreements. I argue that the questions posed by 
varying degrees of vagueness – as exemplified by the causal claims discussed above – are 
important enough to warrant empirical research. In order to do so, a coherent method to 
recognize and compare the vagueness in international agreements is necessary. Chapters 5 
and 6 of this thesis attempt to address just this research gap. 
4 The linguistic perspective: existing methods to indicate vagueness 
The goal of this chapter is to investigate how vagueness has been identified by other 
scholars. This is important for several reasons: first, it will show where research on the 
comparison and measurement of vagueness in language stands today, to form a point of 
departure for further studies. Second, the landscape of what has been done before will 
outline the possibilities and limits of identifying vagueness. Third, previous findings on how 
to recognize vagueness will give essential clues on what might be identified as vague in the 
current study. The limits of applicability of previous studies will also be discussed. The 
chapter proceeds in five parts: the first, and longest, will draw on the findings of linguistic 
scholars studying vague language. This is the area in which most research has taken place, 
and the most advanced techniques for identifying vagueness are found. However, there are 
strong limitations on which of these findings are applicable to studying IL. The reasons for 
these limitations will be specified in part 2. Part 3 is concerned with the few instances in 
which scholars of IL and IR have attempted to expand on how to identify vagueness. Part 4 
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discusses one central remaining problem: the importance of context. The last part draws on 
the findings of this chapter to prepare my own analysis of vagueness in international 
agreements. 
4.1 Linguistic measures 
There are two main ways to research vague words. The first is to start with a definition, 
and from there deduce which words are vague and which are not. The second is to do 
empirical research on which words participants of a specific speech community perceive as 
vague. Both methods have advantages and drawbacks which should be carefully weighed 
against each other according to the goal of the study. As discussed in chapter 1, the field of 
study concerned with the language component of vagueness – vague language – is 
linguistics. In the following, I will present first deductive approaches to identifying vagueness 
in the field of linguistics before turning to the few existing inductive studies. 
4.1.1 Deductive approaches18 
Indicators for vagueness can be directly deduced from definitions. For example, it should 
theoretically be possible to establish a list of vague words by looking at a number of nouns 
individually and asking whether or not they are susceptible to the Sorites Paradox. 
Unfortunately, the existence of higher order vagueness and the ways in which natural 
language is used makes it virtually impossible to complete such a task without additional, 
arbitrary criteria. In other words, it is virtually always possible to construe a borderline case 
for any given word or concept. Morzycky (2013: 4-5) illustrates why identifying vague 
language is a far from simple undertaking: 
“Vagueness is ubiquitous. It’s in obvious places, such as in the semantics of 
GRADABLE ADJECTIVES—that is, adjectives that admit degree modification or 
can occur in comparatives and related constructions. Accordingly, that’s the spot 
linguists have most concentrated on. But as the classic form of the sorites 
reflects, it’s also found in nouns as well. One can construct sorites sequences for 
PPs like across the quad. Verbs can be vague: love gives rise to borderline cases 
(for some people, apparently with alarming regularity), as can run (how fast must 
you go to count?)”.19 
Therefore, most approaches here called deductive are a little less immediate. They 
identify sub-classes of vehicles or carriers of vague language and proceed to deduce – usually 
                                                          
18 Brunner (2011: 64) gives a comprehensive overview over the various categorizations of vague words 
and phrases in French. 
19 PP means prepositional phrase in this case. 
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incomplete and exemplified – lists from there. Another characteristic that most of these 
approaches have in common is that they take their examples from spoken language. 
The definitions given fall in three broad categories: Formal definitions, functional 
definitions, and exemplifications. Most useful for the project at hand are formal definitions, 
because they can be can be applied more or less directly to instances of text. Exemplifications 
are a little trickier, because while the examples themselves can be directly applied, the limits 
of what counts as being in the same category as the example isn’t clear – a phenomenon that 
will incidentally be topical to the discussion below. Functional definitions are very common 
in linguistics, but they are very difficult in their application for two reasons. One, the function 
of the expression in question must be recognizable from the text. This is especially 
challenging in legal texts, as I will discuss in section 4.2.2. Two, this kind of definition may 
lead to a problem of circularity if we want to identify vagueness to then see in a second step 
what it is used for. Quite a few of the definitions proposed in the following combine two or 
even all three of these categories. 
 
Hedge words 
The first category of words I would like to look at is hedge words. The relationship 
between hedge words and vague language is not quite straightforward (see chapter 2.1.2 for 
a closer discussion). Nevertheless, hedge words are very good at fulfilling the criterion of 
being ‘purposely and unabashedly vague’ as postulated by Channell (1994: 19), because in 
the vast majority of cases, hedge words could be left out of the sentence with only very slight 
change in meaning, but making a sentence much more precise. The first person to name the 
class of words and study them in detail is Lakoff (1973). He gives a list of 63 words and 
expressions titled “Some hedges and related phenomena” (1973: 473). Interestingly, not 
only does he make no claim of completeness, he does not even attempt to clearly define 
hedges from similar expressions. What he is clear about, though, is that hedges are words 
and phrases that render bits of language vaguer, by reflecting the fuzziness of a truth value 
of a statement (Lakoff 1973: 471). 
Building on his works, several different definitions of hedges have been proposed. One of 
the more prominent ones comes from Salager-Meyer (1994). Her definition of hedges is two-
fold: she employs a formal and a functional approach. She sets out by defining hedges 
through there function: 
“embraces a three-dimensional concept: (1) that of purposive fuzziness and 
vagueness (threat- minimizing strategy); (2) that which reflects the authors’ 
modesty for their achievements and avoidance of personal involvement; and (3) 
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that related to the impossibility or unwillingness of reaching absolute accuracy 
and of quantifying all the phenomena under observation“ (1994: 153). 
Later, she goes on to give formal criteria on how to identify hedges. According to her, 
hedges include five separate linguistic phenomena. Some of these relate to vagueness in 
their own right, and will be discussed more extensively below20. Shields are “modal verbs 
expressing possibility” (154). Approximators are taken from Prince et al. (1982: 86) to mean 
“stereotyped ‘adaptors’ as well as ‘rounders’ of quantity, degree, frequency and time” (154). 
She also includes “expressions such as ‘I believe’, ‘to our knowledge,’ ‘it is our view that . . .’ 
which express the authors’ personal doubt and direct involvement.” (154). Here, and in the 
next category of ‘emotionally-charged intensifiers” (154) she blurs the distinction between a 
functional and a formal approach of identifying vagueness. The last category is concerned 
with “compound hedges” (154), which describes instances when the above categories are 
combined by language users (155). 
Crompton criticises this mixing of functional and formal definition. He states “It seems 
clear that hedging cannot, unfortunately, be pinned down and labelled as a closed set of 
lexical items.” (Crompton 1997: 281) and then goes on to define a hedge as “an item of 
language which a speaker uses to explicitly qualify his/her lack of commitment to the truth 
of a proposition he/she utters.” (1997: 281), departing entirely from the formal aspects of 
definition. 
Cutting (2012: 285) elaborates on the functional aspects: 
“A review of the literature of VL in general suggested that there are three hedging 
functions; in the study, these were labelled ‘courtesy’, ‘modesty’ and ‘caution’. 
These are particularly relevant to the assumption that the level of 
informativeness [sic] would be low because of the community of practice’s shared 
knowledge and Conventions”. 
The problem with these sorts of functional approaches to hedges is that they again muddy 
the waters on which words and phrases may be counted as a hedge. To still be able to 
recognize hedges when they come up, Crompton (1997: 282) proposes the following test: 
“Can the proposition be restated in such a way that it is not changed but that the 
author’s commitment to it is greater than at present? If “yes” then the 
proposition is hedged. (The hedges are any language items in the original which 
would need to be changed to increase commitment)”. 
It is interesting to note that unlike most studies of vague language, which are concerned 
with spoken language, the largest area of studying hedges has come to be academic writing, 
a specific sub-class of written language. 
 
                                                          
20 Due to authors using differing vocabulary, such an overlap is unfortunately unavoidable. 
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General extenders/vague categories 
Another marker for vague language is what I will call vague categories. Different authors 
have discussed the phenomenon under various names: general extenders (Overstreet 2006: 
25), extension particles (DuBois 1992), or vague category markers (O’Keeffe 2004: 5). What 
they mean by this is a form of speech where a person makes a statement about something, 
and then, after the sentence could potentially be complete extends it by making it an 
example for a vague category. This of course presupposes a certain amount of shared 
knowledge between speaker and audience about what else could fall into this category. 
O’Keeffe (2004: 6) gives a functional definition along these lines: 
“The vague category markers in the corpus will be seen as recognisable chunks 
of language that function in an expedient way as linguistic triggers employed by 
speakers and decoded by participants who draw on their store of shared 
knowledge”. 
While O’Keeffe hints at some formal criteria that might be used to identify vague 
categories, she herself does not use them. She states: “The analysis focuses on any forms 
that make vague reference to sets or categories. Research tells us that vague category 
markers are found in clause-final positions and mostly comprise a conjunction and a noun 
phrase” these are admittedly thin criteria, and she immediately continues to say “however 
because a bottom up approach to identifying all vague categories in the data was used, there 
was no pre-selection criteria based on form”. 
Overstreet/Yule (1997: 250-1) give some thought to a formal definition: 
“The forms in question can be characterized as a class of clause-final expressions 
that have the syntactic structure of conjunction plus noun phrase. […] They all 
have nonspecific or ‘general’ reference, and they ‘extend’ otherwise 
grammatically complete utterances. They can be divided into one subset called 
adjunctive general extenders (typically beginning with and) and another called 
disjunctive general extenders (beginning with or)”. 
They go on to give some examples, making it clear that they do not envision a definite, 
closed list of general extenders 
Channell (1994: 119) gives the examples of ‘or something’, ‘and things’, and ‘whatnot’. 
She proceeds to give a list which, contrary to most instances, appears to be intended to be 
exhaustive. According to her, what she calls tags, or vague category identifiers can either 
start with and or with or. Special emphasis is laid on the phenomenon that vague categories 
require a certain amount of knowledge from the interlocutors to work: “Hearers and readers 
need to draw on pragmatic information in order to identify the intended vague category. 
They use in particular: (a) the surrounding linguistic context; (b) the purpose of the text or 
conversation; and (c) their world knowledge” (Channell 1994: 143). 
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Vague Quantifiers/approximators 
One feature of language that is intimately related to understanding precision and 
vagueness are numbers. Usually, numbers of any kind evoke precision. However, there are 
also ways to refer to quantities that render language decidedly vaguer. 
“We saw […] that there exist a number of ways of being vague about quantities 
in English. In particular, speakers have the option of either adding something to 
a precise number or numbers, or using a round number, or using a vague 
quantifier” (Channell 1994: 42). 
Although Channell dedicates three separate chapters to these phenomena, I will 
summarize them all as vague quantifiers, because they are all concerned with expressing 
vague quantities, and they seem to go together for other authors. This category of vagueness 
indicators is one where most clarifications come in the form of examples, so I will try to give 
an overview of what different authors consider to be approximators or vague quantifiers. 
Examples for approximators in conjunction with numbers given by Channell are: ‘five or 
six’, ‘about ten’, ‘around the twenty percent mark’, ‘eighty or so’ (1994: 42-43). Some of 
these words can have a completely different meaning when used in a different context: in 
the sentence ‘I am talking about this’, the word ‘about’ is used very differently than in 
Channell’s example above. This shows that one has to be careful when only looking at words, 
especially when the analysis is partly or completely automated. Using round numbers is 
another indicator Channell (1994: 78) uses for identifying vagueness. However, while this 
may work in general speech, it is very hard to identify which numbers are meant as precise, 
yet incidentally round, and which are meant as an approximation. 
Examples for non-numerical vague quantifiers, according to Crystal/Davy (1975: 113) are 
‘oodles’, ‘bags of’, ‘heaps of’, ‘umpteen’, ‘touch of’. Channell (1994: 95) adds ‘some’, 
‘several’, ‘lots’, ‘a high rate of’, ‘masses of’, ‘a lower’, ‘a higher’, ‘and an extensive’. Talking 
about vague quantifiers in surveys, Bradburn/Miles (1979: 92) give the examples ‘very’, 
‘pretty’ and ‘not too’ (often, strong, etc., see also Wänke 2002). Coventry et al. (2010: 222) 
give the examples of “few, some, many and lots of“. Lin (2013: 76) speaks of “vague 
quantifiers such as a bit and a little bit”. 
In addition to these exemplifications, there are also attempts at defining vague 
quantifiers through their function. “One of the functions of proximative adverbs (around, 
about, almost, nearly, etc.) in discourse is to make reported events, times, distances, 
numbers, etc. vague.” (Janney 2002: FN 9). But even in this case, exemplification is used, and 
the function cited is almost tautological. Although it dies seem to be the case that when it is 
not the numbers themselves that are used to convey vagueness, approximators as a group 
do seem to mostly consist of adverbs, with a few adjectives added for good measure. There 
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is a slight curiosity in that Channell (1994: 118) gives a definition of a category by 
exemplifying the exclusions rather than the inclusions: 
“There exist in English a large number of ways of quantifying without using 
numbers. […] With the exception of the minority of terms which are at the ends 
of scales, for example, all, never, these terms are vague. […] Many of the vague 
quantifiers are restricted to spoken, informal contexts.” (Channell 1994: 118)”. 
A main takeaway from all these examples is that there is no definite list of words or 
expressions in the category of vague quantifiers, and that deductive methods always have to 
rely on the assessment of the researcher. Somewhat ironically, most of the definitions used 
take the form of vague category markings themselves. 
 
Placeholder words 
Channell (1994) identifies several English placeholder words: ‘thingy’ (158), ‘thingummy’, 
‘thingummyjig’, ‘thingumabob’ (159), ‘whatsisname’, ‘whatnot’ (160), and ‘whatsit’ (161). Of 
course, these words exist in any language. The functional definition follows shortly after: 
“Placeholders are used for two communicative reasons: 1 when speaker does not 
know or has forgotten a name or noun; 2 when speaker does not wish to use a 
name or noun” (Channell 1994: 164). 
 Placeholder words are almost exclusively used in spoken language (164). It is also obvious 
that these words are also very informal, and it is perhaps the category that illustrates most 
clearly why findings from the field of linguistics cannot simply be applied to specialized 
languages like those used in IL – at least not without careful further investigation. Even 
though the examples above are not meant to be a closed list, it borders on the ridiculous to 
find even similar words in any kind of legal text. 
 
Mass nouns 
The concept of mass nouns is a little more complicated than most other indicators 
discussed here. Chierchia (2010: 100) informs us that “[w]hile every noun/concept may in a 
sense be vague, mass nouns/concepts are vague in a way that systematically impairs their 
use in counting”. Accordingly, this category might come closest to the philosophical 
definition of vagueness as discussed in section 2.1.1. The opposite of a mass noun is a called 
a ‘count noun’ (Trask 2013: 67). 
Comparing the two expressions ‘more than half’ and ‘most’, Solt (2011) try to get at the 
specific differences in meaning of mass concepts. 
“The felicitous corpus example (37a) contrasts with the awkward (37b); the issue 
here is that racism is not something that can be quantitatively measured. On the 
other hand, more than half is acceptable in examples such as (38), the difference 
being that energy use can receive a numerical measure (expressed e.g. in 
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kilowatt hours). (37) a. But black activists acknowledge that most racism is not 
so blatant. (Associated Press, 16/9/1991) b. ?But black activists acknowledge 
that more than half of racism is not so blatant. (38) More than half of home 
energy use goes to space heating and cooling. (Popular Mechanics, 184(6), p. 79, 
2007) As the preceding discussion shows, most and more than half —despite 
their superficially similar meanings—are used very differently by speakers” (Solt 
2011: 170).21 
Solt illustrates the inherent immensurability of racism: It is a concept that cannot be 
counted and therefore fulfils the criteria of being a mass noun. 
 
Determiners 
In conjunction with mass nouns, determiners are sometimes discussed as relating to 
vagueness. According to Trask (2013: 80), a determiner is 
“A lexical category, or a member of this category, whose members typically occur 
within noun phrases and indicate the range of applicability of the noun phrases 
containing them. English determiners include the articles the and a, the 
demonstratives this and that, possessives like my and your, quantifiers like many, 
few, no and stressed some, and various other items like either, which, both and 
unstressed some. In most versions of the X-bar system, determiners are regarded 
as specifiers of nouns” 
They have a special relationship to mass and count nouns, as some determiners go only 
with mass nouns, while others can only be used in conjunction with count nouns. This was 
already hinted at in Solt’s distinction above. Determiners could therefore potentially be used 
to distinguish mass nouns from count nouns in automatic language processing, especially 
since there can normally be only one determiner in a noun phrase (cf. Aarts et al. 2014: 119). 
 
Shields 
As the name suggests, shields are defined primarily through their function: distancing the 
speaker from what she is saying and thereby protecting her. Jucker et al (2003: 1761) tell us: 
“First, speakers indicate in various ways their degree of commitment toward a 
proposition being expressed. Vague expressions are themselves an explicit 
Conventional device for conveying a lack of commitment. One way of doing this 
is to use a so-called ‘shield’”. 
They are also overlapping with many of the phenomena already discussed above, 
including adjectives like ‘probably’. The reason why I include them as a separate category 
here is that when talking about shields, scholars lay the most emphasis on verbs, which are 
not at the centre of any of the other classes of vagueness indicators. 
                                                          
21 The question mark in example 37b indicates a grammatically or otherwise wrong sentence in 
linguistic Convention. 
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“First of all, there exists a range of parenthetical phrases like I think, I believe or 
I guess […] Finally, different kinds of modal verbs, e.g. might, would and could, 
can indicate lack of certainty” (Jucker et al 2003: 1762). 
Jucker indicates that shields are one of the means which the relationship between 
uncertainty and vagueness, mentioned in chapter 2.1.2, can be expressed. 
The indicators for vagueness identified in this section are various and diverse, and 
practically all of the definitions are vague themselves, in the sense that it is not clear which 
words and expressions are included or excluded. On the other hand, they do present a 
relatively detailed picture on what to look for when trying to find vagueness. They all have 
in common that they are useful when attempting to find vagueness within a sentence: all of 
them relate to either words or short phrases, and none rely on the entire sentence or the 
sentences surrounding it to apply. 
4.1.2 Inductive approaches 
Another way to approach the question of how to identify vague language is by proceeding 
inductively. This involves empirical studies, asking people how they perceive different 
characteristics of text. This sort of process is much more time-intensive, and much rarer, than 
the theoretical approach discussed above. 
Caraballo/Charniak (1999) test various measures to automatically determine the degree 
of specificity of nouns in text, for instance factoring in how often they occur and how often 
they are modified by adjectives, verbs or other nouns. This method is interesting as it 
considers the words immediately around the noun in question, and also as it does not require 
extensive questionnaires. However, directly linked to this, the criteria they give to their 
program are actually arrived at from theoretic preconceptions and in this sense not 
empirical. On the other hand, the results were then re-evaluated and checked, and therefore 
this may still count as an attempt to go beyond mere positing of theoretical notions on how 
to recognize vague words. One interesting indicator that has not appeared above is that the 
authors suppose that 
“One possible indicator of specificity is how often the noun is modified. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that very specific nouns are rarely modified, while very 
general nouns would usually be modified” (1999: 64). 
However, in this very idea encapsulates its main problem: would the idea expressed by 
the modified general noun still lack specificity? Their model does not address this, being 
aimed only at the specificity of the original, unmodified nouns. 
Gilhooly/Logie (1980) use a questionnaire to determine (among other things) the 
ambiguity of 1944 words, but they simplified it by letting subjects first rate all words as 
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ambiguous or not ambiguous, and then only asked for interpretations of those words that 
were rated ambiguous. While this comes close to empirically determining the perceived 
vagueness of words, two points are worth keeping in mind. For one thing, their instructions 
regarding the rating of words according to their ambiguity reads as follows: “Words referring 
to objects, materials, or persons were to receive a high concreteness rating, and words 
referring to abstract concepts that could not be experienced by the senses were to receive a 
low concreteness rating” (1980: 396). This, while certainly in a way related, is quite different 
from the concepts of vagueness discussed here. Second, the fact that they look at single 
words, while advantageous in terms of research design and feasibility also bears certain 
limitations – as we have seen with regards to vague quantifiers above, words may have 
radically differing meanings depending on how they are used in a sentence. Nevertheless, 
the list of results on all tested words they provide (397-428) is maybe the most 
comprehensive assessment provided in this direction of study. 
Chandra et al. (2003) develop an Ambiguity Index by empirically determining which 
different interpretations of a term actually are understood in practice, and how often they 
occur. Their definition of ambiguity, as something that “can be defined as the tendency for 
a term or concept to be understood in more than one way” (2003: 48) comes much closer to 
the concept of vagueness under discussion here. The way they measure this is by comparing 
the most frequent response option to the frequency of all other options. So, they effectively 
measure the probability of people interpreting a statement differently than the dominant 
interpretation. This is very interesting as it does not require respondents to realize any 
vagueness or ambiguity in a statement at all: they may all be convinced that their 
interpretation is the only plausible one. 
In this and the previous section I have attempted to give an overview of the most common 
ways to identify vague language. It is not easy to identify clear categories, since the 
terminology is far from fixed and even when authors make reference to one another, they 
still usually modify the concepts at least a little. One thing that this overview makes clear is 
that vague language is not restricted to one or a few word classes. Instead, it is necessary to 
take a closer look at nouns, adjectives, adverbs, verbs and conjunctions alike. It is also 
noteworthy that most of the emphasis lies on vocabulary (even if it is sometimes compound 
phrases like in the case of general extenders) and not on grammatical features. 
4.2 Legal language as specialized language 
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While the study of vague language and how to identify it is by far the most prevalent in 
the field of linguistics, there are a few problems with the applicability of the findings to the 
current study. Most importantly, the overwhelming majority of the studies is based on 
spoken, everyday language. The language and expressions used under such circumstances 
varies greatly from those used in formal legal agreements like the ones studied here. To give 
one obvious example, words like ‘thingy’, as discussed in section 4.1.1, while clearly vague, 
never appear in international agreements. But even when the differences are not quite so 
glaring, there is no indication that expressions that would be seen as vague in one context 
would appear so in another context as well. This point is important for all different categories 
of language, but perhaps especially so in the highly specific world of legal language. 
Consequently, this section will first outline the arguments on why differences among 
speech communities and (professional) contexts are important to take into account when 
analysing language. In a second part, I will briefly touch on the specific peculiarities of legal 
language. This serves as a background to the description of how vagueness has been 
identified so far in legal/IR contexts. In both cases, I will use the phenomenon of vagueness 
to anchor and exemplify, but the importance of differences between speech communities 
are more widely applicable than that. 
4.2.1 Specialized languages 
The findings of the previous section cannot simply be applied to international 
agreements. As Easterbrook (1984: 87) states: 
“Words have meaning only to the extent there is some agreement among a 
community of users of language. Unless both writers and readers understand the 
same thing by some construction of words, the writing either fails of any purpose 
or, as with literary interpretation, liberates the reader to supply his own meaning 
or story”. 
Therefore, it is important to take into account the community of language users. There is 
not one clear and accepted definition of specialized languages. One of the most widely 
received ones comes from Castellví (1999: 59) 
“The set of rules, units and restrictions that form part of the knowledge of most 
speakers of a language constitutes the common or general language. [...] In 
contrast, we speak of special or specialized languages to refer to a set of 
subcodes (that partially overlap with the subcodes of the general language), each 
of which can be ‘specifically’ characterized by certain particulars such as subject 
field, type of interlocutors, situation, speakers’ intentions, the context in which a 
communicative exchange occurs, the type of exchange, etc.”. 
She emphasizes that in addition to looking for units and rules, it must be considered how 
speakers actually use a language. As can be seen by the exemplifications, it is not actually 
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easy or clear to decide what counts as a specialized language in the end, and which features 
of the language will be different from general language. Maia (2003: 27) suggests that the 
differences go beyond specialized terminology: 
“simply knowing the correct vocabulary for legal terms in another language […] 
is not sufficient to translate from the legal genre of one language into that of 
another”. 
However, it is clear that specialized languages can be attributed to groups of people who 
speak a language. According to Gumperz (1971: 114), these communities can be constituted 
according to all kinds of criteria: 
“Most groups of any permanence, be they small bands bounded by face-to-face 
contact, modern nations divisible into smaller subregions, or even occupational 
associations or neighborhood gangs, may be treated as speech communities, 
provided they show linguistic peculiarities that warrant special study”. 
In the case of this paper, the speech community of interest is a professional one. In 
addition to allowing professional communities to communicate efficiently about very specific 
problems, they can also be a mark of status and rank, and act as a gate-keeping mechanism 
to prevent specialized knowledge from being obtained by the general public. Explicitly 
mentioning the legal and the medical field, Heath (1979: 103) elaborates on this point: 
“Anthropologists and linguists, working in cultures other than our own, have 
described the secret and /or special languages of those members of societies who 
hold access to restricted information, and we have learned much about the role 
linguistic competence plays in socialization into these privileged positions. It is 
reasonable to attempt to gain corresponding knowledge about the 
communicative habits of those who serve somewhat similar purposes in today’s 
modern and complex societies”. 
While it is difficult to say in general how language is modified in specialized communities 
– precisely because different communities engender different (types of) modification – it is 
nevertheless clear that it is important for any analysis of language to know which kind of 
specialized language the discourse under study is part of. As Gumperz (1971: 115) illustrates, 
understanding at least the basics of the specific kind of speech community is fundamental to 
any kind of understanding: 
“Just as intelligibility presupposes underlying grammatical rules, the 
communication of social information presupposes the existence of regular 
relationships between language usage and social structure. Before we can judge 
a speaker’s social intent, we must know something about the norms defining the 
appropriateness of linguistically acceptable alternates for particular types of 
speakers; these norms vary among subgroups and among social settings”. 
It is therefore necessary to look more closely at the properties of legal language, in order 
to understand how it differs from general language and avoid false equivalences. 
4.2.2 Characteristics of legal language 
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Having established that specialized languages are a fundamental analytical category, I will 
now take a look at legal language in particular. The first question to ask is whether legal 
language is indeed a specialized language – and thus a subsection of, in our case, English, or 
if it might even be a different language altogether: 
“Legal language is treated as a sub-type of natural language. It shares with 
natural language several relevant semantic and pragmatic features, such as 
fuzziness, contextuality of meaning and viability as an instrument of 
communication. The characteristics of a legal language are rather problematic 
and controversial, and even its very existence is discussed” (Wróblewski 1985: 
240). 
Discussing the same doubts, Tiersma nevertheless agrees to treat legal language as a sub-
category of general language rather than putting it in an entirely different category. 
“Although some have suggested that legal English is a separate language, it 
seems best to regard it as a variety of English. For the most part, legal language 
follows the rules that govern English in general. At the same time, it diverges in 
many ways from ordinary speech, far more than the technical languages of most 
other professions” (Tiersma 1999: 49). 
I would agree with Tiersma in his assessment that legal English is indeed a variety of 
English, but his argument shows how large the differences can be perceived as. 
The following subsections detail a number of features that distinguishes legal language 
from ordinary language. 
 
Formality 
Mellinkoff (1963: 19) writes: “There is a ceremonial quality to the language of the law 
achieved by the use of ‘formal words’ – words set apart from the language of street or locker 
room”. Formal and ritualistic language is another trait of the legal lexicon. Such language 
tends to be archaic as well, although it need not be”. Tiersma (1999: 100) notes that in texts 
as well as court proceedings, the language tends to be at its most ritualistic in the beginning 
and at the end. One of the reasons Tiersma gives for the formality of most legal documents 
is that it is used to mark the document as a legal act, with all the consequences that entails. 
However, he also adds that there is such a thing as ‘lawyerly slang’ (1999: 137), countering 
the notion that legal language is exclusively formal. Mattila (2006: 39) argues that one of the 
functions of legal language is to uphold the authority of the law, which entails a need for 
some formality. 
 
Specialized vocabulary 
Several of the characteristics Mellinkoff identifies in his seminal book ‘The language of 
the Law’ as distinguishing legal from everyday English have to do with vocabulary: “Frequent 
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use of common words with uncommon meanings”, “Frequent use of Old English and Middle 
English words once common use, but now rare”, “Frequent use of Latin words and phrases”, 
“Use of Old French and Anglo-Norman words which have not been taken into the general 
vocabulary”, and “Use of terms of art”. (1963: 11) Of course, Mellinkoff is talking here 
specifically about English legal language, so even when international agreements are written 
in English, that is not to say that they have the same characteristics as the English legal 
discourse we are concerned with. For example, current international agreements appear to 
contain much less Latin words than Mellinkoff attests for the English legal system. 
Nevertheless, vocabulary has often been cited as the main difference between legal and 
everyday language (see critically Charrow et al 1982: 175). The existence of legal dictionaries 
and thesauruses stands testimony to the importance of legal vocabulary (see Garner/Black 
2004 or Curzon 2007). 
 
Grammatical structures 
The grammar of the legal language is of course closely based on general grammar (Mattila 
2006: 3). Nevertheless, Charrow et al (1982: 176) identify several grammatical peculiarities 
of the legal language. According to them, passive constructions, the interjection of phrases 
in the middle of a clause, phrases beginning with ‘as to’, nominalizations, word lists and 
multiple negatives, while unusual in everyday language, are common in the legal setting. On 
the other hand, it could of course be argued that since these constructions do exist in the 
general language but are used less frequently there, this does not amount to changes in 
grammar but simply to a legal writing ‘style’ (Mattila 2006:3). Mellinkoff (1963: 145) suggests 
that some of the grammar used in legal texts has been taken from Latin. 
 
Exclusivity 
All of the features mentioned above come together make it extremely difficult for 
laypeople to understand legal language. In accordance with Heath’s point about the 
exclusiveness of specialized languages, a large part of the academic discourse on legal 
language has focussed on the difficulties for ordinary people to understand the language of 
the law. For example, Levi (1990: 25) writes on the so-called ‘legalese’: 
“it is the quality of the written language in those documents which elicits intense 
reactions from many citizens, who feel that the language in those cases serves 
not as a means of, but rather as an obstacle to, effective communication”. 
Indeed, when compared to other technical professional languages like that of engineers 
or even medical professionals, the question of accessibility to the general population seems 
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especially glaring in the legal field, because of the direct impact the language itself has on 
every person’s life. After all, „language is the vehicle by means of which law is transmitted, 
interpreted and executed in all cultures” (Levi 1990: 4). In fact, the scope of the problem is 
such that a concerted effort – the plain English movement – is dedicated to rendering legal 
language more accessible to the general population. 
However, there may also be positive aspects to this exclusivity: 
The other side of the coin is that a specialist language strengthens group 
cohesion. This holds true, too, for the legal profession: an in-house language 
encourages among lawyers a feeling of solidarity towards their colleagues; it 
consolidates professional identity in legal circles, and expresses the commitment 
of lawyers to the values and traditions of their profession” (Mattila 2006: 52). 
The specialized nature of legal language excludes people untrained in law, but it does 
enhance a sense of community among those who speak it. 
 
Performativity 
Maley (1987: 27) takes a completely different approach to getting at the distinguishing 
characteristics of legal langue: “Controlling actions by words; here is the key to the 
understanding of legislative language.” What he refers to here are the performative 
properties of the language of the law. Mattila (2006: 31) elaborates: 
„Speech acts are of fundamental importance from the standpoint of the legal 
order. Given that the law is a metaphysical phenomenon that is only ‘alive’ in 
language, it is only by language means that it is possible to change legal 
relationships. The language of the law is thus an instrument of speech acts: it has 
a performative function”. 
The above quotes may seem to imply that performativity itself is the factor that sets legal 
language apart from other types of language. This is not quite the case: After all, Austin 
(1962: 147) has famously shown that all language is, in some way, performative. However, 
legal language indeed stands out as a particularly explicit type of performative language. By 
their very definition, laws are prescriptive, and this is reflected in the language they are 
formulated in. While in ordinary life, illocutionary acts are often implied in the language (i.e. 
one would say ‘do the dishes’ instead of ‘I order you to do the dishes’), legal language often 
expresses this illocutionary force directly in the provisions themselves. And a large part of 
this explicit illocution is expressed in verbs. Austin’s argument gradually abstracts from these 
verbs, showing that it is not necessary to say ‘I promise’ for a promise to be made (1962: 32), 
but it is not at all a random choice that these verbs are his starting point. It follows that verbs 
which make an illocutionary act, deserve particular attention in the legal context. Based on 
Austin’s (1962: 32) expression, I will call these verbs explicitly performative verbs, or explicit 
performatives. As a testament to how important verbs are to legal language, entire articles 
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have been written on the use of the modal auxiliaries ‘shall’ and ‘should’ in treaty text (cf. 
e.g. Williams 2005, D’Acquisto/D’Avanzo 2009). 
4.2.3 Legal language and vagueness 
At first glance, legal language seems to contain less vagueness than ordinary language. As 
Tiersma (1999: 71) puts it: 
“Much of the linguistic behaviour of the legal profession is geared towards 
speaking and writing as clearly and precisely as possible”. 
The notion that legal language is more precise than general language is almost as 
ubiquitous as the view that it is difficult to understand for laypeople.22 
Interestingly, two of the characteristics Mellinkoff (1963: 11) ascribes to legal language 
are “deliberate use of words and expressions with flexible meanings”, and “attempts at 
extreme precision of expression” They appear contradictory: How can legal language be 
characterized, at once, by use of deliberately flexible meanings and extreme precision? 
Mellinkoff seems to hint that the question of vagueness is particularly important in the legal 
discourse, and it can consequently tend to both extremes of the spectrum. 
Quite apart from research discussing the nature of vagueness in the legal language, an 
argument can also be made deriving from the properties of vague language. As we have seen 
in section 4.1.1, indicators of vague language are often defined functionally. By way of 
summary, Drave (2001: 26-7) lists the functions of vagueness in everyday conversation: as 
filling lexical and knowledge gaps, (de-)emphasising or deliberately withholding certain 
information, conveying tentativeness, an evaluation of, or expectation about, or a 
proposition, or maintaining an atmosphere of friendliness, informality or deference. Having 
discussed the peculiarities of legal language above, it is clear that several of these functions 
do not apply in the legal field. Some of them are tied to spoken language, while other 
function may relate to entirely different forms in the legal field. Fjeld (2005: 157) sums it up, 
saying 
“the precisification strategies used by law experts and by normal readers/laymen 
are of different kinds, which often leads to misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations”. 
Another anchoring point ties back to the vagueness indicator of vague categories, 
discussed in section 4.1.1. O’Keeffe points out that in order for vague categories to function 
communicatively, a shared framework is needed: 
“It is argued that the shared knowledge required in order to construct vague 
categories has a common core of socio culturally ratified ‘understandings’ and 
                                                          
22 See Mattila (2006: 3) or the discussion on so-called ‚legalese’, e.g. Benson/Kessler 1986 or Hill 2001. 
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that the range of domains of reference of these categories is relative to the depth 
of shared knowledge of the participants and relative to their social relationship” 
(2004: 1). 
Additionally, vagueness is usually implicitly assumed to apply to the locutionary 
dimension of language. However, especially considering the very explicitly performative 
nature of the legal language, it is a fair question whether or not this assumption is actually 
true – vagueness may well be found in both the locutionary and the performative aspect of 
a legal text. 
As this section has shown, the indicators for vague language as discussed above can only 
be useful as a first point of departure. 
4.3 Vagueness indicators in IL 
Having seen the importance of specialized languages, it stands to reason that in order to 
find useful indicators for the presence of vagueness in international agreements, it is 
necessary to turn to scholars of IL. Unfortunately, even though many researchers have 
hypotheses on the causes and effects of vagueness in IL (as shown in chapter 3), very few 
give any indication as to which criteria they use to identify and compare vagueness. This is 
not to say that scholars make no assertions on which agreements and provisions they believe 
to be vague: on the contrary. But those who do assert vagueness often stick to specific 
examples and rarely go into the details on why exactly they consider some phrases to be 
vague and not others. This makes generalizations extremely difficult. 
Franck (1988: 713-714) gives some examples on what a comparison between sentences 
in a treaty would look like: 
“To illustrate the point, let us compare two textual formulations defining the 
boundary of the underwater continental shelf. The 1958 Convention places the 
shelf at “a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said 
areas.” The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, on the other hand, is far 
more detailed and specific. It defines the shelf as “the natural prolongation of . . 
. land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea is measured,” but takes into account such specific factors as “the thickness 
of sedimentary rocks” and imposes an outermost limit that “shall not exceed 100 
nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath,” which, in turn, is a line connecting 
the points where the waters are 2,500 meters deep”. 
 
While he thus provides a somewhat more detailed description of what he means by 
vagueness than most other scholars of IL, he nonetheless fails to provide the empirical means 
to actually test his theory. In order to do so, we would need criteria allowing a classification 
of some treaty texts as vaguer than others, before then seeing if they are actually obeyed 
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more readily. The examples that Franck gives could be used to deduce such criteria, but the 
only one that seems obvious from his text is that determinate rules seem to contain more 
numbers. While his theoretical argument is compelling, the empirical foundation for it is still 
somewhat lacking. 
Abbott et al. (2000) have theorized on vagueness in international agreements in the 
context of their study of the legalization of international regimes. They propose a three-
partite conception of legalization, dividing it into obligation, precision and delegation. 
“Obligation means that states or other actors are legally bound by a rule or 
commitment or by a set of rules and commitments […] in the sense that their 
behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures 
and discourse of international law, and often domestic law as well. Precision 
means that rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize, or 
proscribe. Delegation means that third parties have been granted the authority 
to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) 
to make further rules” (Abbott et al. 2000: 401). 
If the level of each of these indicators is high, a rule or regime will then be highly legalized. 
While they embed their hypotheses about precision in legal documents in the broader 
framework of legalization, they also provide one of the further-reaching attempts to 
operationalize the concept, building on Franck’s theories. According to them, 
“A precise rule specifies clearly and unambiguously what is expected of a state 
or other actor (in terms of both the intended objective and the means of 
achieving it) in a particular set of circumstances. In other words, precision 
narrows the scope for reasonable interpretation. In Thomas Franck’s terms, such 
rules are ‘‘determinate.’’ For a set of rules, precision implies not just that each 
rule in the set is unambiguous, but that the rules are related to one another in a 
noncontradictory way, creating a framework within which case-by-case 
interpretation can be coherently carried out. Precise sets of rules are often, 
though by no means always, highly elaborated or dense, detailing conditions of 
application, spelling out required or proscribed behavior in numerous situations, 
and so on” (Abbott et al. 2000: 413). 
However, while they do provide a few guidelines on how to distinguish vague treaties 
from precise ones – most notably ‘rule-like’ instead of ‘standard-like’ formulation, use of 
numbers and non-contradictory rules, most of their accounts still remain in the area of 
examples, not easily applicable criteria, as the following quote shows: 
“Much of international law is in fact quite precise, and precision and elaboration 
appear to be increasing dramatically, as exemplified by the WTO trade 
agreements, environmental agreements like the Montreal (ozone) and Kyoto 
(climate change) Protocols, and the arms control treaties produced during the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and subsequent negotiations. […] Even 
many nonbinding instruments, like the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development and Agenda 21, are remarkably precise and dense, presumably 
because proponents believe that these characteristics enhance their normative 
and political value” (Abbott et al 2000: 414). 
While being critical of Abbott et al.’s approach, Flohr also offers some explanation on 
what more precise legal provisions look like: 
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“Rule-like provisions would narrow the room for interpretation and might, for 
example, provide that ‘truckers shall drive no more than 50 mph and take breaks 
every 4 hours’. Compared to the principle of ‘driving cautiously’, precision would 
have increased, thereby reducing addressee discretion. However, addressee 
discretion, especially in the international legal system, also depends on the 
degree to which rules are prescriptive, meaning whether they impose duties as 
absolute requirements or as recommendations or options to consider. In practice, 
these criteria will often overlap and they may even appear indistinguishable, 
although they are analytically distinct” (Flohr 2014: 53-54). 
There are very few studies which discuss specific indicators for vagueness in international 
legal language. In an article comparing the English and Croatian versions of the Arbitration 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of the 
Republic of Slovenia, Šočanać (2009: 190) discusses determiners, modifiers, modal auxiliaries 
and passive constructions as to their effect on vague language. According to her, 
“exact quantification tends to give a high degree of precision to the language of 
the document. On the other hand, determiners such as some, any, all, both, 
either, neither, each and every imply varying degrees of precision both in general 
and legal language” (2009: 199). 
Determiners seem to be important in order to determine whether a provision is vague or 
precise, but it remains unclear which determiners point in which direction, and why. 
On the subject of modifiers23, Šočanać also finds that while some modifiers enhance 
precision, others render the text vaguer. 
“In general terms, quantification involves greater determinacy than qualification, 
which, in itself, implies different degrees of precision. Most of the examples [of 
modifiers] in our corpus are descriptors, involving different degrees of 
indeterminacy/precision” (Šočanać 2009: 199). 
Modal auxiliaries can also be indicators for vagueness or precision. In particular, ‘may’ 
and ‘shall’ are discussed by Šočanać: 
“May can cause vagueness since it can express both deontic permission and 
epistemic possibility. […] Shall denotes ‘mandatory intent’ which means that 
noncompliance is punishable by sanction” (Šočanać 2009: 200-1). 
It is not entirely clear if she therefore also considers ‘shall’ to be more precise than other 
modal auxiliaries, but the way the data is presented seems to imply just that. 
Fjeld (2005) considers the role of vague adjectives in normative text.24 According to her, 
“Most nouns are indefinite and need specification, either according to the 
situation, or according to linguistic specification. The main function of adjectives 
is normally to specify or identify vague or indefinite nouns, and this was also the 
case in the analysed acts. A certain set of adjectives proved to be extremely 
                                                          
23 According to Trask (2013: 174), a modifier is a member of „any category which serves to add 
semantic information to that provided by the head of the category within which it is contained, such 
as an adjective or a relative clause within an NP or an adverbial within a VP.” 
24 Although Fjeld is mostly concerned with (Norwegian) domestic legal texts, I discuss her work here 
because it is the basis for some research focussed on the international sphere. 
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frequent in the acts examined. An analysis of their semantics show that they are 
in fact often used as deprecisification tools in normative texts” (Fjeld 2005: 157). 
According to her, most adjectives serve to make a sentence more precise, but a certain 
subset of them actually makes legal sentences vaguer. She distinguishes dimensional and 
evaluative adjectives: The former “are interpreted according to the external properties of 
the referent of a noun and a metric scale of comparison to make up their quantity 
parameter” (2005: 159-60), while the latter “refer to internal and often prototypical 
properties, and must be interpreted according to an unpredictable and subjective scale of 
measurement related to their class of comparison” (2005: 160). They are therefore much 
more problematic in their interpretation (2005: 164). 
Partly basing her work on Fjeld, Di Carlo (2011) refers to ‘weasel words’, which are very 
similar to hedge words, in her analysis of the indeterminacy of Security Council resolutions 
on the Second Gulf War. She differentiates consequence adjectives (di Carlo 2011: 48) and 
modal adjectives (di Carlo 2011: 49), both of which are sub-classes of the evaluative 
adjectives specified by Fjeld (2005: 164-5), as well as weasel nouns (di Carlo 2011: 49). 
Interestingly with regard to the discussion on the performativity of legal language, both 
classes of adjectives used by di Carlo mainly affect the performative dimension of the 
sentence. According to her, these three groups of words are indicative of intentional 
vagueness in legal texts (di Carlo 2011: 47). It is important to note the di Carlo uses deductive 
categories, which do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the community of legal 
professionals. 
In this part of the dissertation, I have shown both that a reliable measurement tool is 
necessary for deeper insights into the fields of IR and IL and that such a tool does not as of 
yet exist. However, I have also provided some starting points for the following investigation: 
There are a few indicators of vagueness to be drawn from the literature. For example, it 
seems to be a common assumption that numbers increase the precision of a text. Similarly, 
words that more closely describe a rule (i.e. adjectives and adverbs) are seen as reducing 
vagueness, but some subclasses of adjectives may increase it. Flohr (2014: 54) and Šočanać 
(2009: 200) also add the dimension of prescriptiveness to the possible indicators. In the 
following, I will build on these thoughts to attempt the realization of the possibility to 
systematically measure vagueness in international legal documents. 
All of the indicators used by political or legal scientists discussed here are deduced from 
theoretical definitions and not based on what people perceive as vague. They are, however, 
usually concerned with existing legal documents and as such provide more insight than those 
based on general language. 
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4.4 Conclusion: uses and limits of existing methods 
It may seem like I have used a lot of space detailing ways to indicate vagueness in the first 
part of this chapter, only to then argue that they are not useful when looking at international 
agreements. This is not quite the case: While I do argue that existing linguistic indicators for 
vagueness cannot be applied to the context of IL without further thought, they do provide 
important starting points. It is quite possible that some or even all of the indicators are still 
valid in this context. But in order to know which ones remain applicable, and which ones do 
not carry over to the international legal context – and which new indicators may come into 
play that are not represented above – it is necessary to look directly at international 
agreements, and also to study how vague language is understood and interpreted by experts 
in the legal field. The next chapter is therefore aimed at developing new methods on the 
basis of those outlined here to specifically detect indicators of vagueness in international 
agreements. 
5 Looking for indicators of vagueness: original methods 
While the previous chapter discussed methods for discovering vagueness already existing 
in the literature, this chapter will lay out the method I used to find out features of 
international legal agreements that indicate vagueness. Section 5.1 will present the methods 
which were used to design a survey which was conducted among experts in IL in order to 
find out how to identify vagueness in legal texts. Section 5.2 goes to present the results of 
this survey in two parts: Section 5.2.1 presents the answers to a multiple choice section of 
the survey, wherein respondents were asked to rate sentences according to how vague they 
found them. Section 5.2.2 discusses the comments left by respondents in answer to open-
ended questions. Section 5.3 describes the analysis of the data gained by the survey and 
ultimately presents a consolidated tool which can be used to measure the relative vagueness 
of international agreements. 
5.1 Methods for the survey 
In this section, I will explain the methods used to survey international legal professionals, 
and my reasons for using them. The main goal of the survey was to learn what professionals 
in the field of IL regard as vague in international agreements. This is primarily for two reasons. 
For one, it is vital to capture the opinions and impressions of people who belong to the 
language community. The language of IL differs in significant ways from general other types 
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of professional or regional languages (see chapter 4.2.2), and therefore what appears vague 
will likely differ as well. Therefore, people familiar with the language will be better able to 
recognize vagueness where it is present. Secondly, their perceptions matter because at least 
in part, their interpretation becomes reality. As we have seen in the section on causal 
assumptions, negotiators’ beliefs on what vagueness may do can influence their behaviour 
around it. Similarly, how they believe vagueness to be expressed will change what 
formulations to use according to what they would like to achieve. In this way, even though 
the survey is limited to finding out what some people in the community of IL – speakers 
perceive to be vague, this limit is actually broader then it at first sounds, because the 
perceptions of the people surveyed are, albeit in a small way, part of what actually makes a 
sentence vague or not. 
In general, while designing the survey I had several, sometimes conflicting concerns. 
Firstly, as with most surveys, I aimed at maximising the responses. This was necessary for 
three reasons. One, the survey was made to collect, at least in part, quantitative data, and 
for quantitative studies more data is – ceteris paribus – better. Two, most statistical 
evaluation methods commonly used to evaluate raw data points call for a certain lower limit 
of data points to be applicable. Furthermore, while the study was not meant to be 
representative, I did try to make the field of respondents (within the intended target group) 
as large and diverse as possible by sending invitations to participate to universities as well as 
research institutes and international organisations from different countries. 
Secondly, the material I wanted to ask about also needed to be as close as possible to 
actual agreements. This is the case for several reasons enhancing the quality of the 
responses. Leaving the text as unaltered as possible would avoid the accidental exclusion of 
significant characteristics. As mentioned in chapter 4.2 above, it is also imperative to stay 
within the framework of the language of IL. If this was the only concern of the study, it would 
have been best to have people read complete, unaltered agreements and ask for their 
perceptions on the vagueness. However, there are other concerns prohibiting that approach. 
The most obvious one is a respect for the time of busy professionals, and a commitment 
to user-friendliness in surveys. The reasons for this are both ethical and pragmatic. For one, 
making a survey as user-friendly as possible is an end in and of itself, being the bare minimum 
acknowledgement that people donate their time to fill it out. For the other, people are much 
more likely to continue filling out a survey, or even recommend it to others, if it is user-
friendly and demands only a limited amount of time to fill out (see Dillmann 1993: 298). 
Therefore, respecting people’s time constraints, and making their experience as pleasant as 
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possible also maximises the potential for usable answers, enhancing the quality of the data 
gained in accordance with the aim outlined above. 
The second constraint on the necessity to stay as close as possible to the original materials 
is the aim of comparability. The more closely one stays to the original text and the more 
idiosyncrasies and details are taken up, the less likely it will be to apply to any other text. 
Therefore, the limits of the usefulness of the data would be the exact texts that would have 
been asked about in the survey. 
As mentioned above, another aim of the survey was to collect expertise from a specific 
target group, namely people familiar with IL. This is because random people may have very 
different conceptions about language and, as mentioned in chapter 4.2, opinions of people 
in the language community shape the language. This aim conflicts with the goal of getting as 
many responses as possible, because it narrows the target group considerably. 
Two more conflicting goals are the need to check for likely hypotheses, and the equally 
important need to stay open to new insights. The few hypotheses that were won by looking 
through relevant literature needed to be tested, because the sort of correlations drawn here 
depend on firm theoretical footing to be taken seriously to be even approximated to causal 
relationships. Therefore, hypotheses already taken up in more theoretical literature are 
more convincing in showing possible causalities, not simply correlations. 
On the other hand, since they were so few and far between, it was just as necessary to 
be open to new insights. Since the people surveyed were best placed to know which signs 
point to vagueness in international agreements, it makes sense that they would add some 
insights not present in the literature so far. Relatedly, all surveys entail the inherent danger 
of priming the respondents with answers that are thought likely by the survey designer (see 
Tversky/Kahnemann 1973), thus rendering the quality of the data questionable. 
Given the amount and the inherent contradiction between some of the aims, it is of 
course impossible to maximise them all at once. It follows that they need to be balanced 
against each other in some way. I have encapsulated the compromises in four solutions, 
which together map out the methodology behind the survey. I will now discuss each of the 
solutions in turn. 
The first solution I settled on was to conduct the survey at sentence level. Sentences were 
taken in their original form from treaty texts, but no longer units of text were tested. This 
procedure has several consequences. The first one is that some measure of vagueness 
cannot be accounted for, because there is no reason why all vagueness should be on the 
sentence level. However, this vagueness is certainly the easiest to identify. Additionally, as 
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was shown in chapter 4.3, when vagueness in international agreements is discussed, it is 
most often talked about on the sentence level. Most importantly, in the drafting process of 
documents, the unit of discussion tends to be on the sentence level, as can be observed in 
the fascinating and informative textual history of the Kyoto Protocol (Depledge 2000). In 
order to mitigate some of the obscuring effects, I included a broad range of sentences, 
chosen partly at random, partly to include as many different characteristics as possible. I will 
expand on the procedure used to choose sentences for each part when getting to the 
sections of the survey. The fact that some of the sentences remained long and fairly complex, 
although a trade-off with user-friendliness, had one welcome side-effect: participants not 
used to the language would have found it hard or time consuming to complete the survey, 
helping out in the selection process. 
The second solution settled on was to split the survey into three parts, of which I will 
discuss the two that are pertinent to this study below.25 This served several aims: for one, it 
made it possible to combine relatively closed questions with open ones, thus accounting 
both for the test of indicators found in chapter 4 and the need to stay open enough in the 
research design to discover new ones. Additionally, it allowed to focus different parts better 
on different goals. Lastly, the diversity in questions enhanced user-friendliness by offering 
more variety and interest to participants (see Converse/Presser 1986: 63). In the next 
paragraphs, I will discuss the design of each of the survey parts in turn. 
The first part consists of six sentences taken directly from treaty text. To select the sample 
sentences, I separated all agreement texts included in this study (just under 90.000 words in 
total) into separate sentences. I then used Microsoft Excel to count the words in each 
sentence to order each document’s sentences by length. The choice of sample sentences 
was half-randomized. I aimed to achieve a sample representing a broad range of documents, 
sentence lengths, verbs and numbers of adjectives used etc. The sentences were equally 
distributed between those taken from UNFCCC and NPT documents, as well as from 
documents of differing legal statuses. Unfortunately, the constraints of an online survey 
make it impossible to fully randomize a large-scale selection of data, which is why some 
targeted selection needed to take place. For instance, the shortest chosen sentence is 14 
words long, while the longest amounts to 129 words. They were taken both from preambles 
as well as operative clauses. The number of different sentences was again constrained by the 
need to not burden any one respondent with a too lengthy questionnaire, and by the need 
                                                          
25 A third part was present in the survey, but since its results are not taken into account in the analysis, 
I will also refrain from discussing it here. 
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to repeat the questions often enough to gain a number of estimates for each, so as to 
minimize the effect of outlier opinions. In this way, I established a list of 30 sample sentences, 
which participants of the survey were then asked to rate according to their vagueness. 
Choices given were ‘not at all vague’, ‘contains some vagueness’, ‘fairly vague’, ‘very vague’ 
and ‘no answer’ (on the benefits of labelling each point of a scale see Krosnick 1999: 544). 
The scale remained the same for each of the questions (see Weisberg et al. 1996: 98). The 
choices were intentionally left fairly open to the interpretation of the participants, yet clearly 
mark different levels of vagueness. Participants were encouraged to use the whole range of 
possible answers. In order to maximize the data gained from the survey, but not overwhelm 
participants, the six sentences each contributor saw were drawn at random from a pool of 
30 sentences (see Weisberg et al. 1996: 99 on limiting the number of survey questions). The 
order of the sentences was equally randomized (on the importance on varying the order of 
text in online surveys see Krosnick 1999: 545). This procedure has the added benefit of 
eliminating biases of comparison, where one sentence is rated a certain way simply because 
the previous sentence is perceived as comparably vague or precise. Respondents were given 
a box at the end of the page to add any comments or thoughts they would like. 
A second part of the survey simply asked each respondent two questions: “In general, 
which features of a sentence make you consider it vague?” and “Which features of the 
sentences in this survey made you consider them precise?” This was aimed at giving them 
the chance to add their own understandings of vagueness, and thus generating more target-
specific hypotheses (see Fink 2003: 17 on the importance of both open and closed questions 
in surveys). This part was beneficial both from a data collection and a user friendliness point 
of view. For one, it gave respondents a chance to interact with the survey relatively freely 
and give thoughts of their own apart from strict numbered scales. Since the answers to these 
questions were not mandatory to complete the survey, they did not place an extra burden 
on the experts. For two, the same freedom to express themselves enhanced data collection, 
since it minimized suggestiveness and opened up the chance to find points might otherwise 
have been overlooked. 
The third solution hinged on making the survey as technically flawless as possible. To this 
end, the choice of a good hosting website was essential, which is why the survey was made 
on SoSciSurvey26. When a first draft of the questionnaire was completed, it was thoroughly 
tested in both face-to-face and online pretest sessions27. When possible, the Think Aloud 
                                                          
26 Visit website at https://www.soscisurvey.de//. 
27 On the importance of pretests, see Schnell/Hill/Esser 2008: 347. 
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technique was used (see Prüfer/Rexroth 2005: 14), meaning that testers were encouraged 
to talk continuously while taking the survey, expressing everything coming to their minds 
while completing it. After the comments and suggestions from the first round had been 
incorporated into the design, a second round followed. In this way, I tried to maximize a good 
experience for participants as well as clarity in asking for the questions the survey was 
designed to answer. 
After a welcoming page explaining the general intent of the survey, the next page contains 
two questions meant to ascertain the expertise status of participants: They were asked to 
rate their level of expertise in the field of IL, and also to supply information on whether they 
had any background in either environmental/climate law or the NPT. The content-oriented 
part of the survey is divided in three parts, only the first of which is relevant to the results 
discussed in this paper. 
Solution four focussed on reaching the target group of the survey. The target group for 
this survey were people with a background in IL. This is because a very specific type of 
language is used in international agreements and interpretations and assigned meanings are 
likely to differ between members of the general population and experts. This presumed 
difference may be very important in general, but the purpose of this study was first to find 
out how experts interpreted the data. They are the ones drafting and working with them, 
after all. The invitations to participate were sent out exclusively via email. Both general 
email-lists as well as writing to specific persons and writing to departments of IL were used. 
Emails were sent out to mailing lists concerned with International Law and IR as well as 
faculties and institutes of IL. The number of people reached is difficult to estimate, as is the 
percentage of experts within the people reached (though through the targeted invitations, 
this last number was probably fairly high – see section 5.2). To screen participants further, 
two questions were introduced in the very first pages of the survey. They asked participants 
to rate both their level of expertise in IL, and whether they had a background in the fields of 
either environmental or nuclear non-proliferation law. 
5.2 Results of the survey 
All in all, the Survey received 341 clicks in the 90 days it was online. 131 questionnaires 
were started. Of those, 50 were aborted after the first page. This could in large part stem 
from participants realizing they do not have the expertise needed to fit in the target group. 
68 questionnaires were filled out completely. These are the ones the results of this study 
draw from. 
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16 of the interviewees self-identified as students of IL, 18 as PhD students, 16 as having a 
PhD in IL, 17 as international legal professionals with 1-20 years of experience, and 15 people 
as ‘other’, most of whom indicated degrees in IR. The slight variation in the total comes from 
the fact that double mentions were possible, most often used to convey both professional 
and academic experience or a lower degree in law and a higher one in another field. 
5.2.1 Sentences voted as vague 
The first part of the survey asked respondents to rate 5 sentences according to their 
vagueness, as described in section 5.1. 68 people responding to 5 out of 30 questions each 
leads to a total of 340 responses to 30 questions. In the following, sentences used in the 
survey are referenced by their running number. The complete list of sentences, including full 
references, can be found in section 9.3. 
The first result of note is that the sentences were rated very differently from each other. 
This clearly points to the fact that experts in IL do judge sentences to contain different 
amounts of vagueness, and that they are at least partly agreed in which sentences are vaguer 
than others. At the most precise end, 93.75% (15 out of 16) of respondents thought the 
sentence 
“Each Party included in Annex I shall submit the information required under 
paragraph 1 above annually, beginning with the first inventory due under the 
Convention for the first year of the commitment period after this Protocol has 
entered into force for that Party” (VS 25) 
was either precise or mostly precise. At the most vague, 90.91% (10 out of 12, with one 
‘don’t know’) said the following sentence was either ‘somewhat vague’ or ‘very vague’: 
“The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international 
economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and 
development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling 
them better to address the problems of climate change” (VS 22). 
This very first juxtaposition of sentences could, to a certain extent, be used to understand 
what is considered vague or not by example. However, it would be extremely difficult to 
apply this to any other documents in a systematic way. 
In between the two extremes, the sentences were relatively evenly distributed. Four 
sentences (VS 4, VS 16, VS 22, and VS 26) were rated vague by exactly 50% of respondents. 
The graph below illustrates the variance of perceived vagueness in all the sample sentences: 
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Figure 2: Variance of perceived vagueness 
 
The graph above shows that over all participants, answers vary by up to 83 percentage 
points. While the number of people who were undecided on a sentence were usually low, 
one sentence eluded judgement: 4 out of 9 people said they couldn’t decide whether the 
sentence “A clean development mechanism is hereby defined” was vague or not. Because 
this number is so high, it has been excluded from further analysis. One participant noted that 
this sentence in particular was dependent on context: 
“what does “hereby” refer to? What is a clean development mechanism? If the 
Definition were vague, so would the sentence be” (Interview 49, 19.11.2014, 
13:57h). 
The table below shows the differences between various groups of experts participating 
in the study. 
Table 1: Perceived vagueness of sentences by profession of respondents 
Sentence All 
respondents 
Students PhD 
Students 
PhD 
holders 
Professional Other 
VS 25 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 
VS 26 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 
VS 12 0.11 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VS 16 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VS 28 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.67 
VS 29 0.25 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.50 
VS 21 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.33 N/A 
VS 14 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.25 N/A 
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VS 8 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.00 
VS 15 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.25 
VS 20 0.44 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.67 
VS 3 0.45 0.25 0.50 0.33 1.00 1.00 
VS 30 0.46 0.33 0.20 1.00 0.00 1.00 
VS 4 0.50 0.67 0.60 0.00 0.25 0.50 
VS 13 0.50 0.50 N/A 0.50 1.00 N/A 
VS 17 0.50 N/A 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
VS 23 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 
VS 27 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.50 
VS 2 0.54 0.75 0.67 0.00 0.50 0.33 
VS 24 0.56 0.50 0.80 0.67 0.40 0.25 
VS 1 0.57 0.67 0.25 0.60 0.50 1.00 
VS 18 0.60 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.75 
VS 6 0.64 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.33 0.50 
VS 11 0.64 1.00 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.33 
VS 9 0.71 N/A 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 
VS 19 0.77 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.80 0.75 
VS 10 0.80 N/A 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.50 
VS 5 0.86 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 
VS 22 0.91 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Unfortunately, the number of participants does not allow a systematic analysis for each 
of the different groups. However, with few exceptions, they generally appear to be of similar 
opinions. The results are not definite – there are too many categories for the number of data 
points, so further research on this phenomenon is necessary. They do suggest, however, that 
going ahead with the aggregated data is not likely to lead to distorted results. 
Excluding the above sentence VS 7 from further analysis, and not counting the ‘I don’t 
know’- type answers, this part of the survey totals 309 responses, which makes it very 
comfortably possible to analyse statistically. Due to the randomized nature of giving out 
sentences, varying amounts of responses have been collected for each sentence. As 30 
sentences were included in the study, responses per sentence range from 7 at the lower end 
and 18 at the higher end, with a mean of just over 10 responses per sentence. 
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This section of the survey is the backbone of the study, as it serves as the basis for testing 
the hypothesis on vagueness. Before I come to that part, I will discuss the comments left by 
respondents. 
5.2.2 Comments 
Taken together, the survey gathered a total of 94 comments. Using qualitative content 
analysis based on Mayring (2010), I first ordered the comments by topic, then by their 
orientation in the topic. In the following, I will present the most common themes and the 
insights gained from each of them. This is a qualitative, not quantitative, analysis, aimed not 
at conclusive, comparable results but at gaining a better understanding of expert’s opinions, 
and seeing which hypotheses might be worth pursuing. 
The numbers of commenters are only included to provide rough impressions on general 
trends, and should not be read as inherently conclusive. Additionally, to present a detailed 
and in-depth picture, I often present similar amounts of comments on each side of a debate, 
even when the vast majority of commenters clearly favoured one particular argument. 
The majority of the comments can be said to fit one of eight categories: verbs expressing 
obligations, references, definitions, hedge words, sentence length, measurability, the need 
for context and generality. 
Most often, participants commented on the question whether or not verbs expressing a 
higher degree of obligation are also more precise. 28 comments in total were made on this 
topic. The vast majority of these were of the opinion that verbs associated with stronger 
obligations like ‘shall’ and ‘will’ are also indicative of a higher level of precision. One 
commenter stated that 
“Those verbal expressions clearly ´demanding´ that a state follow that what is 
stated in the provision grant a more precise connotation to the reading of the 
text” (Interview 119, 03.12.2014, 11:33h). 
Another answered the question ‘what makes sentences more vague’ with the following: 
“The use of certain expressions that diminish the level of obligation (or at least 
the sense of urgency of compliance) prescribed by the text, such as should instead 
of shall, recommend instead of urge etc.” (Interview 180, 04.12.2014, 16:07h). 
Commenters also referred to specific verbs, stating for example that a sentence is vague 
“[i]f only support for a certain goal is declared (“[re]affirm”/”note”/...) with no 
corresponding duties (“shall”)” (Interview 359, 05.01.2015, 12:24h).28 
                                                          
28 The high numbers of certain interviews are due to the fact that all interactions with the survey have 
been counted continuously from the first testing stage, even those where someone only clicked on 
the link to the survey without answering any questions. This has no effect at all on the study but 
simplifies labeling. 
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or 
“[w]hen they contain words implying that the sentence does not contain an 
obligation which is legally binding, e.g. “welcomes”, “promotes”, “should”, 
“urges”, “invites”, etc...” (Interview 87, 02.12.2014, 16:11h). 
There were no comments proposing the opposite, i.e. that these verbs make sentences 
more vague, but four commenters disagreed with the premise entirely, arguing that binding 
force and precision are completely separate categories and thus these verbs do not influence 
the level of precision at all. One of them said 
“In particular, the use of “shall” or “should” does not indicate a difference in 
precision, but a difference in obligation. They represent different things, not 
different degrees of the same thing” (Interview 123, 03.12.2014, 11:40h). 
Another participant made a very interesting distinction: 
“adding further information makes sentences more precise; use of legally more 
determining vocabulary does not (it makes the legal consequences following 
from such phrase more precise, but not the sentence as such)” (Interview 99, 
02.12.2014, 18:19h). 
Here, the distinction between legal indeterminacy and vagueness is clearly drawn. 
However, the legal indeterminacy in this case comes still from within the text, and not from 
conflicting legislation or other sources of contextual indeterminacy. 
The second most comments were made on the terms generality and specifics. All but one 
of the fourteen commenters agreed that more general provision were vaguer, while more 
specific sentences were seen as more precise. One participant, when asked which features 
of a sentence they considered vague, replied “commitment to a general goal without precise 
steps to be taken in order to achieve it” (Interview 111, 03.12.2014, 9:30h). Other answers 
to the question were “general aims” (Interview 104, 02.12.2014, 18:42h), “general clauses”, 
“too general phases” (Interview 336, 29.12.2014, 18:52h) and “broad statements with 
unclear policy implication” (Interview 179, 04.12.2014, 14:45h). On the other hand, when 
asked what made a sentence more precise, commenters answered with “use of specific 
terms” (Interview 309, 24.12.2014, 13:20h) or simply “specifications”. Again, no participant 
stated that the reverse was the case, but one commenter argued that generality and 
specificity were entirely different categories from vagueness and precision. The following 
comment makes this point quite clearly: 
“I couldn’t decide which sentence is more precise quite often, because I had the 
impression that the difference between the two sentences was not vague vs. 
precise, but general vs. specific...” (Interview 118, 03.12.2014, 11:33h). 
This distinction relates back to the difference in use of the term vagueness in 
philosophical terms and everyday language discussed in chapter 2.1.1. It appears that most 
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respondents understand the term vagueness in the everyday sense of the word, while this 
last commenter uses the philosophical concept. 
A third area eliciting comments concerned referencing of other legal texts. Most 
commenters were of the opinion that these kinds of references render a sentence more 
precise. For example, one commenter stated that 
“The lack of reference to other – based upon more precise background, such as 
expert-based documents, resolutions, etc. – norms is also the sign or root of 
vagueness” (Interview 371, 14.01.2015, 16:39h). 
Another, asked about indicators for precision in sentences, cited “referrals to previous 
documents” (Interview 78, 02.12.2014, 15:05h). In this category, nobody made a point 
excluding references as indicators of vagueness or precision. Interestingly, however, three 
comments were made that indicate the exact opposite of the point made above, namely that 
references actually render a given legal sentence vaguer. One comment explained this 
position in the following way: 
“Vagueness was due to [...] the constant ´references´ to other articles or 
preambles present in the Convention. This act of self referring [sic] may lead to a 
variety of interpretations, leaving the provision read [sic] very imprecise” 
(Interview 119, 03.12.2014, 11:33h). 
This comment draws the interesting parallel between references in the text and the point 
made in chapter 3.2.3, namely that fragmentation in the law leads to legal indeterminacy. 
However, this point of view remains a minority among respondents to the survey. 
The inclusion and use of definitions was unanimously seen as enhancing precision by 
commenters. They said that “the use of clearly defined legal terminology” (Interview 94, 
02.12.2014, 17:02h) makes sentences more precise, and that the “inclusion of terms which 
are understood differently in different contexts” (Interview 131, 03.12.2014, 12:30h) is what 
renders sentences vaguer. One commenter explained that 
“Precision thus follows from [...] the inclusion of at least first order definitions of 
concepts (that is each concept is at least defined on a first level, that is the 
definitions includes necessary conditions of the concept; greater clarity could be 
reached by again finding necessary conditions for the necessary conditions of the 
concept” (Interview 126, 03.12.2014, 12:02h). 
Commenters also said that they considered shorter sentences to be more precise, while 
associating longer sentences with vagueness. Statements such as “Particularly compound or 
otherwise long sentences produce vagueness” (Interview 197, 11.12.2014, 13:39h) or 
“[precise sentences] went straight to the point, short, and relatively simple.” (Interview 197, 
11.12. 2014, 13:39h) For the commenters, vagueness via sentence length is strongly 
associated with complexity and readability, stating that “the shorter sentences the better for 
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understanding” when asked what made a sentence precise. Following this train of thought, 
grammatical clarity was seen as an indicator of precision as well: 
“Vagueness seems to be related to [...] the grammatical setup of a sentence (in 
terms of unclear sentence structure)” (Interview 126, 03.12.2014, 12:02h). 
On the other hand, the inclusion of more information in a sentence – necessarily 
lengthening it – was mostly seen as reducing vagueness. As such, one participant commented 
that “more informative / explanatory text” (Interview 306, 24.12.2014, 9:01h) is indicative 
of precision, another said “adding further information makes sentences more precise” 
(Interview 99, 02.12.2014, 18:19h). 
Commenters were not undivided on this issue, however. One respondent said that 
“Sometimes, by introducing a description, one can actually make the initial 
statement less precise” (Interview 346, 03.01.2015, 11:54h). 
These related topics are a little less clearly biased toward one direction than the ones 
discussed above. However, the general trend is that shorter and less complex sentences are 
seen as more precise. 
Commenters did agree on the topic of hedge words (although not usually calling them by 
this name). The seven comments on this topic are in agreement that hedge words render 
sentences vaguer. Examples included were “to the extent possible” (Interview 77, 
02.12.2014, 14:52h), “as appropriate”(Interview 77, 02.12.2014, 14:52h), “equitable” 
(Interview 105, 02.12.2014, 19:10h), “timely” (Interview 105, 02.12.2014, 19:10h), 
“regularly” (Interview 257, 22.12.2014, 21:38h), “effective”(Interview 91, 02.12.2014, 
16:49h) and “soon” (Interview 199, 18.12.2014, 22:52h). They referred to these words as 
“undetermined terms” (Interview 105, 02.12.2014, 19:10h) or “vague descriptions that are 
not really measurable”. 
This last quote leads to the next topic of comments: measurability. Five experts said that 
to be considered precise, sentences must include measurable concepts. The following 
comment illustrates the sentiment: 
“Also vague are descriptions that are not really measureable such as ‘as much as 
possible’ or ‘an environment that will promote...’. As an example, ‘economic 
growth’ is measureable. ‘an environment that will promote economic growth’ is 
not” (Interview 346, 03.01.2015, 11:54h). 
This discussion relates back to the philosophical conception of vague concepts as 
immensurable and incommensurable as discussed in chapter 2.1.1. 
Three commenters called into question the entire premise of the survey by arguing that 
vagueness can only ever be identified from the context of a sentence, never from the 
sentence itself. I will provide all three comments in their entirety for two reasons: First, since 
they are critical of the work done in this thesis, I want to render them unaltered, so as to not 
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fudge interpretation to my advantage, but rather let the reader judge the value of each of 
the arguments for themselves. Second, I think that the debate is important and merits 
detailed attention and discussion. I also want to give them sufficient room because, in a way, 
the survey was biased against them – not intentionally, but simply by the fact that I was not 
explicitly inviting participants to comment on the lack of context, and instead implicitly made 
it clear that I hoped to find indications of vagueness in the sentences themselves through 
the design of the survey. Therefore, I consider that there position may be more relevant or 
widespread in the community of experts in IL than the low number (3 out of 68) commenters 
might suggest. 
“My experience tells me that there is not any sentence which cannot be extremely 
vague. It depends on the context. Since no context was given, it is impossible to 
decide how vague a sentence is. Hence, the survey is based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of legal practice and methodology. Only the context would 
allow for the identification of precision. Since no context was given, most 
questions could not be decided” (Interview 123, 03.12.2014, 11:40h). 
“It is not easy to rate the vagueness of the sentences without knowing the 
context, for example no. 6 ‘A clean development mechanism is hereby defined’ – 
what does ‘hereby’ refer to? What is a clean development mechanism?” 
(Interview 49, 19.11.2014, 13:57h). 
“You seem to believe that vagueness could be evaluated by merely looking at 
singular sentences of a legal text. However, some of your cited sentences refer to 
other clauses within the legal text – its vagueness can therefore only judged by 
looking systematically at the sentence within its context (i.e. systematic 
interpretation). That is because the sentence receives its content also through 
these other sentences” (Interview 126, 03.12.2014, 12:02). 
The last two comments seem to me to be less absolute than the first, because they 
explicitly or implicitly state that the problem of context is present – or at least more pertinent 
– for some sentences than for others. 
I agree with these commenters on a central point: context is very important for the study 
of vagueness. The choice not to include context in the data collection has been a 
methodological one, and while I remain convinced that it was necessary in the interest of 
gaining any usable data, I agree that it also makes the study incomplete: I will not be able to 
present a comprehensive list of factors influencing the vagueness of legal text. This is a hard 
limit of this study, and one I recognize. However, I am confident that context is not the only 
possible way to identify a vague sentence, but argue that there are also indicators at the 
sentence level. For one thing, this is supported by the other participants and commenters, 
who did find differences in vagueness between the sentences and identified indicators. 
Furthermore, most of the literature we saw earlier bases its examples on passages of one or 
two sentences, no more, clearly showing that however important context may be, there are 
also aspects of the sentences themselves which are relevant for the study of vagueness. My 
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third argument is epistemological: If there were absolutely no indication for vagueness in a 
single sentence, the context – which is also comprised of sentences – could not contain any 
vagueness, either.29 There could be legal indeterminacy, because of contradictions amongst 
sentences or simply because the documents themselves could be unclear in their binding 
force, or because of characteristics of legal systems. But for there to be vagueness in the 
text, some traces of it must be found in at least some of the sentences, even if the presence 
of other sentences can then mitigate or exacerbate it. 
5.3 What makes sentences vague? 
In the previous sections, I described the survey design and its overall results. The next two 
chapters are concerned with analysing the data thus gained and ultimately making a tool 
which can provide an automated comparison of the vagueness of different international legal 
agreements. In a first step, I will test nine hypotheses – drawn both from the literature and 
comments discussed above – on the data gained by the survey. The next step is to take the 
hypotheses which proved to have a statistically significant relationship with the perceived 
vagueness of a sentence and combine them into a tool which can process a large amount of 
legal text quickly. 
5.3.1 Testing hypotheses 
Both the linguistic approaches in Chapter 4.1, as well as the comments by survey 
respondents shown in section 5.2.3 above can be used to identify several hypotheses on 
which features of a sentence make it vaguer and which make it more precise. 
In the literature discussed in chapter 4.1, hedge words, general extenders, vague 
quantifiers, placeholder words, mass nouns, determiners, and shields were identified as 
potentially relevant indicators for vagueness in text. The sparse literature on identifying 
vagueness in international agreements (discussed in section 4.2.3) adds modifiers, modal 
auxiliaries, determiners, numbers and the use of passive voice as features to look out for. 
Survey respondents (see section 5.2.3) have claimed that verbs expressing obligations (here 
referred to as explicit performatives), hedge words, sentence length, referencing, generality 
and measurability affect the vagueness of a legal sentence. Not all of the mentioned 
indicators can be tested within the limits of this study. Some of them, like placeholder words, 
                                                          
29 On the notion that the context is independent from the indeterminacy of the text, see 
also Peller (1985: 1173) as discussed in section 2.2.2. 
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are clearly not applicable to legal language. Others, like generality or referencing, are 
exceedingly hard to operationalize in a manner suitable to quantitative data analysis. 
Keeping these considerations in mind, eight indicators are included in this study. 
Leaving out those criteria too vague to be operationalized and those that clearly do not 
apply to legal language leaves a number of hypotheses which will be discussed below. The 
first hypothesis, based on the comments of survey respondents, is that longer sentences are 
perceived as vaguer. The second hypothesis, which is supported by linguistic literature in 
general, by studies related to legal language specifically, as well as by survey respondents, is 
that the presence of numbers renders a sentence more precise than it would otherwise be. 
A third hypotheses, which is similarly widespread, is that that sentences containing hedge 
words are vaguer than those which do not. In order to check this hypothesis against the one 
that would ascribe an effect on vagueness by all modifiers (which has been suggested by 
literature on legal language), I also check the effect of the number of adjectives and adverbs 
on the perceived vagueness of a sentence. A fifth hypothesis, which is supported by literature 
on both general and legal language, but is not supported by survey respondents, is that 
determiners have an effect on the vagueness or precision of sentences. Two more 
hypotheses, which appear to be specific to legal language and have also been mentioned in 
the comments of survey respondents are that the presence of a weak explicitly performative 
verb renders a sentence vaguer, while the presence of a strong explicitly performative verb 
leads a sentences to be perceived as more precise. Additionally, I have included the 
hypothesis that the regime of origin of a sentence may influence its perceived vagueness. 
This hypothesis does not have its roots in the literature or survey comments, but it is 
necessary to test for in order to be able to estimate the limits of application for this study. In 
the following, the quantitative data from the survey is used to test these nine hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: sentence length 
One of the features mentioned in the comments of the survey was sentence length. As 
shown in section 5.2.3, most commenters agreed that shorter sentences are an indication of 
a sentence being more precise, while longer sentences indicate more vagueness. 
The indicator I chose for the length of a sentence were the number of words it contained. 
Alternatives could have been the number of letters, but using word count as an indicator 
seemed adequate for this study because it is more intuitively understandable – it is easier to 
picture a sentence containing 10 words than one containing 65 letters. The first step to 
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testing this hypothesis, then, was to establish the number of words in each of the tested 
sentences. The longest sentence comprised 129 words, 
“The Conference of the Parties [...] further recognizes that deep cuts in global 
greenhouse gas emissions are required according to science, and as documented 
in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, with a view to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold 
the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C above pre-industrial 
levels, and that Parties should take urgent action to meet this long-term goal, 
consistent with science and on the basis of equity; also recognizes the need to 
consider, in the context of the first review, as referred to in paragraph 138 below, 
strengthening the long-term global goal on the basis of the best available 
scientific knowledge, including in relation to a global average temperature rise 
of 1. 5 °C” (VS 11), 
while the shortest was only 10 words long: 
“The Conference expresses its strong support for effective IAEA safeguards” (VS 
1). 
On average, the sentence length was around 45 words, with the median at 43. 
The next task was to establish a dividing point. Sentences under this point are considered 
short for the purposes of this study, sentences with the same number or more words than 
that are considered long. In order to keep approximately the same number of sentences in 
each group, I chose a cut-off point at 41. 
The resulting table is shown below: 
Table 2: Answers of respondents by length of sentence 
 
Not at all 
vague 
Contains 
some 
vagueness 
Fairly 
vague 
Very vague Sum 
1-39 
Words 
29 38 41 30 138 
40+ Words 33 60 41 32 166 
Sum 62 98 82 62 304 
 
Combining the first two categories under the label ‘not vague’ and the last two categories 
under ‘vague’ turns out a simpler table for better overview: 
Table 3: Number of respondents considering a sentence vague by length of the sentence 
 
Not vague Vague Sum 
1-40 
Words 
67 71 138 
41+ Words 93 73 166 
99 
 
Sum 160 144 304 
 
This table foreshadows the results discussed below: While the number of people who 
consider a sentence precise rises slightly when considering longer sentences, the number of 
people who consider it vague stays approximately the same regardless of its length. This in 
itself is interesting, as it contradicts the impression gained from looking at the comments: If 
anything, longer sentences were considered slightly more precise. The following graph 
visualizes this result: 
 
Figure 3: Respondents considering sentences precise or vague, by sentence length 
Taking a closer look at the numbers, however, reveals that there is no statistically relevant 
correlation at all. When plotting all the combination of sentence length and assessment of 
vagueness on a scatter graph, this becomes intuitively apparent: 
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Figure 4: Perceived vagueness by sentence length 
Spearman’s rho30 (which is the appropriate correlation coefficient for ordinal scales 
(Gingrich 1992: 796) is -0,032. This number is close to 0, which suggests that the two 
variables are independent of each other. The result does not change in any meaningful way 
if the data is expressed in the form of percentages of people who consider a sentence vague. 
While the results vary slightly if the expertise status of the respondents is taken into 
consideration, none of the numbers suggest any statistical correlation or significance. Below 
is a table of Spearman’s rho values for the different groups: 
Table 4: Spearman’s rho values of the relationship between vagueness and sentence 
length by respondent group 
Respondent group Spearman’s rho values 
Students of IL -0.157 
PhD Students in IL -0.021 
People with PhD in IL 0.083 
Legal Professionals -0.085 
Other 0.119 
 
In light of this, I draw the conclusion that the perceived vagueness of a sentence does not 
correlate with its length. This result is particularly interesting considering the high number 
                                                          
30 “[Spearman’s rho] produces a correlation coefficient which has a maximum value of 1, indicating a 
perfect positive association between the ranks, and a minimum value of -1, indicating a perfect 
negative association between ranks. A value of 0 indicates no association between the ranks” 
(Gingrich 1992: 820). 
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of survey respondents who explicitly commented that length is a factor in how vague they 
consider a sentence to be. 
 
Hypothesis 2: numbers 
Several commenters mentioned that they perceived a sentence as vague when its content 
was ‘measurable’. Since it is not possible to measure this feature directly, I simplified it by 
testing whether or not a sentence contained numbers (both cardinal and ordinal numbers 
were counted). The presence of numbers also features heavily as a factor for vagueness in 
the relevant literature (see section 4.1.1). 
Contrary to expectations, however, the participants of this survey did not perceive 
sentences containing numbers differently from those which did not. The complete data on 
the presence of numbers and the ratings of participants are summarized in the table below. 
Table 5: Survey responses by number of numbers 
 
Not at all 
vague 
Contains 
some 
vagueness 
Fairly 
vague 
Very vague Sum 
0 Numbers 29 54 48 41 172 
1 Number 6 16 17 12 51 
2 Numbers 6 12 6 2 26 
3+Numbers 21 16 11 7 55 
Sum 62 98 82 62 304 
 
The value of the test used to calculate correlation is -0,210, which is not enough to reject 
the null hypothesis, both because it only shows a weak correlation and because it is not 
statistically significant. This result does not change significantly (to a value of -0.230) when 
the sentence length is taken into account. 
Given that the emphasis on numbers in linguistic literature is almost equal to that of 
hedge words, this result is among the more surprising of this study. However, there are 
several possible explanations for numbers working in different ways in legal language than 
they do in everyday use. For one thing, numbers are often used to reference other provisions 
of the same agreement, or provisions in different agreements. Without knowing their 
content in turn, it is not possible to say whether they render the given sentence more or less 
vague and therefore there should not be any effect in the perceived vagueness. Another 
factor may be that numbers in legal agreements are frequently used in minor detail which 
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do not affect the main meaning of the provision. Consider the following sentence, which was 
also included in the survey: 
“The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, decide upon 
modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced 
activities related to changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the land-use change and forestry 
categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for 
Parties included in Annex I, taking into account uncertainties, transparency in 
reporting, verifiability, the methodological work of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, the advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice in accordance with Article 5 and the decisions of the 
Conference of the Parties” (VS 8). 
The words in question are ‘first’, ‘(Annex) I’, and ‘(Article) 5’. While the numbers certainly 
specify matters – to which session, which annex and which article the provision is referring 
to – these numbers hardly have any impact on the vagueness or precision of the main 
content of the provision in question. It is possible that the minority of numbers in legal 
agreements that are related to the actual content of the provision function similarly to 
numbers in everyday language, i.e. making the provision more precise. If that is the case, the 
effect is obscured by all the other numbers present in legal documents. It may also be that 
legal experts see numbers as less important than other indicators of vagueness (although 
this option contradicts respondents’ statements in the comments to this survey). In any case, 
the matter requires more detailed investigation than is possible in the framework of this 
study. For the time being, the hypothesis that numbers lead to a sentence being perceived 
as more precise is not supported by the available data. 
 
Hypothesis 3: hedge words 
One widespread assumption in the literature is that hedge words make sentences vaguer 
(see chapter 4.1.1). The survey participants agreed in the comments (see section 5.2.3). The 
first step to accomplish here was to choose the words to be included in the category of hedge 
words. This was somewhat limited by the original material, since it is not possible to test for 
words that did not appear in the 30 sentences that were tested. I settled on the following 
words: ‘relevant’, ‘appropriate’, ‘available’, ‘specific’, ‘particular’, ‘well’, ‘effective’, ‘good’, 
‘possible’, ‘general’, ‘practicable’, and ‘regularly’. All of these words fulfil the general 
criterion of being hedge words in the sense that their addition makes the language of a 
sentence vaguer than it would be without it. Each of the 30 sentences contains either none, 
one or two of these words. Therefore, I established a table with these three categories. 
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Table 6: Survey responses by number of hedge words 
 
Not at all 
vague 
Contains 
some 
vagueness 
Fairly 
vague 
Very 
vague 
Sum 
0 Hedge 
words 
51 46 29 28 154 
1 Hedge 
words 
4 30 36 15 85 
2 Hedge 
words 
7 22 17 19 65 
Sum 62 98 82 62 304 
 
Again, for the better overview, here is the same table with the four options condensed 
into two: 
Table 7: Respondents considering sentence vague or precise, by number of hedge words 
 
Precise Vague Sum 
0 Hedge 
words 
97 57 154 
1 Hedge 
words 
34 51 85 
2 Hedge 
words 
29 36 65 
Sum 160 144 304 
The difference to the graph on sentence length becomes clear immediately. While the 
number of people considering sentences containing zero hedge words precise is almost 
double the amount of people who consider them vague, this picture has changed 
significantly when sentences with two hedge words are considered. In this case, the number 
of people considering the sentence precise is lower than the number of respondents who 
see it as vague. Again, let’s look at a visualization of the table to make the finding more 
accessible: 
104 
 
 
Figure 5: Respondents considering sentences precise and vague by number of hedge words 
Interestingly, the ratio of people considering a sentence vague does not seem grow when 
moving from one hedge word to two – it even decreases slightly. This puzzling occurrence 
may be solved when we turn away from absolute number of hedge words and consider the 
percentage of hedge words in a sentence, when set in relationship to the total number of 
words. It is possible that sentences with two hedge words simple tend to be much longer, so 
that the presence of an extra hedge word does not alter the perception of the meaning that 
much given the amount of information present in the sentence. 
However, when looking at the numbers, this explanation does not seem to hold, either. 
When taking the percentages of hedge words as the basis for analysis, the above graph looks 
as follows: 
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Figure 6: Respondents considering sentences precise and vague by percentage of hedge 
words 
The difference does not grow in the last two categories, but rather declines very slightly. 
It looks like sentences without any hedge words are seen as more precise than usual, while 
sentences including at least one hedge word – regardless of their number or the length of 
the sentence – are seen as somewhat more vague. 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is 0.442, which means that the number of hedge 
words (relative to the number of words) in a sentence is moderately positively correlated 
with the percentage of people who thought the sentence was vague. The relationship 
between the pairs of data is visualized in the following graph: 
 
Figure 7: Perceived vagueness by percentage of hedge words 
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The more hedge words there are – or in this case, if there are hedge words at all – the 
vaguer experts in IL will perceive it as. The correlation is significant at p<0.05, which means 
that there is less than a 5% chance that this result has been obtained by chance. 
In light of the heavy emphasis on hedge words in linguistic literature, this result is not 
particularly surprising. It seems that hedge words function similarly in the legal language than 
they do in everyday language use, at least when it concerns vagueness. 
 
Hypothesis 4: adjectives and adverbs 
At first glance, there appears to be no significant relationship between the number of 
adjectives and adverbs and the number of people who perceive a given sentence as vague. 
However, when modulating the relationship by sentence length, a moderate, but statistically 
significant positive correlation emerges – the more adjectives and adverbs there are per 
sentence, the vaguer it appears to be perceived. The resulting graph illustrate these results. 
 
Figure 8: Respondents considering a sentence precise and vague by combined percentage 
of adjectives and adverbs 
This is actually at odds with the hypotheses gained from studying the literature: adjectives 
in general are assumed to make a sentence more precise. Because the result is so surprising, 
I studied the numbers even more closely and found a different explanation. As shown above, 
the number of hedge words correlates positively with vagueness. Hedge words are primarily 
– and in this case, exclusively, adjectives and adverbs, so the two hypotheses are not actually 
independent of each other. 
When removing hedge words from the number of adjectives, the weak positive 
correlation with vagueness, while still present, is no longer statistically significant. It is 
therefore not included in the list of vagueness indicators in this study. 
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Hypothesis 5: determiners 
Determiners are words like your, their, these, some, whose or which31. These words put 
the other words of a sentence in relation to each other and provide some context. In the 
literature covered in chapter 4.2.3, determiners are seen as one possible factor for vagueness 
in legal documents, although whether they render a text more vague or more precise 
remains unclear. In this study, sentences with more determiners were seen as more precise 
than sentences that contained a lower number of them. 
 
Figure 9: Respondents considering a sentence precise and vague by number of determiners 
The graph shows that sentences with three determiners are much more often considered 
precise than is the case otherwise. Further tests indicate that this result is not dependent on 
the length of the sentence. There appears to be a moderate, but statistically significant 
negative correlation between the absolute number of determiners a sentence contains and 
its perceived vagueness. 
                                                          
31 For a definition of the term ‚determiner’ see section 4.1.1. 
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Figure 10: Perceived vagueness by number of determiners 
Neither the literature nor the comments of survey respondents provide any real 
explanation for this relationship. It could be speculated that those determiners most 
commonly used in legal text specify the meaning of the nouns they are attached to, in a 
similar way as in the case of adjectives discussed in section 4.3. The significant drop in 
perceived vagueness when sentences reach three determiners could be explained by the fact 
that while all sentences use some determiners, specific legal language uses an unusually high 
number of them. In any case, the relationship between vagueness and the number of 
determiners in a legal sentence definitely merits further study. 
 
Hypothesis 6: weak explicit performatives32 
Lastly, I come to two of the most interesting results. Verbs might be the most important 
type of words in the legal language (see section 4.2.2 for a more detailed discussion), but 
they are not very prominent in linguistic literature on vagueness indicators (although they 
are sometimes mentioned, see chapter 4.1.1). There is therefore some incentive to check 
whether, and in what way, explicitly performative verbs influence the perceived vagueness 
of legal sentences.33 When the operational verb of a sentence expresses only a weak intent 
to be legally binding – which is the case with verbs like ‘should’ or ‘undertakes to’34 – 
international legal practitioners appear to perceive the sentence as vaguer than average. The 
relationship is easily visible in a graph: 
                                                          
32 For an explanation of what explicit performatives are, see chapter 4.2.1. 
33 This matter is closely related to the discussion on vagueness vs. bindingness outlined in section 
5.2.3. 
34 The full list of explicitly performative verbs which tested as vague in this study were ‚would’, ‚could’, 
‚should’, ‚underline’, ‚underscore’, ‚recognize’, ‚have the right’, ‚call’, and ‚undertake’. 
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Figure 11: Perceived vagueness by number of weak explicitly performative verbs 
The Spearman’s rho of 0.698 suggests a strong positive correlation between vagueness 
and the presence of a weak operational verb. This is the highest result among all the 
hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 7: strong explicit performatives 
On the other end of the scale, verbs like ‘shall’ and ‘will’ express a strong binding force. 
In keeping with the previous hypothesis, sentences containing these words are seen as more 
precise than others. The correlation is moderate and negative. 
 
Figure 12: Perceived vagueness by presence of strong explicitly performative verbs 
The above graph clearly shows that while sentences without strong explicitly 
performative verbs (represented in the first column of graph 14) have a wide range of 
vagueness, almost all sentences containing the verbs ‚shall’ or ‚will’ are seen as less vague 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0 1 2 3 4
Re
sp
on
de
nt
s c
on
sid
er
in
g 
se
nt
en
ce
 
va
gu
e
Number of weak verbs
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0 1 2
Re
sp
on
en
ts
 c
on
sid
er
in
g 
se
nt
en
ce
 v
ag
ue
Number of strong verbs
110 
 
than average, with only one exception. These verbs tend to make sentences be seen as more 
precise. The outlier sentence which can be seen in the chart is the following: 
“To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the 
scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees 
Celsius, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development, 
enhance our long-term cooperative action to combat climate change”. 
This exception notwithstanding, the negative correlation between strong explicit 
performatives and vagueness remains clear, and provides a counterpoint to the weak explicit 
performatives discussed above. Some explicitly performative verbs, like ‘remain convinced’, 
and ‚note’, appear to have no relationship with a sentence’s perceived vagueness. 
 
Hypothesis 8: regime 
The hypothesis that the regime from which the sentence is taken may influence its 
perceived vagueness stands out in two respects. For one, it is the only characteristic tested 
for which is not inherent in the sentence itself, but lies in its context. Secondly, it does not 
stem from the literature or the survey participants. Nevertheless, it is an important case for 
the interpretation of the following results. If there turns out to be a significant difference 
between sentences from each regime, it would be problematic to analyse them in aggregate 
form. Furthermore, it might reveal a bias by the people surveyed: a large difference in 
assessment could indicate that experts were influenced by the context of the sentence 
(because they believe one regime to be vaguer than the other) and did not judge the 
sentence on its own. 
However, there does not appear to be a correlation between the regime a sentence is 
taken from and the number of people perceiving it as vague. While there is a very slight 
tendency for sentences from the UNFCCC to be perceived as vaguer than the NPT (the value 
of spearman’s rho is 0.149 and -0.149, respectively – the mirroring results from the fact that 
all sentences were taken from one of the two regimes), these numbers are far from 
statistically significant and should not be taken as meaningful differences. 
 
Summing up, five of the eight tested hypotheses are not supported by the data: this study 
cannot support a correlation between vagueness and the regime, sentence length, how 
many adjectives are used, the use of conjunctions and how many numbers are used in a 
sentence. Four hypotheses, however, revealed a statistically significant correlation: the 
percentage of hedge words, the vague and precise explicitly performative verbs and the 
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amount of determiners present in a sentence. Hedge words come as no surprise, given their 
prominence in studies on vague language (see chapter 4.1.1). Determiners, as well, have 
been hypothesized to be indicators for the vagueness of legal sentences (see chapter 4.2.3). 
Verbs are less prominent in ordinary language studies of vagueness. However, given the 
peculiarities of legal language (see chapter 4.2.2), and the prominent role verbs play therein, 
it is not surprising that verbs would also feature prominently in how vague a legal sentence 
is perceived to be. 
5.3.2 Building the tool 
In the previous section, I have shown which hypotheses on what leads sentences in 
international agreements to be perceived as vague are supported by the data. The goal of 
this study is to build a tool which makes it possible to quickly assess how vague the sentences 
of an international agreement are. To that end, the most diagnostic findings of the previous 
analysis are combined into a points system. 
Upon closer inspection, four hypotheses appear to be supported by the data: 
- Hedge words make sentences vaguer 
- A low number of determiners make sentences vaguer 
- Weak explicitly performative verbs make sentences vaguer 
- Strong explicitly performative verbs make sentences more precise. 
In order to facilitate later assessments and analyses, I have combined these four elements 
into a points system. If a sentence contains one or more hedge words35, it receives 1 point. 
If it contains less than 3 determiners36, it receives another point. If it contains any of the 
verbs ‘would’, ‘could’, ‘should’, ‘underline(s)’, ‘underscore(s)’, ‘recognize(s)’, ‘has/ve the 
right’, ‘call(s) for’ or ‘undertake(s)’, it receives 1 point, and if it contains either ‘shall’, ‘will’ or 
‘remain(s) convinced’, it receives -1 point to indicate the enhanced precision. 
When these points are added up, each sentence can now be rated with a score between 
-1 and 3. This allows for some differentiation between sentences, while also keeping the 
scoring system relatively straightforward and intuitively related to the results. 
When comparing the scores of the sentences with the percentages of people who rated 
them as vague, the resulting scatter plot looks as follows: 
                                                          
35 To repeat, the hedge words used in this study are ‘relevant’, ‘appropriate’, ‘available’, ‘specific’, 
‘particular’, ‘well’, ‘effective’, ‘good’, ‘possible’, ‘general’, ‘practicable’, and ‘regularly’. 
36 As identified by the CLAWS5 tagging method (http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/claws5tags.html). 
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Figure 13: Vagueness score by perceived vagueness 
The graph shows that this score and the perceived vagueness of a sentence are positively 
correlated. The higher the score a sentence receives, the likelier it becomes that survey 
participants rated it as vague. The corresponding spearman’s rho correlation test is at 0.751, 
which means that there is a strong positive correlation between the combined features and 
the perceived vagueness of a sentence. The result is also statistically significant at p<0.5. By 
combining the indicators, a stronger correlation is achieved than any of the single indicators, 
enhancing the predictive value of the tool. In effect, if a sentence in an agreement has a score 
of three (i.e. it contains at least one hedge word, less than three determiners, and a verb of 
weak explicit performative, but no strong explicitly performative verb), this can be translated 
as saying ‘It is likely that a person with expertise in IL would consider this sentence vague’. 
5.4 Conclusion: indicators of vagueness in international agreements 
In the course of this chapter, eight indicators were tested as to their relationship with 
perceived vagueness in international legal agreements. These were the regime of origin, 
sentence length, presence of hedge words, presence of numbers, number of adjectives and 
adverbs, number of determiners, weak explicitly performative verbs and strong explicitly 
performative verbs. Of these, four proved to have a statistically significant relationship with 
the perceived vagueness of a sentence: If a sentence contains at least one hedge word, if it 
contains less than three determiners, or if it contains a weak explicitly performative verb, the 
sentence is perceived as comparatively vaguer than other sentences by survey respondents. 
Conversely, if a sentence contains a strong explicitly performative verb, it is perceived as 
comparatively more precise. These four indicators are combined to constitute a vagueness 
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scale ranging from -1 (very precise) to 3 (very vague) with which to rate sentences in 
international legal agreements. Each sentence is assigned a binary score for each of the 
categories (1 or 0 for the first three categories, -1 or 0 for the last). Simple addition provides 
a combined vagueness score for each sentence. In a next step, the scores for each sentence 
in a legal document can be used to calculate an average vagueness score for the entire legal 
agreement. The automated nature of this tool allows the processing of large amounts of text 
in very little time. 
The following chapter will apply this measure to 17 different international agreements. 
This will allow a test of the vagueness measuring tool in practice, explore a range of different 
comparisons, and a detailed study of what each component of the score actually signifies in 
legal sentences. 
6 Finding vagueness in international agreements: Applying the 
vagueness score 
In this chapter, I will apply the vagueness score developed in chapter 5.3.2 to a total of 
17 documents stemming from two international regimes: the NPT regime and the UNFCCC. 
The first part of the chapter contains some clarifications on comparison groups. In a second 
part, I will discuss some high-level aggregate data, in order to point out general trends and 
compare some groups of documents. In section 6.3, I will look at the documents in more 
detail, discussing the particularities of each and also translating some of the quantitative 
data back into actual characteristics of legal sentences by giving examples of sentences 
scoring in each of the categories. In a fourth part of this chapter, I will compare the results 
of this study with previous assessments by researchers as to the vagueness of documents. 
While a comparison of vagueness has never been done systematically, there are some 
individual assessments. This enables me to discuss various aspects of the tool developed here 
and to see where it overlaps with these previous assessments as well as the cases in which 
it leads toward different conclusions. Section 6.5 takes up insights gained in the two previous 
sections as to the limitations and challenges of the tool and starts a discussion on further 
research. 
6.1 Comparison groups and legal status 
The analysed documents can be categorized in several ways. In this study, I concentrated 
on comparisons by regime (UNFCCC or NPT), text category (preamble, main text, annex, 
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titles, or final clauses), and legal status (decision, declaration or Convention/Protocol), 
though other possible axes for comparison certainly exist. In this section, I will briefly detail 
the different comparison groups, focussing especially on the legal status of documents. 
The comparison of and within regimes is fairly straightforward. Separating documents by 
their regime of origin and only comparing documents has several advantages. For one, each 
regime may have its own idiosyncratic speech patterns which might make it harder to 
compare vagueness between regimes than within one. Additionally, the context and the 
content within a regime are much more fixed, so that the comparison is more likely to be 
focussed on actual differences in vagueness and not as susceptible to possible outside 
influences. On the other hand, it can also be beneficial to compare the vagueness of 
documents stemming from two or more regimes. This can help to identify language patterns 
which are in fact used in most IL, and in some cases the question whether documents from 
one regime are in general more vaguely formulated than from another may yield important 
insights into the dynamics and politics of the respective regimes. As with all the comparison 
groups discussed here, there is no one right way to compare international agreements, but 
it is very important to include information on which groups or documents are being 
compared and why. 
I use a second set of characteristics to compare different legal texts is the part of the 
agreement in which a sentence features. In this study, I broadly follow Aust (2000: 332) in 
differentiating preambles, main body of text, annexes, titles, and final clauses. I focus on the 
main text, but occasionally other parts of the treaty are discussed when they are especially 
relevant. The differentiation is important for several reasons: One, different parts of 
agreements deal with different content. That may make different parts of the text more or 
less relevant for the analysis in question. Two, some parts of agreements like headings and 
some annexes are not actually composed in sentences, which presents a challenge for the 
tool (further discussion in section 6.5). Three, different sections of text are interpreted as 
having differing legal status. Talking about preambles, for example, Aust (2000: 337) writes: 
“The preamble is part of the context of the treaty for the purposes of 
interpretation […] The more one burdens the preamble with unnecessary, but not 
always insubstantial, material, the greater the danger that it will be relied on to 
support a particular interpretation of the main text”. 
In describing preambles as context to an agreement, Aust makes the distinction that the 
preambular paragraphs themselves are not included in the text that would require 
interpretation in the first instance. Headings are seen as even less integral to the text: 
“As with the preamble, there should be no discussion of headings until the end of 
the negotiations: otherwise much time may be wasted arguing over the wording 
of what is no more than a label” (Aust 2000: 340). 
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Final clauses, on the other hand, can be more important than one may assume. 
“Final clauses can be a trap for the unwary. Compared with the main body of a 
treaty, the final clauses may appear to anyone who is not a foreign ministry 
lawyer to be less important, and in a sense they are. But [….] final clauses do play 
an essential, if different, role from the main text” (Aust 2000: 345). 
Aust refers to clauses on consent to be bound and entry into force here, which are often 
at the end of the agreement, and there is not usually much variance between agreements in 
how these clauses are formulated, but their content can nonetheless be crucial for the 
agreement in question. Even though most annexes form an integral part of the treaty they 
are part of, “it is prudent to distinguish their provisions from those in the treaty itself” (Aust 
2000: 355). Each of these parts of text follows different Conventions and is constituted by 
slightly different language. It is of course possible to compare an entire agreement to another 
one, but the comparison will necessarily be slightly less detailed if different parts of text are 
not taken into account. 
Lastly, the legal status of the document is of crucial importance. However, even the 
number of possible categories is controversial. According to the most intuitive, and 
Conventional, distinction there are only two types of legal documents: legally binding 
treaties on the one hand and any other document drawn up between two or more states on 
the other (see e.g. Aust 2000: 18). Unfortunately, whether an agreement is legally binging or 
not is contingent on whether or not the parties to the agreement intended it to be binding 
(Aust 2000: 17). This can of course create confusion. More pragmatically, legally binding 
documents are often identified by their need of ratification. Three documents in my corpus 
fulfil this criterion: NPT (1968), the UNFCCC (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1997). 
Every other document then simply has the status of being not legally binding. 
To make matters even more complicated, legal bindingness need not be considered a 
binary. One can, for example, classify decisions made by all parties within the framework of 
a given regime as a separate legal category in addition to legally binding Conventions and 
non-binding declarations. While coming at the cost of more fuzziness, this classification has 
the advantage of allowing more room for the perceived importance and bindingness of the 
different treaties. Certainly, such decisions do not usually require ratification. They are 
however adopted with consensus by an official body including all member states. As long as 
a country wishes to stay inside a given regime, it must also respect the decisions taken by 
the Conference of the Parties (COP). The legal nature of COP decisions in the climate regime, 
for example, has been the matter of some debate among scholars of IL. After having devoted 
an entire paper on the validity of COP-made law, Camenzuli (2007:25) comes to the 
conclusion that 
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“While the legally binding nature and characterization of CoP acts and decisions 
as ‘law’ will and should continue to be the subject of further research and 
discussion, the importance of this CoP made law in determining the effectiveness 
of MEAs [Multilateral Environmental Agreements] means that efforts should also 
be directed at ensuring its validity. Whether law making power of CoPs fall within 
the law of treaties or international institutional law, in either case, provided the 
interpretation adopted by the CoP is uncontested and not modified by further 
practice, it is likely to be regarded as authoritative”. 
Considering also that the mechanisms of IL (discussed in chapter 3.1.3) are often based 
more on norm-changing, mutual acceptance and public recognition, these factors seem 
sufficient to allow for an extra category in-between the binding treaties and the non-binding 
declarations. In the following chapter, I do adopt this three-part split. 
The question remains which documents to sort in which category. As stated above, the 
NPT and the Framework Convention as well as the Kyoto Protocol are unambiguously legally 
binding and constitute the group I call ‘Convention/Protocol’. At the other end of the 
spectrum, Ministerial Declarations under the UNFCCC are clearly designed to be declarations 
of intent, without any legal consequence. CoP Decisions under the UNFCCC regime belong in 
the third category of decisions. This leaves RevCon Final Declarations. On the one hand, the 
fact that they are named ‘declaration’ is a hint that they should be categorized with the 
UNFCCC Ministerial declarations. On the other hand, they are universal decisions by all 
parties made on the basis of the NPT, reviewing and developing it over time. In this, they 
serve a similar purpose to CoP decisions. For these reasons, I categorize them as decisions 
for the purposes of this study. 
In general, it is often useful to vary as few components as possible when comparing 
agreements: for example, when wanting to compare documents across regimes, it may be 
best to stick with documents of similar legal status and compare the same part of each text.  
6.2 Overall results 
The results of the application of the tool to documents of the NPT and UNFCCC regimes 
can be seen in the following table: 
Table 8: Average vagueness points by document: all text 
Regime Year Document 
Name 
Legal 
Status 
Sentences Total 
Points 
Average 
Points 
NPT 1968 NPT 1968 Convention
/Protocol 
60 26 0.43 
NPT 1975 NPT 1975 Decision 120 176 1.47 
NPT 1985 NPT 1985 Decision 222 307 1.38 
NPT 1995 NPT 1995 Decision 82 142 1.73 
NPT 2000 NPT 2000 Decision 351 488 1.39 
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NPT 2010 NPT 2010 Decision 364 501 1.38 
UNFCCC 1992 UNFCCC 
1992 
Convention
/Protocol 
282 216 0.77 
UNFCCC 1995 UNFCCC 
1995 
Decision 28 42 1.50 
UNFCCC 1996 UNFCCC 
1996 
Declaration 30 41 1.37 
UNFCCC 1997 UNFCCC 
1997 
Convention
/Protocol 
297 104 0.35 
UNFCCC 1998 UNFCCC 
1998 
Decision 460 540 1.17 
UNFCCC 2000 UNFCCC 
2000 
Decision 227 192 0.85 
UNFCCC 2001 UNFCCC 
2001 
Declaration 12 13 1.08 
UNFCCC 2002 UNFCCC 
2002 
Declaration 31 54 1.74 
UNFCCC 2007 UNFCCC 
2007 
Decision 54 59 1.09 
UNFCCC 2009 UNFCCC 
2009 
Declaration 52 48 0.92 
UNFCCC 2010 UNFCCC 
2010 
Decision 388 497 1.28 
 
The first important finding, though it may seem basic, is that there indeed exists a 
diversity of vagueness among the different documents. Means range from 0.36 points in the 
Kyoto Protocol to 1.83 points in the Delhi Ministerial Declaration. Out of a maximum possible 
range of 4 (-1 to 3), average vagueness scores cover a range of 1.47. Considering that an 
average score of 3 means that all the sentences of the agreement would need to score as 
vague in each category, this is quite a large variation. It indicates that even though the basic 
unit under scrutiny are sentences, the vagueness scores still show differences at the level of 
entire agreements. 
On average, there does not seem to be a significant difference between the two regimes: 
The NPT averages 2.89 points, while the UNFCCC sentences get 2.67 on average. Counting 
only the main text bodies of agreements does not make a difference in the distribution, 
although it does elevate the vagueness scores slightly. The next two graphs are intended to 
show the similarity of the data when using the entire text of each agreement (Figure 14) as 
opposed to restricting analysis to the main body of text, excluding preambles, headings, 
annexes, and final clauses (Figure 15).  
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Figure 14: Average scores by documents, all text 
Figure 15: Average scores by documents, main body of text 
The above graphs both show all documents, sorted by their respective regime and in 
order of their dates of adoption. Legally binding documents are coloured in red, Decisions 
made by a RevCon or CoP show up in blue, and Ministerial declarations are highlighted in 
green. What becomes apparent is that the three documents averaging the least points are 
the ones that are the most firmly counted as legally binding: The original NPT of 1968, the 
original UNFCCC (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (1997). 
The two documents scored by far as being least vague are the NPT and the Kyoto Protocol. 
A little vaguer, but still relatively precise, are the UNFCCC (1992), the Bonn agreement, and 
the Copenhagen Accord. On the vague end of the spectrum, the most vague document from 
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both regimes are, respectively, the NPT review conference (RevCon) closing document from 
1995 and the Delhi declaration of 2002. While all of the red bars – representing the two 
Conventions and the Protocol – are clearly lower (meaning less vague) than all other 
documents, it cannot be said that the green bars are, on average, much higher than the 
others. When taking the averages of the three groups, this hunch becomes clear: 
Table 9: Averages by document type, all text included 
Document type Average vagueness score 
Protocol/Convention 0.52 
Decision 1.32 
Declaration 1.28 
The difference between the first category and the next two is pronounced, while the 
latter categories are very close, the Declarations actually scoring slightly more precisely than 
the decisions. However, when looking only at the main text of the document – excluding 
preambles, annexes, headlines, and ending formula, this last fact changes. The table below 
shows the scores for the main text, aggregated by document group: 
Table 10: Averages by document type, main body of text 
Document type Average vagueness score 
Protocol/Convention 0.53 
Decision 1.38 
Declaration 1.45 
While the numbers for all categories go up slightly, the average for declarations changes 
by 0.17, which is the most significant change and puts them above Decisions in terms of 
vagueness. This result is particularly interesting because in all other respects it does not seem 
to matter which parts of the text are included in the analysis. Most of the time, the 
differences are very slight and crucially they do not usually change the results of a 
comparison. Unless otherwise indicated, I will base the analysis that follows on the main 
body of text of documents for methodological reasons explained in section 6.1. As will be 
discussed in section 6.5, the group of comparison is crucial to obtain meaningful data. In this 
particular study, calculating the vagueness score of the entire documents as opposed to only 
using the main body of text does change the absolute results slightly, but does not change 
the relative results (i.e. which documents are vaguer than others), because all documents 
become slightly more precise. In order to provide a more solid comparison, I usually use only 
the main body of text in this analysis. In the rare cases where taking into account other parts 
of text proved necessary or useful, I have indicated the deviation. 
All the scores shown above are averaged from all sentences in a given document being 
assigned a score from -1 to 3. Looking at the score distribution of all documents taken 
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together, the resulting graph approaches normal distribution, though skewed slightly to the 
right – vaguer – end of the spectrum: 
 
Figure 16: Overall score distribution 
The majority of sentences score 1, meaning that most sentences contain some vague 
features and some that are precise. Just over half as many sentences score 2 points, meaning 
three out of the four measured criteria score as vague. The third largest category – again 
containing about half as many sentences as the previous one – is that of fairly, but not 
completely precise sentences, where usually one of the four categories remains vague, while 
three of them indicate precision. The two smallest categories are the most extreme ones. 
Again, the vague side contains about double the amount of sentences than the equivalent 
category on the left – precise side. If a sentence gets -1 points, all categories indicate a vague 
sentence, while if it receives 3 points, all categories indicate that the sentence is precise. It 
is important to note that the categories themselves are not scaled – there are only two values 
that can come out of one category. While the distribution definitely varies among the 
different documents, the basic pyramid shape mostly stays recognizable, if sometimes 
moved a step to the left or to the right. 
Another way to analyse the data is to take a closer look at the categories themselves. As 
described in the previous chapter, there are four of them. The first one determines whether 
or not the sentence contains any hedge words. The second category is used to indicate if a 
sentence contains less than three determiners. The last two categories are concerned with 
verbs: they look at whether a weak or a strong performative verb is present, respectively. 
The category checking for strong performative verbs is the one responsible for the minus 
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points: here, the result is not either 1 (for vague) or 0 (for precise), but rather 0 as an indicator 
of vagueness when no such verb is present or -1 as an indicator for precision, when it is. 
The following graph shows how many sentences overall score in each of the categories: 
 
Figure 17: Percentage of sentences scoring in the respective category in all documents 
As the graph shows, most of the sentences score in the category ‘determiners’ – 84.5% of 
them, in fact. This means that only around 15% of sentences contain three determiners or 
more, and thus come in at the precise end of this category. The next biggest category is hedge 
words. Just over 30% of sentences overall contain at least one hedge word. 23.3% of all 
analysed sentences feature weak performative verbs like ‘should’ or could, while strong 
performative verbs like ‘will’ and ‘shall’ are found least often, albeit still in 17.5% of the 
sentences. Of course, this data is aggregated, and the composition of scores varies widely 
when looking at the individual documents. The graphs below show overviews of these 
differences for each category. 
The first graph shows the distribution of hedge words in each of the analysed agreements. 
Like in figure 16, the bars are ordered chronologically by regime, and Conventions and 
Protocols are marked in red, decisions in blue and declarations in red. 
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Figure 18: Percentage of sentences containing hedge words 
In general, the percentage of sentences containing hedge words varies from 10.4% in the 
Bonn Agreements on the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (or UNFCCC 
2000) and 60.9% in the Final Declaration of the NPT RevCon of 1995. This is a variance of just 
over 50 percentage points, so it is a safe conclusion that not all international agreements use 
hedge words in equal measures. Interestingly, the legal form of the document does not seem 
to make a significant difference in this category at first glance. However, the average 
numbers by document type as shown in table 12 do show a difference, although it is not 
particularly large: 
Table 11: Percentage of sentences containing hedge words by document type 
Document type Sentences containing hedge words 
Protocol/Convention 29% 
Decision 35% 
Declaration 37% 
 
The difference between the document type lowest in hedge words and the highest one 
stands at 8 percentage points. 
In the category of determiners, the comparing graph looks differently. 
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Figure 19: Percentage of sentences containing less than three determiners 
The bars look more uniform in height, with the notable exceptions of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol. Since both documents are legally binding, this 
result foreshadows the results of the grouped averages, where this type of document scores 
significantly lower. The NPT is the document that gets the least points for determiners 
meaning that it contains most of them, because sentences containing 3 or more determiners 
receive 0 points in this category, while those comprising two or less score 1. 45% of sentences 
in the NPT contain two or less determiners, while that number is 97.5% for the Delhi 
Ministerial Declaration (UNFCCC 2002). The variance is similar to the one for hedge words at 
just over 52 percentage points. Looking at the grouped averages, a far more distinct picture 
can be shown: 
Table 12: Percentage of sentences containing less than three determiners by document 
type 
Document type Sentences containing determiners 
Protocol/Convention 63% 
Decision 89% 
Declaration 89% 
Decisions and declarations actually have the same percentage of sentences with two or 
less determiners, but the legally binding documents show a clear distinction from that 
number by 36 percentage points. 
The next chart shows the prevalence of weak performative verbs in the documents. For 
the purposes of this study, weak performative verbs are ‘would’, ‘could’, ‘should’, 
‘underline’, ‘underscore’, ‘undertake’, ‘recognize’, ‘have the right’, and ‘call’. 
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Figure 20: Percentage of sentences containing weak explicitly performative verbs 
What is interesting here is that for the first time, there seems to be a notable difference 
among the regimes. While there is an outlier in the NPT regime – the Final Declaration of 
1995 – most other documents score remarkably similarly, including the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. In the UNFCCC, on the other hand, the percentage of sentences including weak 
performative verbs varies widely, and Ministerial Declarations appear to contain the vast 
majority of them. Both the UNFCCC (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol have very low 
percentages, though the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC 2007) contains no weak performative 
verbs at all. The variation here is over 67 percentage points, which is extremely large. 
When grouped by document type, the averages can be found in the following table: 
Table 13: Percentage of sentences containing weak explicitly performative verbs by 
document type 
Document type Sentences containing weak verbs 
Protocol/Convention 16% 
Decision 27% 
Declaration 37% 
 
The differences here are noticeable and evenly spaced at 10-11 percentage points each. 
The scale follows the usual progression, with legally binding documents, NPT 
notwithstanding, featuring the least amount of weak explicitly performative verbs with 16% 
of sentences containing them and 37% of sentences in Declarations containing these verbs. 
The last category is the opposite of the previous one, namely strong performative verbs. 
In the case of this study, this includes the verbs ‘shall’ and ‘will’. 
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Figure 21: Percentage of sentences containing strong explicitly performative verbs 
Here, the differences are even more distinct. Clearly the vast majority of times that ‘will’ 
or ‘shall’ is used in international agreements, it is in legally binding ones. Decisions 
sometimes feature a few instances, and Declarations do not contain any as often as they do 
– but there is the notable extreme outlier of the Copenhagen Accord, which will be discussed 
in detail later on. The variance comes in at 65 percentage points, which is comparable to the 
range of weak performative verbs, even though in total strong performative verbs are used 
much less often. 
As expected, the differences among document types are stark: Legally binding documents 
feature strong performative verbs in over half of their sentences, while Decisions only 
employ them in 12% of theirs. Due to the extreme outlier status of the Copenhagen Accord, 
Declarations come in at 18%. In section 6.4, I will give some reasons for why I think this is an 
anomaly. The table below summarizes these results: 
Table 14: Percentage of sentences containing strong explicitly performative verbs by 
document type 
Document type Sentences containing weak verbs 
Protocol/Convention 55% 
Decision 12% 
Declaration 18% 
 
In the following section, I will look at each individual document in more detail, and make 
an attempt to translate some of the quantitative data back to their qualitative meanings by 
giving examples of what sentences with specific vagueness scores or characteristics may look 
like. 
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6.3 Detailed result by agreement 
The following two sections detail the application of the tool to individual agreements. In 
section 6.3.1, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as well as five Final Documents of its 
RevCons are analysed. In section 6.3.2, 11 documents pertaining to the climate regime are 
studied, including the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, four Ministerial Declarations and five 
Decisions. In each case, I show the detailed composition of the aggregate vagueness score 
that the specific treaty received and quote and discuss some especially interesting sentences. 
The main goal of the chapter is to showcase how to apply the tool developed in this 
dissertation and what certain scores mean in practice, but in doing this I also provide some 
new information about the individual agreements. In some instances, limitations of the tool 
have been brought to light in the detailed analysis. I have made mention of it when this 
happened in this section, but the actual discussion of these issues takes place in section 6.5. 
6.3.1 Documents under the NPT regime 
The NPT regime has been called “one of the oldest, most ambitious, and most universal 
arms control treaties ever to enter into force” (Peloso 2011: 311). Its goal, as stated in its 
name, is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In order to do that, the NPT strikes 
a “basic bargain”, which 
“allows countries to surrender their right to develop nuclear weapons in return 
for access to international assistance in civilian nuclear technology” 
(Way/Sasikumar 2004: 1). 
Every five years, the signatories meet at RevCons. RevCons are aimed at assessing the 
implementation status of each of the provisions in the NPT, providing recommendations to 
further the treaties’ goals and, if possible, produce a Final Declaration on addressing these 
issues (Boon 2012: viii). 
 
NPT 1968 
The NPT, concluded in 1968, is the first of its kind and the starting point of the Non-
Proliferation Regime. It can be divided into a preamble (ending with sentence 15), the 
operative clauses and ending formulas (starting at sentence 36). On the importance of 
distinguishing the parts of an agreement see section 6.1. 
With a vagueness score of 0.43, the agreement is on the very precise side of the spectrum. 
Most parts of the text are fairly similar, the only exception being the preamble, which scores 
1.36 vagueness points. The main body of text scores 0.4, and the concluding text scores -0.04 
points. This is in line with preconceptions about these parts of text. 
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Looking only at the main body of text, the average score of 0.4 is combines four categories 
(hedge words, determiners, weak explicit performatives and strong explicit performatives), 
which can be seen in the graph below. 
 
Figure 22: Percentage of vagueness indicators NPT 1968 
The sub-score for hedge words is 0.25, which means that a quarter of the sentences in 
the main body of text ( or more specifically, five out of 20) contain at least one hedge word37. 
Nine sentences, or 45% of sentences in the main body of text, contain three or more 
determiners. Seven sentences (or 35%) contain verbs of weak performative force, while 13 
of them (65%) are based on verbs with strong performative force38. This last number is very 
high, and while it is not solely responsible for the low vagueness score, it is certainly a major 
factor. The distribution of sentences on scores looks as follows: 
 
                                                          
37 See Section 5.3.1 for a list of the hedge words which were tested for. 
38 This last number is indicative of precision, not vagueness, so that the effect on the total is negative. 
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Figure 23: Score distribution NPT 1968 
While most sentences score 1, meaning two indicators suggest precision and two suggest 
vagueness, it is clear that the distribution is heavily skewed towards the more precise end. 
In fact, only two sentences score more than 1 point, and both of them score 3, the highest 
number of points. They are Art. 4.2: 
“All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to 
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and 
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” 
(NPT 1968: Art. IV.2) 
and Art. 6 
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control” (NPT 1968: Art. VI). 
In the first case, ‘the fullest possible’ is a hedge, ‘all’ counts as a determiner, which means 
the sentence does score in this category, and ‘undertake to facilitate’ is a very weak verbal 
structure that indicates a low performative force, resulting in a weak obligation. In the 
second case, ‘in good faith’ and ‘effective’ count as hedge words or clauses, ‘each’ is the sole 
determiner, and the verb ‘undertake’ again indicates a low level of obligation. 
The preamble also contains one sentence scoring 3. It is necessary to note, though, that 
the usual structuring of the preamble means that it consists mostly of half-sentences, held 
together by a clamp of subject (‘the signatory states’ etc.) in the beginning and a version of 
‘have agreed as follows’ in the end. While they therefore cannot be analysed quite like 
complete sentences, the difference between them is still interesting. In this case, the 
sentence fragment in question reads 
“Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of 
the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of 
nuclear disarmament” (NPT 1986: preamble). 
‘Earliest possible date’ is a hedge, undertake again takes the role of weakly performative 
verb and no determiners are present. 
Five sentences in the main body of text of the agreement receive the lowest possible 
score of -1. I will not list all of them here, but simply give two examples. The first is a sentence 
under Art. 3.1: 
“Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with 
respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, 
processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility” 
(NPT 1968: Art. III.1). 
In this case, no hedge words are present. The operative verb is ‘shall’, which indicates a 
legal obligation and is a verb with strong performative force in this context. Determiners are 
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‘any’, and ‘such’, where ‘any’ is used twice and therefore reaching the threshold of 3. 
Similarly, this sentences contained in of Art. 3.4, is counted as precise: 
“For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-
day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the 
date of such deposit” (NPT 1968: Art. III.4). 
The operative verb is again shall, there are no hedge words and ‘their’, ‘such’ (2) are 
determiners. Additionally, although this is not reflected in the scores, the sentence contains 
a reference to the clearly defined time period of 180 days. Furthermore, six sentences in the 
concluding text receive a score of -1. This is not surprising, since the closing paragraphs often 
contain clear-cut and uncontroversial arrangements concerning when to meet next or 
ratification procedures. 
Content-wise, some of the most important parts of the agreement concern the actual 
provisions against nuclear proliferation, most notably articles 1 and 2 of the agreement. They 
are very similar in their sentence structure and read, respectively, 
“Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons 
or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce 
any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices” (NPT 1986: Art.I). 
and 
“Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer 
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of 
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or 
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices” (NPT 1986: Art.II). 
Both of these sentences receive a score of 1, bringing them to the middle of the vagueness 
scale. This is because even though they do not contain any hedge words and neither of them 
contains more than two determiners, the operative verb of the sentence is ‘undertake’ which 
indicates a relatively low level of obligation. Apart from this, though, the language that 
follows this operative word is unusually strong (which is not reflected in the results 
generated by the tool). 
 
NPT 1975 
Eight years after the conclusion of the original Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and five 
years after its entry into force, the first RevCon ended with a Final Declaration. It is important 
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to note that the legal status between the original agreement and this document differ (see 
section 6.1). The Final Declaration goes through all the articles of the original agreement, 
noting the current status, progress and opinions on each. It has about double the length of 
the original agreement. 
The total vagueness score of the entire document is 1.48, which is relatively vague but 
not yet among the vaguest of the tested documents. Considering only the main text does not 
change the relative position but heightens the score slightly to 1.52. In my analysis, the 
document consists of 120 sentences.39 
 
Figure 24: Percentage of vagueness indicators NPT 1975 
As shown in graph 25 above, 50.5% of sentences in the 1975 NPT review document 
contain at least one hedge word. 79.4% score positively for containing less than three 
determiners. A third of the sentences contains a weak explicitly performative verb. In 
comparison to the previous document, it is notable that over half of the sentences contain 
neither strong nor weak explicitly performative verbs. These verbs are either neutral in their 
effect on the perceived vagueness, or have not been tested for in the original study and are 
therefore impossible to classify. Since the standards of which verbs to use when are more 
relaxed in less formal documents, it is natural that this would be the case for a larger amount 
of verbs in a review document than in the original agreement. Otherwise, scores in all sub-
parameters are consistent in showing that the document is overall relatively vague. Breaking 
the scores down by the number of sentences that receive them creates the following graph: 
                                                          
39 Each single provision was counted as a sentence if it concluded either with a dot or a line break. 
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Figure 25: Score distribution NPT 1975 
14 out of 97 sentences in the main text have a vagueness score of 3. One of them is 
exemplified here: 
“Therefore, the Conference expresses the hope that States that have not already 
joined the Treaty should do so at the earliest possible date” (NPT 1975: 10). 
Even though it is relatively short, it manages to tick all the boxes for a vague sentence 
under this schematic: ‘expressing hope’ is a verb of very weak performative force, an ‘earliest 
possible’ date is a hedged expression and no determiners or strong performative verbs are 
present. Another one is as follows: 
“The Conference underlines the importance of adherence to the Treaty by non-
nuclear-weapon States as the best means of reassuring one another of their 
renunciation of nuclear weapons and as one of the effective means of 
strengthening their mutual security” (NPT 1975: 9). 
The verb in this sentence is ‘underline’, which has a weak performative force – in fact, it 
does not include any direct call for action at all. ‘Their’ is used twice, making it a total of two 
determiners in the sentence. Saying the adherence is the ‘best’ and ‘one of the effective 
means’ is a hedge, although less clearly so than in other cases. 
Only one sentence in the main text (and in the whole document) has score of -1: 
“The Conference takes note of the continued determination of the Depositary 
States to honour their statements, which were welcomed by the United Nations 
Security Council in resolution 255 (I968), that, to ensure the security of the non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, they will provide or support 
immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-
weapon State Party to the Treaty which is a victim of an act or an object of a 
threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used” (NPT 1975: 9). 
Here, one problem with the tool becomes apparent: the word ‘will’, which counts as the 
verb with strong performative force in the sentence, is not the operative verb. That role falls 
to ‘takes note’, which was neutral as to its vagueness in the test cases and therefore does 
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not receive any positive or negative score. The implications of this issue for the tool itself will 
be discussed in section 6.5. 
 
NPT 1985 
While the NPT RevCon in 1980 did not produce a Final Declaration, the next one, five 
years later, did. Since it is a Final Document like its predecessor, the two documents are 
comparable in legal terms, as are the following three Final Declarations of NPT RevCons. At 
222 sentences, the length of the document again almost doubles the previous one. Against 
the backdrop of heightened Cold-War tensions, it may be considered remarkable that the 
conference took place at all, much less produced a Final Declaration. 
The 1985 Final Document receives a total vagueness score of 1.37. This is fairly similar to 
the previous document from 1975. While the number is still slightly above average for this 
study, it is the lowest score of all the Final Declarations of the NPT. Looking at the way this 
score is made up, it appears that 36.7% of the sentences contain hedge words, 82.4% receive 
a vagueness point because they contain less than three determiners, 31% contain weak 
explicitly performative verbs and only 6% include strong performative verbs: 
 
Figure 26: Percentage of vagueness indicators NPT 1985 
 
This is a fairly typical distribution of the indicators. The graph below shows the 
distribution of vagueness points among sentences in the main body of text of the document: 
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Figure 27: Score distribution NPT 1985 
As should be expected, most sentences fall somewhere in the middle range of scores. 105 
sentences score 1, that is to say that they include two features indicative of precise sentences 
and two which indicate vagueness. But while the middle categories contain by far the most 
sentences, the edge categories are interesting to analyse because they show the types of 
sentences that are counted as especially vague or precise by this method. 
18 sentences in the main text score 3 vagueness points. I will take just two of them as an 
example here. 
“The Conference underlines the need for IAEA to be provided with the necessary 
financial and human resources to ensure that the Agency is able to continue to 
meet effectively its safeguards responsibilities” (NPT 1985: 17). 
The first indicator is the verb ‘underlines’, which is hard to translate into any call or 
incitement for action. Effective – or in this case, the adverb effectively – is a hedge word 
because its presence makes it less, instead of more clear what financial resources are 
needed. The only determiner to be found in this sentence is again the word ‘its’, making it 
well under three determiners. 
“The Conference further emphasizes the responsibilities of the Depositaries of 
NPT in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council to 
endeavour, in consultation with the other members of the Security Council, to 
give full consideration to all appropriate measures to be undertaken by the 
Security Council to deal with the situation, including measures under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter” (NPT 1985: 19). 
Only two sentences of the 205 in the main body of the text receive the lowest vagueness 
score of -1. 
“The Conference takes note of the continued determination of the Depositary 
States to honour their statements, which were welcomed by the United Nations 
Security Council in resolution 255 (1968), that, to ensure the security of the non-
nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, they will provide or support 
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immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-
weapon State Party to the Treaty which is a victim of an act or an object of a 
threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used” (NPT 1985: 28). 
“The Conference commends the recent progress which the IAEA’s Committee on 
Assurances of Supply (CAS) has made towards agreeing a set of principles related 
to this matter, and expresses the hope that the Committee will complete this 
work soon” (NPT 1985: 18). 
No hedge words are to be found in either case. Neither sentence contains a weak verb: 
‘take not of’, which can be seen in the first sentence, was found to be neutral with regards 
to vagueness in the previous analysis, while ‘commends’ (as used in the second sentence) 
was not part of the original study and therefore cannot be assessed here. There are quite a 
few determiners: ‘their’, ‘which’, and ‘any’ in the first sentence and which, as well as twice 
‘this’, in the second. As already discussed in the section above, in both of these cases, the 
strong verb ‘will’ is not actually the operative verb of the sentences. In contrast, here is a 
sentence where it is the operative verb: 
“Such an extending of safeguards will enable the further development and 
application of an effective régime in both nuclear-weapon States and non-
nuclear-weapon States” (NPT 1985: 16). 
However, sentences such as the above are extremely rare in the NPT regime. In fact, the 
likely conclusion is that in the NPT regime, words with a strong performative force or a 
specific legal meaning like will and shall are simply not used in Final Declarations. This 
problem will be discussed further in section 6.5. 
Since there are so few sentences with strong performative verbs, I will also give an 
example of a sentence scoring zero, which is to say it gets no point in any of the categories. 
“The Conference also invites the nuclear-weapon States, and all other States to 
render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to 
refrain from any action that runs counter to the letter and spirit of United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 39/5413” (NPT 1985: 28). 
As can be seen, there is neither a strong nor a weak verb, nor any hedge word contained 
in this sentence. Determiners are ‘their’, ‘any’, and ‘same’. Apart from the challenge that 
‘will’ is only under certain circumstances indicative of precision, this sentence also shows 
another challenge for the method: references to other agreements, which are not 
themselves included in the tool, like the General Assembly resolution referred to above. This 
issue will be discussed further in section 6.5. 
 
NPT 1995 
Another ten years later, the 5th RevCon produced a Final Declaration. In the ten years 
between the two, the global climate shifted significantly. The fall of the Berlin wall and the 
subsequent restructuring of global relations also had significant effects on the non-
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proliferation regime (see e.g. Simpson 1994). Additionally, 1995 was the year in which the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty was extended indefinitely. 
At 82 sentences (2627 words) it is significantly shorter than the previous two Final 
Declarations, and just a little longer than the original agreement. This presents a break in the 
otherwise consistent production of ever longer documents over time: 
 
Figure 28: Number of sentences in different documents of the NPT Regime, all text 
included 
At 1.79 vagueness points, this agreement is the second vaguest in this analysis and the 
vaguest Final Declaration produced by the NPT regime. 
No sentence at all in the document receives a vagueness score of -1. This is due in part to 
the fact that there are no strong performative verbs in any of the sentences: nowhere have 
the drafters used either the word shall or will. This is consistent with the overall pattern of 
Final Declarations under the NPT regime. On the other hand, 67.8% of sentences in the main 
text of the document contain verbs with weak performative force, as shown in figure 30. 
That is by far the highest percentage in all analysed agreements (the second highest 
proportion can be found in the UNFCCC of 1995 and stands at just over 39%), and may be 
indicative of a wish to particularly weaken the legal force of the document. In this regard, 
the document is an outlier. 
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Figure 29: Percentage of vagueness indicators in the NPT 1995 
The fraction of sentences containing hedge words or more than two determiners, while 
also on the higher end, are much more within the usual range of the documents studied 
here. The distribution of vagueness points is shown in the graph below: 
 
Figure 30: Score distribution NPT 1995 
Compared to the previous graph, the whole distribution is skewed towards the left: not 
only are -1 and 0 much less prominent scores, but more sentences score 2 or even 3 as 
compared to 1 point. In the main text alone, 13 sentences score 3 points, the highest number 
on the scale. Two of them are shown as examples below: 
“It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within the 
respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to 
provide for a focused consideration of such issues” (NPT 1995: 8). 
“Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes 
jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of 
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international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant 
appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations” (NPT 1995: 12). 
The first sentence contains not one but two hedge words: both specific and relevant serve 
to obscure rather than clarify what issues are to be considered. In the second sentence, that 
role is filled by the word ‘appropriate’. ‘Could’, used in both sentences is a verb of weak 
performative force. ‘Such’ is the only determiner to be found in either sentence. 
Since there are no sentences containing verbs with a strong performative force, I will look 
instead at one of the two sentences that scored 0 points – that is, they do not score in any 
of the categories which indicate vagueness. 
“The Conference requests that the President of the Conference bring the present 
decision, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the 
decision on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, to the attention of the heads of State or Government of all States and 
seek their full cooperation on these documents and in the furtherance of the 
goals of the Treaty” (NPT 1995: 12). 
The operative verb here is ‘requests’. It has not been part of the original analysis and is 
therefore not scored here, but it could be argued that it is likely to be one of the stronger 
performative verb choices when it comes to compelling action. In any case, the absence of 
any hedge words and the presence of the determiners ‘all’, ‘their’, and ‘these’ render the 
sentence relatively precise. 
 
NPT 2000 
Five years after the RevCon of 1995, the next RevCon also produced a Final Declaration. 
The parties agreed on 13 practical steps to further nuclear disarmament. The agreement’s 
overall vagueness score of 1.41 is comparable to the other Final Declarations except for its 
immediate predecessor (discussed above). It is a little on the higher side of the scale, but not 
extremely so. Contrary to any other Final Declaration, the document contains concluding 
formula. At 351 sentences (12220 words) it is a long document, in the NPT regime second 
only to the Final Declaration of 2010. 
The distribution of points over the four different categories seems pretty standard for 
NPT documents. 
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Figure 31: Percentage of vagueness indicators NPT 2000 
30.1% of sentences in the main body of text score as vague in the hedge word category, 
84.3% in the determiners category, again 30.1% or 96 sentences contain verbs with weak 
performative force and 5% those with strong performative force. The distribution of 
sentences over the vagueness points looks like this: 
 
Figure 32: Score distribution NPT 2000 
Once again, the bulk of sentences scores 1, as would be expected. For this document, the 
graph shows that more sentences are vague than precise. 
As can be seen, only one sentence in the main part of the document scores -1 points: 
“The Conference reaffirms that the cessation of all nuclear-weapon-test 
explosions or any other nuclear explosions will contribute to the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament 
leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and, therefore, to the 
further enhancement of international peace and security” (NPT 2000: 13). 
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Here, while the operative word is ‘reaffirms’, the fact that the next verb is ‘will’ is 
important, and I would argue it is a valid indicator for precision, because it mirrors the 
formulation of the original sentence. As a further example, the following sentence receives 
a score of 0: 
“The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and 
full compliance of all parties with its provisions are the best way to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices” (NPT 2000:2). 
33 sentences – the highest total number of sentences in any of the document (even 
though 3 documents are longer than this one) score 3 vagueness points. Two of them are 
given as examples below: 
“The Conference recognizes that nuclear material supplied to the nuclear-
weapon States for peaceful purposes should not be diverted for the production 
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and should be, as 
appropriate, subject to IAEA safeguards agreements“ (NPT 2000: 5). 
“Nuclear materials designated by each of the nuclear-weapon States as no longer 
required for military purposes should as soon as practicable be placed under IAEA 
or other relevant verification” (NPT 2000: 6). 
The hedge words used in these sentences are ‘appropriate’ and ‘as soon as practicable’ 
as well as ‘relevant’, respectively. Both sentences contain the weak explicit performative 
‘should’. There are no determiners in the first sentence, and the second sentence only 
contains the one determiner ‘each’. 
 
NPT 2010 
The latest RevCon Final Document is, at 12958 words, also the longest produced so far. 
The action plan contained in the document sketches out steps toward nuclear disarmament 
as well as non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
This document scores 1.47 on the vagueness scale, which is on the higher sider overall, 
but similar to most other NPT Final Declarations. The way the points are constituted is also 
fairly average for this type of document, as the graph below shows. 
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Figure 33: Percentage of vagueness indicators NPT 2010 
32.2% of sentences include one or more hedge words, 88.1% of sentences contain two or 
less determiners, 32.2% contain words with weak performative force and 5.8% – or 19 
sentences – contain verbs with strong performative force. Below is a graph showing the 
distribution of scores among the main sentences of the main body of text. 
 
Figure 34: Score distribution NPT 2010 
It reinforces the perception that the distribution of points in this document is fairly typical 
in its genre. 
31 sentences (or 8.9%) receive the maximum number of vagueness points. Some 
examples are: 
“The Conference recognizes that the development of an appropriate 
infrastructure to support the safe, secure and efficient use of nuclear power, in 
line with relevant IAEA standards and guidelines, is an issue of central 
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importance, especially for countries that are planning for the introduction of 
nuclear power” (NPT 2010: 9). 
or 
“The Conference recognizes the importance of having in place effective and 
coherent nuclear liability mechanisms at the national and global levels to provide 
compensation, if necessary, for damage inter alia to people, property and the 
environment due to a nuclear accident or incident, taking fully into account legal 
and technical considerations, and believing that the principle of strict liability 
should apply in the event of a nuclear accident or incident, including during the 
transport of radioactive material” (NPT 2010: 12). 
The operative verbs here is ‘recognizes’ in both cases. In the first case, there are two 
hedge words (appropriate and relevant). The second sentence includes the hedge word 
‘effective’. Neither of the sentences gets above the threshold of two determiners, even 
though they are both fairly long. 
There is no sentence in the text that receives the minimum number of vagueness points, 
so instead I will look at three different sentences from the middle category to see what might 
be characteristic of these. 
“In this regard, the Conference recalls that special efforts should be made and 
sustained to increase awareness in these fields, through participation of States 
parties, particularly those from developing countries, in training, workshops, 
seminars and capacity-building in a non-discriminatory manner” (NPT 2010: 9). 
This sentence scores a point in the category of weak performative verb, which is ‘should’. 
It doesn’t receive any points in the other three categories. There are neither hedge words 
nor a strong explicitly performative verb (which would result in a subtraction of a point), and 
there are three determiners: ‘this’, ‘these’, and ‘those’. The second sentence scoring 1 point 
is 
“The Conference encourages the efforts of IAEA, as well as of other relevant 
forums, in the promotion of safety in all its aspects, and encourages all States 
parties to take the appropriate national, regional and international steps to 
enhance and foster a safety culture” (NPT 2010: 10). 
This is an example of a sentence that includes a hedge word – relevant – and no strong 
performative verb, but also no weak performative verb and three determiners. 
“The Conference supports national, bilateral and international efforts to train the 
skilled workforce necessary for developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy” (NPT 
2010: 8) . 
Here, the only point is given because the sentence has less than three determiners. This 
is the most likely result for a sentence that receives one point, as could also be inferred from 
the fact that usually over 80% of sentences score in this category. 
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6.3.2 Documents under the UNFCCC regime 
In 1992, the UNFCCC was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro and now comprises 194 countries. Between 1995 and today, 
the COP has usually met once a year, with its subsidiary bodies additionally meeting once or 
twice in-between each conference. Included in this study are the UNFCCC (1992) itself and 
those documents produced by COP which have proper names – usually comprised of some 
indication of their legal status and the city in which they were concluded. 
 
UNFCCC 1992 
The UNFCCC officially started an international climate regime separate from other 
environmental concerns. The Convention entered into force in 1994. The objective of the 
agreement is to 
“stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” 
(UNFCCC 1992: Art.2). 
The UNFCCC scores 0.79 on the vagueness scale, making it the third most precise 
document after the original NPT and the Kyoto Protocol. The graph below shows the 
percentage of sentences scoring in each category: 
 
Figure 35: Percentage of vagueness indicators UNFCCC 1992 
41.5% of sentences in the main body of text of this document contain hedge words. This 
is quite a lot of sentences compared to some other documents which score higher points 
overall. 84.8% of sentences contain two or less determiners. The big difference compared to 
other documents lies in the use of verbs. Only 10.4% of sentences contain weak explicitly 
performative verbs, while 37.9 of them contain strong explicitly performative verbs. When 
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putting the UNFCCC next to the other two documents of comparable status, however, this is 
also the point where the difference within this group shows most prominently: in both of the 
other two documents, over 60% of sentences contain strong explicitly performative verbs. 
The number of sentences with the highest and lowest vagueness score is almost the same 
in this document: in the main text, 5 sentences score -1, while 7 sentences score 3. Out of a 
total of 164 sentences in the main body of text of the Convention, 70 score the exact median 
value of 1. The following graph provides an overview of the overall score distribution. 
 
Figure 36: Score distribution UNFCCC 1992 
As opposed to other documents, the distribution is almost perfectly symmetrical, with 
only a slight emphasis on sentences scoring 0 over those scoring 2 points. 
One of the sentences receiving the highest vagueness score is the paragraph stating the 
objective of the Convention (and in effect the entire regime it establishes). For this reason, 
this article, already mentioned above, is often quoted in other documents of the regime. 
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that 
the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC 1992: Art.2). 
‘Would’ is counted as a verb of weak performative force. ‘Relevant’ clearly hedges the 
answer to the question what should actually be done to stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentration. The only determiner to be found in this sentence is ‘any’. 
In the next sentence, the first part in square brackets is an introductory sentence that 
gets counted individually. It is included to provide the subject. 
“[All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and 
circumstances, shall:] Take climate change considerations into account, to the 
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extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and 
actions, and employ appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, 
formulated and determined nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse effects 
on the economy, on public health and on the quality of the environment, of 
projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate 
change” (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 4.1(f)). 
Several hedge words can be found here. In addition to ‘relevant’ and ‘appropriate’, which 
are both counted at the moment, ‘feasible’ is another word that might be included in this 
category. Even though the sentence is not short, it only contains two determiners: ‘their’ and 
‘them’. The score in the category of weak performative verb is ‘would’. 
In contrast, here is a sentence that receives the lowest possible vagueness score: 
“Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex I shall 
make its initial communication within six months of the entry into force of the 
Convention for that Party” (UNFCCC 1992: Art 12.5). 
It is not likely to be chance that this sentence is focussed on a much smaller and less 
contentious aspect of the regime. It provides a specific time frame in which to pass 
information to the regime. The operative verb is ‘shall’, indicating in this context of an 
international legal Convention a definite legal obligation. There are no hedge words to be 
found, and even though the sentence is short, there are four determiners: ‘each’ (twice), and 
‘its’. The contrast to the two sentences above should be clear. 
Since this document is a Convention setting up a regime, the more administrative clauses 
at the end of the document are more relevant than usual. Below are two examples of the 
typically precise sentences: 
“For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, 
accepts or approves the Convention or accedes thereto after the deposit of the 
fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the 
Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit by 
such State or regional economic integration organization of its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession” (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 23.2). 
“Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also 
having withdrawn from any protocol to which it is a Party” (UNFCCC 1992: Art 
25.3). 
In both cases, the operative verb again is ‘shall’. Determiners are ‘each’, ‘such’, and ‘its’ 
in the first case and ‘any’ (twice) as well as ‘which’ in the second case. Neither sentence 
contains any verb weakening their performative strength. 
There are two core provisions of the Convention which deserve special attention because 
of their content. One paragraph that has been seen as the heart of the Convention is Article 
4.2 (a) on the duties of Annex 1 parties. 
“Each of these Parties shall adopt national policies and take corresponding 
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas 
sinks and reservoirs”. 
145 
 
This sentence scores 0 points on the vagueness scale. It receives a point for containing 
only one determiner (‘its’), but receives -1 point because it contains the verb ‘shall’. It is a 
relatively precisely formulated obligation to the parties listed in Annex 1 of the Convention. 
Having analysed this sentence, it may be of interest to also take a look at the paragraphs 
which describe the responsibilities of all parties to the Convention. Those are outlined in Art. 
4.1. Most of the sentences there receive 2 points, except for 4.1 (a), which concerns the 
establishment of national inventories and receives one point, and Art. 4.1(f): 
“[All parties […] shall:] Take climate change considerations into account, to the 
extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and 
actions, and employ appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, 
formulated and determined nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse effects 
on the economy, on public health and on the quality of the environment, of 
projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate 
change”. 
Both ‘take into account’ and ‘undertake’ are weak explicitly performative verbs (although 
only ‘undertake is counted with this method), ‘relevant’ is a hedge, as is ‘appropriate’. The 
‘shall’ in brackets is not counted for this sentence, but counts towards the introduction of 
the Article as a separate sentence. The only determiner is ‘their’. These factors coming 
together mean that this particular part of Article four receives a vagueness score of 3. 
 
UNFCCC 1995 
The first CoP took place in 1995 – the same year as the 5th NPT RevCon – in Berlin and 
established the UNFCCC Secretariat, which has since set up its business in Bonn. It also 
agreed on the Berlin Mandate, which “establish[es] a process to negotiate strengthened 
commitments for developed countries” (UNFCCC 2014). The Mandate is only 3 pages long, 
but has been an important milestone in the negotiation process leading up to the Kyoto 
Protocol (cf. Andresen Agrawala 2002: 47). Its legal status is that of a COP Decision, which 
can roughly be compared in status to a Final Declaration under the NPT regime. The Berlin 
Mandate is very short (28 sentences, or 915 words), and it is the third vaguest of all the 
documents analysed with 1.5 points exactly. 
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Figure 37: Percentage of vagueness indicators UNFCCC 1995 
The breakdown of points in graph 38 gives some insights into why this is so: 60.8% of 
sentences contain hedge words, which is highest percentage of all documents. 87% contain 
less than three determiners, making this category fairly average. Similarly, 39% of sentences 
in the main text contain weak explicitly performative verbs but on the other hand, 30.4% 
contain strong explicitly performative verbs, which is a lot for the document’s legal status 
and a clear difference to documents of similar status under the NPT regime. While only one 
of these cases represents a sentence with the word ‘shall’ and all other points are due to the 
use of the verb ‘will’, there is a crucial difference to the NPT regime: ‘will’ is here used as the 
operative verb of the sentences, not just in less crucial parts of the sentence, and not only 
within descriptions of facts.40 A case in point: 
“The process will be carried out in the light of the best available scientific 
information and assessment on climate change and its impacts, as well as 
relevant technical, social and economic information, including, inter alia, reports 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (UNFCCC 1995: 6). 
This sentence clearly shows that ‘will’ is used in a different capacity under the climate 
regime than in the Final Declarations of the NPT regime. 
The number of sentences receiving each score underline how vague this document is: the 
distribution is practically moved over by a point compared to other documents. 
                                                          
40 Descriptions of facts in international legal agreements are of course also performative. 
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Figure 38: Score distribution UNFCCC 1995 
There are three sentences scoring 3 points, one of which is mostly a quote from the 
Convention. The two other sentences read as follows: 
“The protocol proposal of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which 
contains specific reduction targets and was formally submitted in accordance 
with Article 17 of the Convention, along with other proposals and pertinent 
documents, should be included for consideration in the process” (UNFCCC 1995: 
5). 
“The sessions of this [ad hoc] group should be scheduled to ensure completion of 
the work as early as possible in 1997, with a view to adopting the results at the 
third session of the Conference of the Parties” (UNFCCC 1995: 5). 
Uncharacteristically, both of these vague sentences are actually about relatively small-
scope matters, with the latter sentence especially having an administrative character. The 
first sentence the consideration of a party proposal, and the second one concerns the 
scheduling for a newly established ad hoc group. Both sentences use the verb ‘should’, which 
is of course a weak performative verb. While in the first case, only ‘specific’ is counted as a 
hedge word, ‘pertinent’ could certainly also be counted. The second sentence includes the 
phrase ‘as early as possible’. The first sentence contains one, the second sentence two 
determiners. 
As can be seen in the graph above, no sentence in the main text of this document scores 
-1. There are two sentences scoring 0, two of which are actually introductory sentence 
fragments. Below, you can see one of these fragments in connection with the third relatively 
precise sentence of the document. 
“The process shall be guided, inter alia, by the following: […] The fact that the 
largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has 
originated in developed countries, that the per capita emissions in developing 
countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating 
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in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs” 
(UNFCCC 1995: 4). 
The first part includes a strong performative verb – ‘shall’ – but it also scores a vagueness 
point for having no determiner, thus coming out at 0. The second part of the construct 
follows the more usual pattern of scoring in none of the categories. 
Undoubtedly, the key sentence of this short document is the one including the actual 
Mandate it is named after. 
“[The Conference of the Parties, at its first session] agrees to begin a process to 
enable it to take appropriate action for the period beyond 2000, including the 
strengthening of the commitments of the Parties included in Annex I to the 
Convention (Annex I Parties) in Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), through the 
adoption of a protocol or another legal instrument” (UNFCCC 1995: 4). 
This paragraph receives a vagueness score of 2, because it contains the hedge 
‘appropriate’ and only the determiner ‘another’. 
 
UNFCCC 1996 
In its second session in Geneva, the COP noted – but did not adopt – the 4-page Geneva 
Ministerial Declaration. A large part of the conference was concerned with the preparation 
for what would later become the Kyoto Protocol, and in particular with the second IPCC41 
report. The fact that it is a Ministerial Declaration, rather than a set of decisions, means that 
the agreement is not actually legally binding. This type of document does not have an 
equivalent in the documents analysed under NPT. 
The Geneva Ministerial Declaration has a vagueness score of 1.3, which is roughly in the 
middle of all the documents analysed. 
Breaking this number down, 37% of sentences in the main text of the declaration contain 
at least one hedge word. 92.6% include less than three determiners, 29.6% include weak 
performative verbs, and 14.8% contain strong explicitly performative verbs as shown in 
figure 40. 
                                                          
41 Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1995 
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Figure 39: Percentage of vagueness indicators UNFCCC 1996 
These last two figures are not unusual overall, but they are interesting considering the 
legal status of the document. When taking the non-binding nature of the document into 
account, one would expect that no strongly performative verbs would be used at all. It should 
be noted that in this text like in the Berlin Mandate, the verb used is ‘will’, while ‘shall’ is still 
avoided as an operative verb. I will explore this phenomenon further in section 6.5. 
The following graph shows once more the distribution of scores within the main body of 
text of the declaration. 
 
Figure 40: Score distribution UNFCCC 1996 
In words: Out of 27 sentences in the main body of text, none gets a score of -1, four 
sentences score 0, 12 sentences score 1, six sentences received a score of 6 and five received 
the highest possible score of 3. A sentence from this latter category read as follows: 
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“Ministers believe that the Second Assessment Report should provide a scientific 
basis for urgently strengthening action at the global, regional and national levels, 
particularly action by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I 
Parties) to limit and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, and for all Parties to 
support the development of a Protocol or another legal instrument; and note the 
findings of the IPCC, in particular the following” (UNFCCC 1996: 1). 
This sentence is then followed by several resolutions on particular contents of the IPCC 
report. The trigger word for a weak performative verb is ‘could’, but ‘believe’ might also be 
in this category. The verb ‘note’ appears to be neutral as to its vagueness or precision in the 
results of the survey. ‘Particularly’ features as a hedge word. Even though the sentence is 
fairly long at 71 words, it contains only two determiners: ‘all’ and ‘another’. On the other 
hand, as there were no sentences scoring -1, here are two of the four sentences scoring 0: 
“The projected changes in climate will result in significant, often adverse, impacts 
on many ecological systems and socio-economic sectors, including food supply 
and water resources, and on human health” (UNFCCC 1996: 2). 
and 
“Stabilization of atmospheric concentrations at twice pre-industrial levels will 
eventually require global emissions to be less than 50 per cent of current levels” 
(UNFCCC 1996: 1). 
In both cases, ‘will’ is the operative verb. As mentioned above, this is a difference to the 
Final Declarations under the NPT regime, where ‘will’, if used at all, only ever featured in 
later parts of the sentences. Even though the sentences therefore score -1 point each for 
including a strong performative verb, none of them include three or more determiners, so 
they score 0 points in total. 
 
UNFCCC 1997 
The third COP in Kyoto (1997) established the Kyoto Protocol, which, according to the 
UNFCCC website, is “billed the world’s most ambitious environmental treaty”. Indeed, the 
strong point of the Kyoto Protocol is that it constitutes a legally binding commitment to 
reduce their production of greenhouse gases for all developed country parties listed in Annex 
I of the Protocol (UNFCCC 1998). The treaty measures 25 pages in length and comprises two 
annexes. Especially Annex I is frequently cited, since it comprises the list of countries with 
quantified emission limitation commitments under the Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is 
arguably the most important document in climate regime to date. Its legal status is that of a 
Protocol under Convention, so it is comparable in legal terms to the NPT and the Convention. 
At 297 sentences, or 8520 words, its length is comparable to the Framework Convention as 
well. 
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The Kyoto Protocol is the most precise document in this study. Its vagueness score is 0.36. 
When only looking at main body of text (excluding headlines, preamble, annexes and closing 
sentences), the difference to other relatively precise documents becomes even more 
pronounced: the score is then 0.28. 
 
Figure 41: Percentage of vagueness indicators UNFCCC 1997 
Looking more closely at the makeup of the score, some of the reasons for this become 
clearer. 26.4% of all the sentences contain hedge words, which is second only to the 
Copenhagen Accord. 58.6% of sentences contain less than three determiners, which is an 
exceptionally low score. There is one document in which it this score is lower, which is the 
original NPT at 45%. All other documents, including the Framework Convention, have a 
percentage of over 80, which marks an enormous gap in comparison to other differences. 
Only 4% of all sentences contain weak explicitly performative verbs, which is an extremely 
low number,42 while 61.4% – the highest percentage in all analysed documents – contain 
strong explicitly performative verbs. 
                                                          
42 It is important to keep in mind that, as explained in section 5.3.1, the analysis does not include all 
or maybe even most of weak explicit performative verbs that are possible to use in legal documents. 
It does however include the most common ones. 
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Figure 42: Score distribution UNFCCC 1997 
As can be seen in the graph above, the distribution of sentences among points is shifted 
to the left of the usual distribution, as the majority of sentences score 0, not 1. In numbers, 
35 sentences score -1, 75 sentences score 0, 51 sentences score 1, 11 sentences score 2 and 
only two sentences have a score of 3. 
Here is an example of one of the two sentences scoring 3 (both of which are contained in 
art. 10 of the Kyoto Protocol): 
“Suitable modalities should be developed to implement these activities through 
the relevant bodies of the Convention, taking into account Article 6 of the 
Convention” (UNFCCC 1997: Art. 10(e)). 
The operative verbs in these sentences are ‘would’ and ‘could’ respectively. The ‘suitable’ 
in the first sentences may well be a hedge word, but it is not reflected in the score. The word 
‘relevant’, however, is. 
On the precise side, there are many more sentences to choose from. The first example is 
on the topic of data provision – a matter that often makes for very precise sentences in the 
climate regime. 
“Prior to the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to this Protocol, each Party included in Annex I shall provide, for 
consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, data 
to establish its level of carbon stocks in 1990 and to enable an estimate to be 
made of its changes in carbon stocks in subsequent years” (UNFCCC 1997: Art 
3.4). 
The determiners used here are ‘each’, ‘its’ (twice) and ‘this’. The operative verb is of 
course ‘shall’. The impression of precision this sentences provides may be aided by the use 
of two relatively specific timeframes. However, this indicator did not prove statistically 
significant in the analysis of the survey data, so it is not included in the method used to score 
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sentences here. The next example of a sentence also concerns a major topic for the UNFCCC, 
namely Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF). 
“The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, 
limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990, measured as 
verifiable changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period, shall be used to 
meet the commitments under this Article of each Party included in Annex I” 
(UNFCCC 1997: Art 3.3). 
Again, the operative verb of the sentence is ‘shall’. The determiners used here are ‘each’ 
(used twice), as well as ‘this’. One of the key provisions in the Kyoto Protocol describes the 
duties of Annex I parties. The sentence under Article 3 
“The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their 
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse 
gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated 
pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments 
inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with a 
view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 
1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012” (UNFCCC 1997: Art 3.1) . 
As there are no hedge words or weak performative verbs, but instead a strong 
performative verb (‘shall’) and no less than six instances of determiners – ‘their’ is used four 
times, ‘such’, and ‘this’. This provision therefore also receives 3 points. This is important 
because, as we have seen with the NPT of 1968, a document can be very precise overall but 
still vague in its key provisions. 
 
UNFCCC 1998 
In the following years, the main concern lay in the retention of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
Buenos Aires Plan of Action was adopted by the CoP at its 4th session. Counting about 40 
pages, it is lengthier than its predecessors, comprising seven individual decisions. It is mainly 
concerned with the financial and trading mechanisms called for in the Kyoto Protocol. A lot 
of the more technical – and more detailed – aspects of the decisions are dealt with in 
Annexes. At 460 sentences, it would be the longest document in this analysis. However, the 
majority of these sentences are annexes and tables, so that the main text is only 79 
sentences, or 8670 words long. This fact pushes the limits of this method in several ways, 
which will be discussed in more detail in section 4.6. 
In this specific case, it does not seem to make a big difference whether or not the annexes 
are included. While the vagueness score of the complete document – including annexes – is 
1.17, while just the main text scores 1.28. The difference of 0.11 would not alter the order 
of the documents at all. Both versions of the vagueness scores are close to the overall 
average of 1.13. 
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The sources of this score is also fairly typical: 
 
Figure 43: Percentage of vagueness indicators UNFCCC 1998 
34.2% of the sentences in the main text of the regime contain hedge words, 89.9% contain 
less than three determiners, 11.4% of sentences feature weak explicitly performative verbs 
and 7.6% contain strong explicitly performative verbs. The following graph shows the 
distribution of scores among the sentences: 
 
Figure 44: Score distribution UNFCCC 1998 
While the graph shows at some more sentences score in the vague category than in the 
precise category, this distribution is still quite usual for this study. 
Four sentences out of 79 in the main text score 3. One of them reads as follows: 
“The consultative process could include, resources permitting, regional meetings, 
regional workshops and a SBSTA workshop process could include, resources 
permitting, regional meetings, regional workshops and a SBSTA and, as 
appropriate, experts engaged in the IPCC process” (UNFCCC 1998: 14). 
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In this case, the operative verb is ‘could’ which has arguably even less performative force 
than ‘should’, which at least implies some level of incitement towards the described action. 
The hedge word is the most commonly used ‘appropriate’. It actually doesn’t contain any 
determiners at all, which is rare even with most sentences scoring in this category. 
On the other end of the spectrum, there are actually no sentences scoring -1 (as can be 
seen in graph 45 above). Instead, here is a sentence scoring 0 points: 
“[The Conference of the Parties [i]nvites all Parties and interested international 
and non-governmental organizations to identify projects and programmes 
incorporating cooperative approaches to the transfer of technologies which they 
believe can serve as models for improving the diffusion and implementation of 
clean technologies under the Convention, and to provide information thereon to 
the secretariat, by 15 March 1999, for compilation into a miscellaneous 
document to be considered by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) at its tenth session” (UNFCCC 1998: 13). 
This is a sentence which scores 0 and also contains neither a strong nor a weak 
performative verb.43 It contains three determiners (‘all’, ‘which’, and ‘its’), therefore not 
scoring in that category. 
As annexes are so important – or at the very least voluminous – in this document, here is 
an example to illustrate the problems of including them in this analysis: 
“What should be the objective of collaboration with relevant multilateral 
institutions to promote technology transfer and what practical steps should be 
taken? “ (UNFCCC 1998: 15). 
Technically, this sentence would score as very vague, but it is not the kind of legal 
language which the subjects of the survey were asked about. For a further discussion of this 
issue, see section 4.6. 
 
UNFCCC 2000 
COP 6 in The Hague could not finish in the time allocated and was concluded at the so-
called COP 6-bis in Bonn, Germany, producing the Bonn Agreement (Sari 2005: 34). The full 
title of the document (‘Bonn Agreements on the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action’) gives a fairly comprehensive summary of its contents. The short decision is followed 
by a 21-page annex structured along seven topics, all concerned with detailing the provisions 
of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. The document has an overall very low score of 0.85. In 
fact, it is the lowest vagueness score of any analysed document that is not one of the three 
                                                          
43 Some of these verbs have been teste das neutral in their effect on perceived vagueness by the study, 
but most of these verbs cannot be included in the tool because they were not part of the survey. Only 
the most common operative verbs were tested. 
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main legal documents of the study, which makes it by extension the most precise set of 
decisions under a Convention or Protocol. 
 
Figure 45: Percentage of vagueness indicators UNFCCC 2000 
As the graph above shows, only 11% of sentences in the main body of text contain hedge 
words, which is the lowest score in any of the documents. On the other hand, the document 
is also exceptionally high in sentences that contain 2 or less determiners: they make up 95% 
of sentences in the main body of text. This category reduces the precision of the document 
to some degree. Only 6% of sentences contain weak performative verbs – this number again 
being lower than even the Kyoto Protocol, the overall most precise document in this study. 
32.5% of sentences feature strong performative verbs. 
The following graph shows the distribution of scores among sentences in the document. 
Two sentences score -1 point, 50 score 0, 92 sentences receive a score of 1, 18 sentences 
score 2 and 1 sentence appears in the vaguest category of 3 points. 
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Figure 46: Score distribution UNFCCC 2000 
The sentence scoring 3 concerns funding for non-Annex I parties. 
“[The Conference of the Parties [r]ecognizes that funding should be made 
available to Parties not included in Annex I, which is new and additional to 
contributions under the Convention” (UNFCCC 2000: 3). 
Both ‘recognizes’ and ‘should’ actually count as weakly performative verbs. On the other 
hand, there is a rare mix-up in the hedge category, as ‘available’ is in this case used as a 
predicate, not an adjective, thus arguable losing its hedge word status. Since this happens 
only very rarely, it is negligible in the aggregate (see section 6.5 for a further discussion on 
this topic). There are no determiners and also no strong performative verbs in this sentence. 
On the precise side, one of the sentences in the main body of text of this document 
scoring -1 is concerned with 
“[The Conference of the Parties agrees] That the use of the mechanisms shall be 
supplemental to domestic action, and that domestic action shall thus constitute 
a significant element of the effort made by each Party included in Annex I to meet 
its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, 
paragraph 1” (UNFCCC 2000: 7). 
As well as 
“[The Conference of the Parties agrees] That, during the first commitment period, 
a Party that selects any or all of the activities mentioned in paragraph 4 above 
shall demonstrate that such activities have occurred since 1990, and are human-
induced” (UNFCCC 2000: 10). 
Both sentences contain the word ‘shall’. The determiners used are ‘that’, ‘each’, and ‘it’s’ 
and ‘any’, ‘all’, and ‘such’, respectively. 
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UNFCCC 2001 
The Marrakech Ministerial Declaration, as can be gathered from its name, is not a legally 
binding document. It shares this characteristic with the 1992 Geneva Ministerial Declaration, 
the 2002 Delhi Ministerial Declaration and the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. It is also shortest 
document in this study, containing only 12 sentences in total. Additionally, four of these are 
in the preamble, one is a closing formula, and two are headlines, so there are only five 
sentences in the main body of text. Since there are so few of them, I will look at them all in 
this section, because the small number of sentences might also mean that small inaccuracies 
in the results don’t necessarily even out, so greater scrutiny is warranted.44 
The vagueness score of this document is 1.08, which is relatively precise. However, due 
to the low number of sentences the difference between the entire text and the main body 
of text is actually quite large, with the latter scoring 1.4. For completeness’ sake, below is a 
graph on the distribution of points, even though at 5 sentences it is perhaps not as 
informative as in other cases. 
 
Figure 47: Score distribution UNFCCC 2001 
All sentences start with this formula: 
“The Ministers and other heads of delegation present at the seventh session of 
the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change” (UNFCCC 2001: 1), 
which as usual is not included in any of the points. 
“Note the decisions adopted by the seventh session of the Conference of the 
Parties in Marrakesh, constituting the Marrakesh Accords, that pave the way for 
the timely entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol” (UNFCCC 2001: 1). 
                                                          
44 The question on how to deal with very short texts is further considered in section 6.5. 
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This sentence scores 1 point because it contains no determiners. ‘Note’ appeared neutral 
in its performativity in the results of the survey. The next sentence in the document scores 
2: 
“Remain deeply concerned that all countries, particularly developing countries, 
including the least developed countries and small island States, face increased 
risk of negative impacts of climate change” (UNFCCC 2001: 1). 
‘Particularly’ is a hedge word. The only determiner used is ‘all’. Like ‘note’, ‘remains 
concerned’ is neutral in its performativity. The next sentence, even though it reads pretty 
differently, also scores 2: 
“Recognize that, in this context, the problems of poverty, land degradation, 
access to water and food and human health remain at the centre of global 
attention; therefore, the synergies between the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 
should continue to be explored through various channels, in order to achieve 
sustainable development” (UNFCCC 2001: 1). 
The score comes together in a different way, though. While this sentence also only 
contains one determiner (‘those’), it does not include any hedge words but instead features 
the weak performative verb ‘recognize’. The next sentence is back to the same features as 
the second one. 
“Stress the importance of capacity-building, as well as of developing and 
disseminating innovative technologies in respect of key sectors of development, 
particularly energy, and of investment in this regard, including through private 
sector involvement, market-oriented approaches, as well as supportive public 
policies and international cooperation” (UNFCCC 2001: 1). 
While the determiner here is ‘this’, the hedge word is actually ‘particularly’, same as 
above. The last sentence in the main body of text of this document scores 0 in all categories, 
which is to say that it contains no hedge words, and no verbs of weak or strong 
performativity, but it does contain three hedge words: ‘its’ and twice ‘all’: 
“Emphasize that climate change and its adverse impacts have to be addressed 
through cooperation at all levels, and welcome the efforts of all Parties to 
implement the Convention” (UNFCCC 2001: 1). 
Interestingly, neither ‘emphasize’ nor ‘welcome’ were rated as weak performative verbs 
by participants of the survey, though both verbs were tested for. 
 
UNFCCC 2002 
In 2002, COP 8 in New Delhi concluded with the Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate 
Change and Sustainable Development. Like most Ministerial Declarations, it is, at about 3 
pages, relatively short. 
160 
 
With a vagueness score of 1.84, the declaration is the vaguest document in the entire 
study. As I have noted in talking about the Kyoto Protocol, the distance to other documents 
becomes even more pronounced when only the main text is taken into account: then score 
is 2.2. The graph below shows the percentage of sentences scoring in each of the four 
categories: 
 
Figure 48: Percentage of vagueness indicators UNFCCC 2002 
60% of the sentences in this document contain hedge words, 90% of them have less than 
3 determiners, and a total of 70% of sentences feature weak explicitly performative verbs. 
Consistent with the non-legally binding nature of the document, no sentence contains a 
strong performative verb. As a result, the lowest category of -1 does not contain any 
sentences. One sentence scores 0, 3 sentences score 1, 8 score 2 and another 8 sentences 
score 3, as can be seen in the graph below: 
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Figure 49: Score distribution UNFCCC 2002 
The following sentence uses the verb ‘should’ not once, but twice: 
“Policies and measures to protect the climate system against human-induced 
change should be appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should 
be integrated with national development programmes, taking into account that 
economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate 
change” (UNFCCC 2002: 1). 
It also includes the hedge word ‘appropriate’. Arguably, the content of the sentence – if 
it were used in a more legally binding setting – could relativize the entire goal of the UNFCCC 
by explicitly subordinating combatting climate change entirely to economic development. 
This is not the case of course both because of the wording of the sentence and the legal 
status of the document it is in. The second vague sentence is uncharacteristic as its topic is 
exchange of information, which usually makes for relatively uncontroversial and precise 
provisions. 
“Parties should promote informal exchange of information on actions relating to 
mitigation and adaptation to assist Parties to continue to develop effective and 
appropriate responses to climate change” (UNFCCC 2002: 2). 
Two hedge words are used in this sentence: ‘effective’ and ‘appropriate’. Incidentally, it 
is a good example of why these adjectives are counted as hedge words: instead of narrowing 
the range of possibilities of what responses to climate change should be taken, they actually 
serve to blur the lines further, making it less instead of more clear what parties should do. 
The operative verb being ‘should’ also cuts down the performative force of this sentence. 
There are no determiners either in this sentence or the next. 
“Technological advances should be promoted through research and 
development, economic diversification and strengthening of relevant regional, 
national and local institutions for sustainable development” (UNFCCC 2002: 2). 
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In this last example the verb is also ‘should’. The hedge word used here is ‘relevant’. Its 
present increases the arbitrariness of which institutions for sustainable development 
actually count under this proposal. 
As there are no sentences with the score of -1, below is the one sentence of the document 
which scores 0: 
“Actions are required at all levels, with a sense of urgency, to substantially 
increase the global share of renewable energy sources with the objective of 
increasing their contribution to total energy supply, recognizing the role of 
national and voluntary regional targets as well as initiatives, where they exist, 
and ensuring that energy policies are supportive to developing countries’ efforts 
to eradicate poverty” (UNFCCC 2002: 2). 
The determiners used here are ‘all’, ‘there’, and ‘that’. There are no hedge words included 
in this study in this sentence. The verbs are categorized neither as strong nor weak 
performative verbs. 
 
UNFCCC 2007 
The COP-13/CMP-3 2007 in Bali was perceived by negotiators as a breakthrough, since it 
saw the adoption of the 4-page Bali Action Plan, outlining the steps to the regime’s future 
after 2012, when the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol ended. In spite of 
its shortness, the plan goes into relative detail on further steps to be taken, and its adoption 
is positively remembered by a lot of COP-participants and observers. At 54 sentences, it is a 
fairly short document. 
With 1.09 points on the vagueness scale, which means the COP decision is on the precise 
end of the spectrum. However, the makeup of these points is interesting: 
 
Figure 50: Percentage of vagueness indicators UNFCCC 2007 
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32.5% of sentences include a hedge word. 97.5% of sentences contain less than three 
determiners – this is actually the highest percentage of all studied documents in this 
category. The verb categories are what the relative precision come from. Interestingly, no 
sentences at all contain a weak verb, while 15% include a strong verb. In terms of the score 
distribution, one sentence receives a score of -1, three sentences score 0, 25 sentences get 
a score of 1, 11 score 2 and no sentence in the main body of text of this document scores 3 
points: 
 
Figure 51: Score distribution UNFCCC 2007 
As there are no sentences in the vaguest category, here are the first two sentences of the 
Bali roadmap, both of which score 2 vagueness points: 
“The Conference of the Parties […] Decides to launch a comprehensive process 
to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention 
through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012, in order to 
reach an agreed outcome and adopt a decision at its fifteenth session, by 
addressing, inter alia: 
A shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a long-term global 
goal for emission reductions, to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention, 
in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Convention, in particular 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities, and taking into account social and economic conditions and other 
relevant factors” (UNFCCC 2007 3):. 
This is followed by several other issues the COP is deciding to address. The first sentence 
scores points in the categories of hedge word, because it contains the words ‘effective’ and 
determiners, because it only contains one instance of them: the word ‘its’. The second 
sentence scores in the same categories, because it features the hedge words ‘particular’ and 
‘relevant’ and actually does not contain any determiners at all. 
In contrast, here is the sentence that scores -1 point: 
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“[The Conference of the Parties,] Decides that the process shall be conducted 
under a subsidiary body under the Convention, hereby established and known as 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention, that shall complete its work in 2009 and present the outcome of its 
work to the Conference of the Parties for adoption at its fifteenth session” 
(UNFCCC 2007: 5). 
It contains the strong performative verb ‘shall’ and three times the word ‘its’, which 
means it gets no points in the category of determiners. 
 
UNFCCC 2009 
The COP15/CMP5 in Copenhagen is surely the most publicized perceived failure of a 
climate summit. It has been noted for the enormous show of NGO/civil society protest and 
the failure to adopt the ‘Copenhagen Accord’, a proposal pushed by the United States of 
America which was however subsequently signed by 141 parties. The main objections by 
small developing states and many environmental activists to the accord were the fact that it 
is not legally binding and that it was tried to implement it without the consulting major 
developing country parties (Deitelhoff/Wallbott 2012: 18). For a declaration – and one that 
was not even adopted by the COP/CMP at that – it is unusual in a number of ways. First, it is 
almost 30 pages long, making it longer than the Convention itself or the Kyoto Protocol. 
Second, it lists from the outset the names of the participating states. Third, it departs from 
the extremely formal language common for declarations, using instead the more business – 
like language more widespread in decisions. 
The Copenhagen Accord has a vagueness score of 0.92. That means it is the 4th most 
precise document out of 11 in UNFCCC Regime or the 3rd most precise for documents which 
are not Protocols or Conventions (14 of which are included in this study). As this might be a 
surprising result, I will discuss it further in section 4.3. The makeup of the score is charted in 
the graph below: 
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Figure 52: Percentage of vagueness indicators UNFCCC 2009 
Only 21.6% of sentences contain hedge words, which is the second lowest percentage 
right after the Bonn Agreement. 94.6% score because the sentences contain a low number 
of determiners 27% contain weak explicitly performative verbs, which seems on the low end 
of average, and – which will be important – 56.8% of sentences contain strong operative 
verbs. 
The score distribution of the main text of the document can be seen in the following chart: 
 
Figure 53: Score distribution UNFCCC 2009 
As the graph shows, 2 sentences receive -1 points, 13 receive 0 points, 11 receive 1 point, 
ten sentences score 2 and one sentence scores 3 points. 
Here is the vague sentence: 
“We recognize the critical impacts of climate change and the potential impacts 
of response measures on countries particularly vulnerable to its adverse effects 
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and stress the need to establish a comprehensive adaptation programme 
including international support” (UNFCCC 2009 5). 
The fact that the verb is ‘recognize’ makes this sentence score in the weak verb category. 
‘Particularly’ counts as a hedge word. The only determiner is ‘its’, which means that it gets a 
vagueness point in that category as well. 
On the other side of the scale, below are the two sentences scoring -1. 
“Delivery of reductions and financing by developed countries will be measured, 
reported and verified in accordance with existing and any further guidelines 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and will ensure that accounting of such 
targets and finance is rigorous, robust and transparent” (UNFCCC 2009: 6). 
“Mitigation actions taken by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to their domestic 
measurement, reporting and verification the result of which will be reported 
through their national communications every two years” (UNFCCC 2009: 6). 
Both of these sentences contain the verb ‘will’, and it is used in the prescriptive sense. In 
the first case, the determiners are ‘any’, ‘such’ and ‘that’. In the second, they are ‘their’ 
(twice), and ‘which’. Perhaps the most important and controversial part of the Copenhagen 
Accord are the paragraphs that talk directly about its goals and how to achieve them. The 
following sentence gets to the heart of that, and it scores 1 vagueness point: 
“To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the 
scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees 
Celsius, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development, 
enhance our long-term cooperative action to combat climate change” (UNFCCC 
2009: 5). 
Here, we can see one of the rare cases when both a weak and strong verb: ‘shall’ on the 
one hand and ‘would’ as well as ‘should’ on the other. These two scores therefore cancel 
out. The sentence does not contain hedge words, and there is only one determiner (‘our’), 
so the sentence scores one point in that category. 
 
UNFCCC 2010 
The COP16/ CMP6 2010 in Cancun concluded with the 30-page Cancun Agreement and 
was widely regarded as a measure to re-establish trust in the process and between the 
participants after what happened in Copenhagen. Indeed, the document itself contains only 
minor novelties. The Cancun Accord scores 1.28 points on the vagueness scale. That means 
it is in about the middle of the spectrum overall, but on the more precise side when it comes 
to regime decisions. 
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Figure 54: Percentage of vagueness indicators UNFCCC 2010 
Overall, 37.1% of sentences in the main body of text in the Cancun Agreement contain 
hedge words. 94.9% of the sentences contain less than three determiners, 17.4% of them 
comprise weak performative verbs, while 10.4% feature strong performative verbs. All these 
numbers are fairly standard for a COP Decision. 
 
Figure 55: Score distribution UNFCCC 2010 
The graph above shows that no sentence in main body of text scores -1, 25 sentences 
score 0, 160 score 1 point, 94 receive 2 points and 20 sentences score 3. This distribution 
more or less resembles the overall distribution of points in all documents. 
One of the vaguest sentences in the agreement reads as follows: 
“[The Conference of the Parties]Urges Parties, in particular developed country 
Parties, to support, through multilateral and bilateral channels, the development 
of national strategies or action plans, policies and measures and capacity-
building, followed by the implementation of national policies and measures and 
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national strategies or action plans that could involve further capacity-building, 
technology development and transfer and results-based demonstration 
activities, including consideration of the safeguards referred to in paragraph 2 of 
appendix I to this decision, taking into account the relevant provisions on finance 
including those relating to reporting on support” (UNFCCC 2010: 13). 
This sentences almost starts with the hedge word ‘particular’, and towards its end also 
contains ‘relevant’, another hedge word. In terms of verbs, the word ‘could’ counts as weakly 
performative. The length of the sentence notwithstanding, ‘this’ and ‘those’ are the only two 
determiners featured. 
On the other hand here is a sentence which scores 0, so is one of the most precise 
sentences in the document. 
“[The Conference of the Parties] Decides to hereby establish a process to enable 
least developed country Parties to formulate and implement national adaptation 
plans, building upon their experience in preparing and implementing national 
adaptation programmes of action, as a means of identifying medium- and long-
term adaptation needs and developing and implementing strategies and 
programmes to address those needs” (UNFCCC 2010: 5). 
It does not contain any verbs that score either in a vague or in a precise direction. Neither 
is there any hedge word from the list included in this study. It does, however, feature 3 
determiners: ‘least’, ‘their’, and ‘those’. 
The detailed analysis above shows the capacities and limits of the presented tool to 
compare the vagueness and precision of legal document. It should have outlined questions 
of comparability – both within and among documents as well as translated vagueness scores 
back to meaningful concepts by showing what parts of sentences they indicated. After 
comparing the results produced by the tool to independent analyses of other researchers in 
section 6.4, I will come back to some of the issues with the tool that came up in the detailed 
analyses above in section 6.5 in order to discuss them more thoroughly. 
6.4 Comparison of the results 
I will now undertake to compare the results of this tool with assessments of other 
researchers on the individual documents (and their comparison). There are several 
challenges to this: first, assessments on the vagueness or precision of agreements are heavily 
biased in favour of extremes (especially towards the vague end of the scale), and agreements 
that are seen as important or much-debated, which again means that more precise or neutral 
agreements are much less discussed. Therefore, I too will necessarily concentrate on the 
more extreme results of the study. Moreover, even in these cases direct assessments are 
few and far between, as the authors tend to focus on different issues and only mention an 
agreements’ perceived vagueness or precision in passing. From this also follows that 
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agreements are seldom compared, it is much more likely to find a passing reference as to 
the vagueness or precision of an isolated agreement, and then it is much more difficult to 
compare it with the place that agreement has in this study. Nevertheless, the check is still 
necessary to be able to assess how well the method presented here works. 
Starting with the original NPT of 1986, there is quite an interesting case to be made. As 
mentioned above, the agreement has the least vagueness points of the NPT regime, as well 
as the second least of all documents tested in the study. With an average of 0.433 (out of a 
possible range from -1 to 3), where the average of the tested documents is 1.14 (the average 
of NPT documents is 1.11). How does this compare to expert’s assessment? For the most 
part, authors address specific provisions rather than assessing the document in its entirety. 
Majority opinion appears to be that provision VI and parts of provision IV, specifically on 
nuclear disarmament, are vague. Interestingly, as the following quotes will show, the authors 
use their assessment of the agreement as vague from very different perspectives. 
“While [Article IV] is only a vague statement with no hard deadlines or 
timetables, it remains the only legally binding obligation on NWS Parties to 
ultimately eliminate their nuclear weapons” (Peloso 2011: 313). 
Peloso is arguing that, even though the article on disarmament is vague, elimination of 
nuclear weapons is still IL. Koplow (1993: 304) elaborates on why he thinks the article is 
vague, and while he in essence agrees with Peloso on the difference between vagueness and 
lack of obligation, his focus is more specifically the US: 
“The Article is unable to be precise about exactly what behaviors are now 
required of the United States or about what specific timetable is mandated for 
negotiation or conclusion of the next step in the sequential evolution of test bans. 
But it is incumbent upon the United States to do something-a vague and 
aspirational obligation is not necessarily a void and meaningless one-and recent 
American policies, refusing even to talk about a comprehensive test ban 
agreement, fall short of our international responsibilities” (Koplow 1993: 304). 
Ford, on the other hand, argues the opposite: 
“the language [in Article 6] about negotiations needing to be ‘‘pursue[d] . . . in 
good faith’’ clearly leaves open the possibility that such negotiations might not 
take place, let alone succeed” (Ford 2007: 404). 
For him, not even negotiations on the subject, let alone actual disarmament, are 
ultimately mandated by the wording of the article. In yet another take on the issue, Craig 
and Ruzicka focus more on why the provisions on nuclear abolition turned out to be vague 
than on its effects. 
“By contrast, a continued focus upon isolated nonproliferation efforts, combined 
with vague talk of nuclear abolition, ran none of these risks” (Craig Ruzicka 2013: 
334). 
On an incidental note, the above sentence also hints that Craig and Ruzicka would 
consider the rest of the original NPT as fairly precise. The risks they refer to are withdrawal 
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of funding and marginalization of non-nuclear weapon states, should they push for strong 
disarmament measures. But regardless of the direction of their argument, some of which are 
clearly contradictory, all these authors agree that the provisions in the NPT on nuclear 
disarmaments by states who currently are in possession of nuclear weapons are vague, as 
Fields and Enia sum up: 
“The NPT is vague at best on how and when disarmament of the NWS should 
happen” (Fields Enia 2009: 190). 
At first glance, this seems a slight contradiction to the tool. However, when looking closer, 
this is not the case at all. First, these provisions appear to be singled out because the rest of 
the agreement is seen to be rather precise: 
“Certainly, the drafters of the NPT knew perfectly well how to state legal 
requirements clearly. Articles I and II of the NPT *its core nonproliferation 
obligations* are quite unambiguous: nuclear weapon states ‘‘undertake not to’’ 
help others acquire nuclear weapons, and non-weapon states ‘‘undertake not to’’ 
acquire them. And Article III is quite clear that each non-nuclear weapon state 
‘‘undertakes to accept’’ nuclear safeguards and that specific procedures and 
safeguards ‘‘shall be’’ accepted and followed” (Ford 2007: 403). 
This assessment is in line with more indirect assessments which take the NPT to be quite 
precise overall. Secondly, and most importantly, it is easily possible to only look at the 
provisions in question with the tool. Doing this shows that Article 6 has a score of 3 – the 
highest vagueness score possible on this scale – as does Article 4.2, which is generally the 
one that is described as vague by these researches (or at least is the part quoted in evidence 
of their proposal). This seems to be a very strong indicator that the tool is consistent with 
expert opinion. 
The RevCons are much less discussed. Müller describes the development on article 6 of 
the original NPT in later RevCons: 
“The major misgivings of non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT had 
always been that their undertakings were precise and controlled […], while those 
of the nuclear weapon states were vague with no strings attached. In 1995, when 
the NPT was extended indefinitely, nuclear weapon states had, for the first time, 
conceded a more precise interpretation of Article VI, which sets out their 
disarmament obligation: they had accepted the concluson [sic] of a CTBT and 
negotiations on a FMCT, and ‘progressive and systematic steps’ towards nuclear 
disarmament. In 2000, these ‘steps’ had been further refined and detailed” 
(Müller 2005: 35). 
As the authors mentioned above, Müller’s focus is article IV. Instead of focussing on the 
original article, however, he traces its development through the RevCon, and notes a decline 
in vagueness over time. Looking at the section concerned with article VI in RevCon 1995, it 
includes 15 sentences, which is indeed more volume than the two sentences of article VI of 
the Original NPT. Additionally, the mean vagueness score of these sentences is 1.87 – 
significantly lower than the score of 3 of the original article, even though the treaty in its 
171 
 
entirety has a higher score than the NPT. In the Final Declaration of RevCon 2000, 27 
sentences are directly concerned with art. VI, and their combined vagueness score is 1.04. 
Again, this low score is even more meaningful in light of the relatively higher score of the 
treaty overall. The tool matches Müller’s analysis on article VI completely. 
Stoiber gives another rare example of an actual comparison of the vagueness of different 
decisions in the same regime: 
“Prior to the revelations of safeguard inadequacies in Iraq, RevCon 
documentation on strengthening safeguards tended to be vague and anodyne. 
For example, the 1985 Final Document records ‘satisfaction with the 
improvements of IAEA safeguards, which has enabled it to continue to apply 
safeguards effectively during a period of rapid growth in the number of 
safeguarded facilities […] The 2000 Final Document reflects a much more 
rigorous evaluation of safeguards, giving support to the fundamental movement 
away from a narrow facility-based approach to a nation-wide approach using 
new authority under INFCIRC/540 to conduct short-notice inspections, utilize 
intelligence information, and conduct environmental sampling” (Stoiber 2003: 
133). 
The overall scores of the Final Documents of RevCon 1985 and 2000 are virtually the same 
in my analysis (1.38 and 1.39, respectively). It is undoubtedly true that the final decision of 
Rev Con 2000 devotes a much larger part of its paragraphs to IAEA safeguards than the one 
of RevCon 1985 – while the latter only dedicates one paragraph (consisting of four sentences 
to the issue), a substantial part of the former document – 50 sentences – is concerned with 
safeguards. On the other hand, all of the four sentences the Final Document of 1985 does 
feature score 1 point, which is lower than the average of sentences concerned with 
safeguards in the RevCon 2000 Final Document of 1.72. As a matter of fact, this point is a 
very good reminder of the difficulties distinguishing between generality and vagueness (as 
discussed in chapter 2.1.1). Four sentences can address a subject much more generally than 
50, but that does not necessarily mean that their language is vaguer. For now, the suggestion 
would be to take note of the amount of language dedicated to a specific issue in any analysis 
of its vagueness. 
This last issue notwithstanding, however, the tool matches the receptions of the 
documents under the NPT regime quite precisely – even down to individual paragraphs. 
I will now turn to similar assessments of documents under the UNFCCC regime. 
One of the few comparisons that are made relatively routinely in the literature is that 
between the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Opinion on this matter is consistent with the 
findings from my tool: researchers agree that the Kyoto Protocol is more precisely worded 
than the UNFCCC. For example, Roberts (2011: 778) states that the Convention was 
“carefully crafted but equally vague” and explains: 
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So the words were nice, but they were just that. The difficult parts – the details – 
were pushed off until later. The Framework Convention remains in effect, and 
making it more concrete has been the focus of great attention since it is the only 
global climate agreement the US has ratified. In efforts to put the UNFCCC into 
binding language requiring action of the Parties, consensus has repeatedly 
broken down into power politics. This happened in the Kyoto round of climate 
negotiations. In Japan in 1997, 129 nations agreed to a more concrete deal on 
how to begin the process of actually reducing greenhouse gas emissions”. (2011: 
778) 
Von Stein agrees with this assessment, 
“In general, however, the [UNFCCC] is fairly imprecise. It does not specify 
quantified emissions targets. In contrast, the Kyoto Protocol is a substantially 
harder agreement—for the Annex 1 parties” (von Stein 2008: 247). 
Nanda (1999: 321) also argues that the convention “contains only vague commitments 
regarding stabilization of GHGs, and no commitments regarding reductions of GHGs”, leaving 
more precise provisions for late discussion. In contrast, the Kyoto Protocol “sets specific 
targets and timetables for reducing overall global emissions of GHGs”. 
This assessment concurs with the tool, as the difference is clear: while the UNFCCCC 
receives a score of 0.77, the Kyoto Protocol scores 0.35, which is significantly lower. I can 
therefore conclude that the comparison made by most experts supports the results of this 
tool. When looking at what researchers say about each agreement individually, the 
assessments do not overlap quite so neatly, but it is important to keep in mind that the tool 
was specifically built to compare vagueness, not to assess single documents or paragraphs 
absolutely. I will go into more detail on this issue when discussing limitations and challenges 
of the tool in section 6.5. In any case, as the quotes above already show, the UNFCCC is 
considered as fairly vague. In my analysis, it is the third most precise document. However, as 
also shown in section 6.5, the categorization heavily depends on what the agreement is 
compared with – it is the least precise of the legally binding documents, and arguably that is 
the correct group for comparison. On the side of the Kyoto Protocol, it is rarely assessed as 
to its vagueness on its own. 
The most challenging case for my analysis is undoubtedly the Copenhagen Agreement. 
Even though it was a mere Ministerial Declaration, which typically do not generate much 
interest, it is a much discussed and highly controversial document45, both in academia and in 
the general news. And most assessments concur that it is vague46. For example, Dimitrov 
sums up what a lot of researchers imply: 
“The Copenhagen Accord is an agreement among heads of governments vaguely 
alluding to limiting temperature rise to 2°C” (Dimitrov 2010: 21). 
                                                          
45 See for example Hofmann 2011: 5, or Saleh 2012: 24. 
46 See for example Michaelowa 2010: 2, and Bodansky 2010: 235. 
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In particular, provisions on adaptation funding are said to remain vague (Falkner et al. 
2010: 253). When applying the vagueness score method presented here, however, with a 
score of 0.92 it is the most precise of all declarations and even quite precise when compared 
to COP or RevCon Decisions. This is quite a glaring discrepancy. However, there are several 
arguments on why that strengthens rather than weakens the case for the application of my 
tool. The first one is simply about intersubjective assessment. In addition to being perceived 
as vague, the Copenhagen agreement certainly was one of the agreements inciting the most 
disappointment in both civil society and the academic community. 
“Rarely has as much anticipation accompanied an international meeting than 
swirled around the 15th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change” (Hunter 2010: 4). 
Because actors had hoped for a more binding and comprehensive agreement (see also 
Bodansky 2010: 230), it is easy to imagine why they would also perceive the accord as vague. 
It is the very fallacy this study sets out to address: Only because an agreement is (perceived 
to be) ineffective, that does not necessarily mean that it is vague in its wording. Especially 
when the agreement differs from expectations it is important to have a more objective tool 
for assessment at one’s disposal. 
Another reason for the discrepancy has its roots in the actual use of words, and highlights 
the importance of context for the application of the tool. The language used in the 
Copenhagen Agreement bears much more resemblance to legally binding documents like 
the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol than it does to other Ministerial declarations. However, 
given its legal status, much of the language that indicates precision in legally binding 
documents (and is mostly reserved for these) may actually not indicate any such thing in 
declarations. The best example here are verbs like should and shall. There are several 
possible explanations for this: the conference it was concluded at was originally intended to 
produce a legally binding document, so it is not inconceivable that some of the language was 
kept the same even though it is unusual for a declaration. Given the careful thought that 
tends to be given to language in legal contexts it is also possible to doubt this explanation. 
There is another possibility: Knowing that a legally binding document would be expected, the 
diplomats may have wanted it to look like as much like such an agreement as possible and 
therefore kept the language similar to one, while of course being fully aware that the 
precision on one level would be undercut by the missing legal status. In general, it is 
astonishing how closely the overall linguistic structure of the Copenhagen accord matches 
that of legally binding documents such as the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol and how 
much it differs from that of other Ministerial Declarations. This is the case especially in the 
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categories of hedge words and strong explicitly performative verbs as shown in graphs 19 
and 22. Going more in detail beyond assessments of the entire Copenhagen accord, Roberts 
specifically focusses on more specific provisions on finance: 
“The accord fails on peaking, emissions reductions, process, and nearly every 
other justice principle. There seemed to be one slightly brighter spot: on 
adaptation finance, where the Copenhagen Accord included what seemed to be 
two clear and fairly ambitious promises. The finance offer was $US 30 billion 
‘‘Fast Start Finance’’ over 2010-2012, ramping up to US $100 billion per year by 
2002. However even these seemingly straightforward promises have led to major 
debates after Copenhagen because their language was so unclear” (Roberts 
2011: 778-9). 
Even though Roberts is not exactly unambiguous himself, I interpret his statement to 
mean that the language on adaptation finance in the Copenhagen Accord is vague. The two 
sentences he is referring to both score 1, which is slightly vaguer than the overall score of 
the agreement of 0.86. This result may be seen as a similarity in trend, however it is necessary 
to tread carefully in this specific instance: it is not at all clear that Roberts is actually finding 
the sentences vaguer than the rest of the agreement – in fact, the opposite could be argued 
as well. In effect, Robert’s analysis, and his reference to ‘seemingly clear’ language highlights 
the difficulties in differentiating lack of ambition and vagueness in legal agreements and the 
feedback loop that exists between agreements being debated and not adopted and them 
being understood as vague or unclear. 
Even though there are some discrepancies, in general the tool matches other, more 
qualitative analyses quite closely. Even and especially at the level of individual articles and 
paragraphs, the tool can provide similar results to qualitative analyses. This alone is a point 
in its favour: the discrepancies which there are might well be worth the trade-off for 
comprehensive and quick data when compared to the detailed study of single documents, 
depending on what questions it is intended to answer. However, even the discrepancies give 
valuable insights: First, the results confirm the intuition that text-based comparisons of 
vagueness are most valuable when drawn between documents of the same legal status. 
Second, the tool highlights both the importance and practical difficulties in differentiating 
between linguistic vagueness – vague language – and legal bindingness. Furthermore, the 
fact that the largest discrepancies in results are found the context of the Copenhagen Accord, 
which has elicited much disappointment, emphasizes the value of having an intersubjective 
tool at one’s disposal, because it can ensure that these kinds of emotions will not affect the 
assessment. 
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6.5 Assessing the tool:  discussion 
The tool as presented here has several advantages. It is specifically designed to be used 
on international legal agreements, taking into account much of the peculiarities of legal 
language and based on the considerations and opinions of experts in IL. It is designed to be 
able to process large amounts of legal text in little time, but also allows more detailed 
analysis of specific sections or provisions, even going down to the sentence level. It provides 
a comparison that is unbiased with personal opinion on any one agreement, but can easily 
be combined with a more qualitative analysis of the text. As the previous section (6.4) has 
shown, it has an overall good reliability when compared to expert opinion on the assessed 
agreements. I would therefore argue that the tool fulfils the purpose it was built for: 
providing a method to systematically compare the vagueness of international legal 
agreements. 
Nevertheless, the previous chapter has also shown a number of weaknesses of the tool. 
Some of these are limitations inherent in the approach and simply have to be weighed 
against its advantages on a case-by-case basis, but quite a few of them arise due to the 
innovative character of the method and simply provide challenges that could be improved 
upon in further work with the tool. In this section, I elaborate on these issues, going from 
general to more specific and, when appropriate, provide some first thoughts for future 
improvement. 
 
Small sample size 
There are several considerations to be taken into account before actually using this tool 
to assess international agreements. The first and most obvious is the small scale and 
exploratory nature of the initial survey, which limits the predictive possibilities somewhat. 
While most of the independent assessment by other researchers confirms that the tool 
works well, it is likely that a more fine-tuned tool could be gained by conducting a larger scale 
survey and possibly conducting direct interviews with experts in order to profit even more 
from their comments. 
The small sample size especially affects verbs, because many verbs used as operative 
verbs in international agreements simply could not be accounted for, thus scoring this 
category for the sentences as 0. For a lot of them, this may be the correct choice – quite a 
few verbs that were tested for in this study do not lead to a sentence being perceived as 
either vaguer or more precise (see section 5.3.1). But there may still be other, albeit less 
frequently used, verbs that do change the perception of vagueness of a sentence. The same 
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issue arises in the category of hedge words: not all hedge words used in the tool could be 
tested for in the survey, and the tool itself uses only the ten most frequently appearing hedge 
words. This allows a fair approximation, because all documents subjected to the tool are 
measured by the same imperfect standard, but the accuracy could certainly be further 
improved upon. To a lesser extent, this fine-tuning is also needed for determiners: not all 
could be tested for in the survey. The problem is less urgent only because this feature 
consists of a clearly defined group of verbs. 
 
Application to other fields 
One major concern is whether the results can be applied to regimes other than the ones 
which the sentences were taken from, because results could vary according to subject 
matter, or the language of specific regimes could be contained enough to feature their own 
specialized (sub)language. The fact that no such variance could be observed here suggests 
that a transfer to other areas of IL is possible, though the fact remains that this survey was 
conducted with sample sentences from only two regimes. Further study is needed before 
any definite claims on this issue can be made. 
It is expected that adjustments would have to be made before results could be applied to 
fields that are not IL, because the indicators – especially the verbs – are dependent on this 
context and also the survey participants were experts only in this field. Nevertheless, the 
results shown here could probably be taken into account to facilitate locating the starting 
point of such research. 
 
Comparison 
Due to the complex nature of vagueness all the values should only be taken as 
comparative, not absolute. The tool assigns a vagueness score to each sentence or 
agreement, but this score by itself has little informative value. Only by comparing two or 
more sentences, sections, or agreements do the numbers become meaningful. In the 
previous section I have shown that in some instances, relative comparisons between 
agreements from other researchers are in accordance with the results of the tool, while 
individual assessments of agreements may not be quite as congruent (see discussion on 
Framework Convention and Kyoto Protocol in section 6.3). These differences may occur 
because the comparison group an author uses is not made explicit. 
The scores produced by the tool should enable someone to determine whether one 
agreement is vaguer than another according to these criteria, not determine an absolute 
177 
 
vagueness score. It is for this reason that determining the appropriate comparison group is 
vital to achieve meaningful results. In this thesis, I have used several comparison groups to 
test the tool on: documents of one regime can be compared to one another, or the entirety 
of documents under one regime compared to another regime. Likewise, documents types of 
differing legal status can be compared, or, probably more usefully in most cases, several 
documents of the same legal type can be compared to each other. Another important 
consideration for comparing documents is which part(s) of the text to include. Preambles are 
probably best compared to other preambles. This concern is a very general one, applying to 
all research which includes comparisons. It is nevertheless crucial to keep in mind when 
applying this tool. 
 
Annexes, titles and questions 
Tying in to the general issue of comparison groups above, there is a special consideration 
to be made in this particular study about annexes. Under the Climate Convention, 
“Annexes to the Convention shall form an integral part thereof and, unless 
otherwise expressly provided, a reference to the Convention constitutes at the 
same time a reference to any annexes thereto” (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 16). 
Nevertheless, annexes do constitute a separate textual category from the main body of 
text of an agreement, and have been treated as such in this study (see comments on 
categorizing above). More challenging is the fact that a big component of the annexes are 
tables with no traditional sentence structures at all or questions, which also cannot be 
measured by the same yardstick as legal sentences. Since the unit of investigation used in 
this study is the sentence, it follows that language not arranged in sentences, as is often the 
case in tables or titles, cannot be analysed by this tool. Technically, most questions would 
score as very vague, but it is not the kind of legal language which the subjects of the survey 
were asked about. Also vagueness and performativity of questions is a very different matter 
from those of a statement. For example, the performative force of ‘should’ when used in a 
question is much less clear than when used in a declarative sentence. This is usually not a 
problem when studying vagueness in international agreements, because international 
agreements do not normally contain questions of any kind. The sole exception, as pointed 
out here are annexes, and even then questions only feature in certain cases. It is mainly for 
this reason that annexes, and with them questions and tables, have been excluded from the 
analysis in this study. If it was truly necessary to include them, further research on the 
vagueness of questions or on single words/parts of sentences would certainly be necessary. 
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References 
Referencing is a very important device in legal texts, yet the tool can give no indication as 
to whether the paragraph referred to is vague or not – which could significantly change the 
vagueness of the sentence itself. However, this is not so much a shortcoming of the method 
as a systematically excluded category. If a specific reference were of particular importance 
to an agreement, it would be perfectly possible to analyse it with the same method and 
include the results. 
 
Explicitly performative verbs 
One problem that became apparent thanks to the detailed analysis above is that the word 
‘will’, which counts as a verb with strong performative force, is not always the operative verb 
in a sentence. It can be used to simply indicate an assumed or hoped for future, not to impose 
any kind of obligation on parties. This leads to a slight overemphasis of the precision of this 
sentence in this tool. In this study, this is only the case in a small minority of sentences, and 
the level of aggregation means there are only extremely small changes in overall results. This 
is an area where there is an interesting difference between the two regimes: Under the NPT 
regime, the only document featuring ‘will’ as an operative verb is the original document from 
1968. As declarations under this regime do not feature any strong performative verbs at all, 
the only instances in which the verb ‘will’ appears is as an indicator of future tense, not in 
the legal sense of the word. This is not the case under the UNFCCC: here, strong explicitly 
performative words are used in all document types, albeit in different numbers. 
Even though it only concerns a small quantity of cases, the issue should still be taken 
seriously, with a view to improving the accuracy in studies with lower quantities of text. One 
remedy would be to only count the first verb used in each sentence. This would entail quite 
complicated operations of computational linguistics, and in all likelihood would not change 
the results all that much. Another, more easily feasible solution to achieve more accuracy 
would be to fine-tune the method so that the verb ‘will’ is excluded from the analysis when 
it is concerned with Final Declarations, because it yields too many false positives to be 
ultimately useful. Since the total number of times the word ‘will’ appeared in the 90,000-
word corpus is 111, it is of course also an option to check for incorrect uses manually. 
 
Errors in automated word detection 
In rare cases, the automated detection of words to determine vagueness points counts 
words that do not actually belong in that category, which can cause it to attribute points 
179 
 
wrongly. I have shown one of these cases in the context of the Bonn Agreement, where the 
word ‘available’ was used as a predicate (‘make funds available’) instead of as an adjective 
(‘any available funds’). While the word is the same, and thus is picked up by the automated 
tool, it is only a hedge word in the second case. There are a few possibilities on how to 
remove these already rare instances, but there is not yet a perfect solution. Some 
quantitative text analysis tools allow users to take into account surrounding words. In this 
case, one could experiment with counting ‘available’ as a hedge word only if there it is not 
accompanied by ‘make’ or ‘made’ at a distance of, for example, ten words or less. However, 
if this would lower the error occurrence or overcorrect and create false negatives instead is 
an open question. 
 
Very short texts 
Many of the issues presented here become less important when assessing large 
quantities of text, because the results tend to average out. With very short documents, what 
would otherwise be small inaccuracies can lead to significant errors in the results. 
Fortunately, short texts are also the least in need of the kind of quantitative analysis 
presented here, because their very shortness allows them to be read in detail. A dual 
approach is therefore recommended: using the tool only as a first approximation, and 
additionally checking the results of the tool on whether or not they make sense for each of 
the sentences involved. 
7 Conclusion and outlook 
IR scholars have made a number of assertions as to the provenance and effects of 
vagueness in international agreements. They have contended that vague agreements are 
less likely to be implemented, less legalised, a result of high transaction cost, party interest, 
increased complexity, or insurmountable differences among parties, and that vagueness 
declines over time in any given regime.  I have argued that to be able to know whether and 
which of these claims are true, it is necessary to be able to systematically measure and 
compare vagueness in international agreements.  
The main objective of this thesis was therefore to develop and test a tool that would do 
so. This required establishing indicators of vagueness applicable to international 
agreements, which did not previously exist. As a first step, I assembled possible indicators by 
studying literature on vagueness in general language as well as the few sources concerned 
with how to detect vagueness in international legal text. I then conducted a survey among 
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experts in IL in order to find out which characteristics of a sentence would make them more 
likely to consider it vague. Based on the data generated by this survey, I conducted several 
statistical tests to find out which possible indicators of vagueness are relevant in the field of 
IL. Having thus established four indicators of vagueness in international agreements, I 
devised an automated tool which aggregates the sentences’ vagueness over larger amounts 
of text. As an explorative case study, seventeen international agreements from the UNFCCC 
and the NPT regimes. In a last step, I compared the results provided by the newly developed 
tool to independent, qualitative assessments of researchers. 
This process led to four sets of results: those of the initial survey, the ones gained from of 
the data analysis, the results of the application of the tool, and of the comparison of the tool 
with other assessments. 
The survey provided a list of thirty sentences ordered by their perceived vagueness (see 
table 1), as well as additional insights by experts in IL into what features of the sentences 
made them see them as vague. Survey respondents claimed that verbs expressing 
obligations, hedge words, sentence length, referencing, generality, and measurability 
affected how vague they perceived a sentence to be.  
The results of the data analysis showed that four out of eight tested hypotheses proved 
to be statistically significant. Sentences in international agreements are perceived by experts 
to be vaguer when they contain hedge words, a low number of determiners, or weak 
explicitly performative verbs, such as ‘would’, ‘could’, or ‘recognizes’, and more precise when 
they contain a strong explicitly performative verbs such as ‘shall’ or ‘will’.  
Applying the tool to seventeen international agreements generated the most extensive 
set of results. I list just some of the most pertinent results here: The tool allows for aggregate 
analysis – up to the level of entire treaty regimes – and can also provide insights to sentence-
by-sentence analysis. The range of vagueness in the analysed agreements is diverse, but the 
overall vagueness scores of the two regimes are very similar. While decisions under the NPT 
regime have very similar vagueness scores to each other, this is not the case for decisions 
under the UNFCCC. The NPT and the Kyoto Protocol have the lowest vagueness scores, while 
the NPT RevCon decisions of 1995 and the Delhi Ministerial Declaration (2002) have the 
highest. Vagueness does not appear to develop in any consistent way over time. Legally 
binding documents are generally more precise than decisions or declarations.  
Finally, the last set of findings supports the usefulness of the tool, as the results provided 
by the tool concur with the overall assessments experts have made of these documents. 
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The answer to my research question ‘How can the vagueness of international agreements 
be systematically compared? is therefore: It is possible to model the vagueness in 
international agreements with reasonable accuracy by using sentences as the basic scoring 
unit, and hedge words, determiners and explicitly performative verbs as indicators for 
vagueness in sentences.  
While the focus of this thesis was certainly on the gathering and analysis of empirical data, 
the results do have some theoretical implications, which are worth noting.  
In the first chapter, I discussed the indeterminacy debate – i.e. the question whether or 
not the law was indeterminate, and if so, whether or not this meant that it had any chance 
at legitimacy, or even exists at all. I argued for a middle ground: There is some vagueness in 
the law, but vagueness is not absolute. Legal texts differ in how vague they are, and 
containing vagueness does not automatically render a law meaningless. This premise is one 
of the underlying assumptions of this thesis. Looking for indicators of vagueness postulates 
at the outset that these indicators can be more or less present, therefore vagueness in legal 
text must vary. Nevertheless, actually finding these indicators, and showing that they indeed 
are present to varying degrees, does support the claim that there is a variance of vagueness 
(see Figure 16). Even though the study was set up under this assumption, and may therefore 
have been biased in its favour, the results could well have shown no significant differences 
at all.  
In section 3.2.4, I briefly discussed the relationship between legal and vagueness. The 
performativity of legal language (see section 4.2.2) suggests that vagueness does not 
necessarily only affect the locutionary content of a legal text, but may also be found in its 
performative force. This in turn is closely related to legal bindingness, where the latter it is 
expressed directly in the text. The respondents of the survey confirmed this in their 
comments: most tied vagueness or precision to explicitly performative verbs (see chapter 
5.2.2). This relationship is far from exhaustively researched, but this thesis shows that the 
two dimensions are related and not easy to separate in practice, in part because they can be 
tied to the same words: for example, ‘shall’ is used to indicate a certain legal status, and IL 
experts also consider sentences containing this verbs to be more precise than others. 
In chapter 4, I have asked if some of the indicators used to identify vagueness in general 
language also apply to international legal agreements. According to my findings, hedge 
words are an indicator that is pertinent to both types of language. However, in the legal 
context much more importance has to be given to verbs than is otherwise the case. The 
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relationship between vagueness and determiners requires further research in both IL and 
linguistics. 
The results of this study also provide a point of departure for scrutinizing the numerous 
hypotheses made in the literature concerning the causes and effects of vagueness in IR. In a 
first instance, the claim that regimes become more precise over time does not appear to be 
the case in the two regimes studied here. Even when only taking into account agreements of 
similar legal status, the agreements which are part of the NPT regime remain remarkably 
steady in their vagueness scores over time, while the agreements under the UNFCCC vary 
with no apparent connection to the time at which they were negotiated. It has to be noted, 
however, that the text of agreements under the NPT regime got longer in a fairly steady 
fashion over time. This in itself does not, of course, indicate precision, but it may signify that 
matters have been dealt with in more detail.47  
The specific conditions under which each agreement was negotiated might also shed 
some light on the reasons some of the vagueness or precision is present. At the very least, 
the variance present in this analysis supports the claim that at least some of the vagueness 
in agreements is intentional and could be avoided if that was wanted by the negotiators. This 
finding could be the basis for further study into why negotiators use vague language in 
specific cases. 
I will end with some suggestions for further research based on these findings. 
First, as discussed in section 6.5, the tool itself as well as the automated word detection 
used by it should be refined further to generate even more accurate results, overcoming 
challenges such as the fairly small sample size of the original survey, inaccuracies in very 
short texts and the application of vagueness scores to headings or questions. 
Second, the tool should be tested further. To do so, it should be applied to other legal 
regimes and international agreements. If the results of these additional tests do not fit expert 
opinion, or if the detailed analysis reveals other problems (such as a significantly different 
vocabulary used in international treaties depending on the subject matter they regulate), 
research should be conducted to adjust the tool accordingly.   
A third area for further study would be using the results presented in chapter 6.3 in order 
to study both the NPT regime and the UNFCCC regime from a different angle. For example, 
combining an in-depth study of the overall reception of the Copenhagen Accord with the 
                                                          
47 Of course, the other explanation is simply an expansion of the scope of the regime. It is 
likely that both explanations are true to some extent. 
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vagueness scores of the sentences may provide deeper insights into the controversy 
surrounding this agreement. Because my analysis was focussed on the tool itself, 
implications of vagueness for the efficacy of the actual documents under analysis were 
necessarily studied in less detail. 
A fourth area for further research is in the area of linguistics: research could be done on 
whether or not the results of this study in a specialized language are potentially applicable 
to different specialized languages, or if the results could even refine the study of vagueness 
in everyday language. 
Finally, the tool should of course be used for its intended goal: To systematically assess 
whether the causes and effects of vagueness hypothesized by IR scholars are true. 
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9.3 List of sentences used in the survey 
Number Sentence Reference 
VS 1 The Conference expresses its strong support for effective IAEA safeguards. NPT 1975: 
14 
VS 2 The Conference reaffirms that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and 
evaluated regularly. 
NPT 2000: 
10 
VS 3 The Conference calls upon States parties to [...] continue to discuss further, 
in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA 
or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the 
nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for 
assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the 
back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and 
without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, 
legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this 
regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards. 
NPT 2010: 
34 
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VS 4 The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. UNFCCC 
1992: Art. 
3.4 
VS 5 Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof. 
UNFCCC 
1992: Art. 
3.1 
VS 6 Ministers believe that the Second Assessment Report should provide a 
scientific basis for urgently strengthening action at the global, regional and 
national levels, particularly action by Parties included in Annex I to the 
Convention (Annex I Parties) to limit and reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases, and for all Parties to support the development of a Protocol or another 
legal instrument; and note the findings of the IPCC. 
UNFCCC 
1996: 1 
VS 8 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, decide 
upon modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and which, additional 
human-induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the land-use 
change and forestry categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the 
assigned amounts for Parties included in Annex I, taking into account 
uncertainties, transparency in reporting, verifiability, the methodological 
work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the advice provided 
by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice in accordance 
with Article 5 and the decisions of the Conference of the Parties. 
UNFCCC 
1997: Art. 
3.4 
VS 9 We underline that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our 
time. 
UNFCCC 
2009: 5 
VS 10 To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse 
gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing 
the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 
degrees Celsius, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable 
development, enhance our long-term cooperative action to combat climate 
change. 
UNFCCC 
2009: 5 
VS 11 The Conference of the Parties [...] further recognizes that deep cuts in global 
greenhouse gas emissions are required according to science, and as 
UNFCCC 
2010: 3 
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documented in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, with a view to reducing global greenhouse gas 
emissions so as to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2 
°C above pre-industrial levels, and that Parties should take urgent action to 
meet this long-term goal, consistent with science and on the basis of equity; 
also recognizes the need to consider, in the context of the first review, as 
referred to in paragraph 138 below, strengthening the long-term global goal 
on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge, including in relation 
to a global average temperature rise of 1. 5 °C. 
VS 12 Australia will not purchase AAUs carried over from the first commitment 
period. 
UNFCCC 
2012: 13 
VS 13 All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to 
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and 
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. 
NPT 1968: 
Art. 4.2 
VS 14 Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right 
of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in 
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 
NPT 1986: 
Art 4.1  
VS 15 The Parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty is the best way to strengthen the barriers against 
proliferation and they urge all States not party to the Treaty to accede to it. 
NPT 1985: 
14 
VS 16 The Conference further noted the calls on all States for the total and 
complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources or 
devices to South Africa and Israel and to stop all exploitation of Namibian 
uranium, natural or enriched, until the attainment of Namibian 
independence. 
NPT 1985: 
14 
VS 17 The Conference reaffirms the determination expressed in the preamble of 
the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, confirmed in Article I (b) of the said Treaty 
and reiterated in preambular paragraph 10 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for 
all time. 
NPT 1985: 
25  
VS 18 Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear 
activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency safeguards 
NPT 1995: 
17 
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in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the 
nuclear-weapon States. 
VS 19 The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of 
tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free 
of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of 
priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. 
NPT 1995: 
16 
VS 20 The Conference welcomes the fact that since May 1997, the IAEA Board of 
Governors has approved additional protocols to comprehensive safeguards 
agreements with 43 States and that 12 of those additional protocols are 
currently being implemented. 
NPT 2000: 
13 
VS 21 Climate change means a change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global 
atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed 
over comparable time periods. 
UNFCCC 
1992: Art. 
1.2 
VS 22 The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open 
international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic 
growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country 
Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate 
change. 
UNFCCCC 
1992: Art. 
3.5 
VS 23 The Conference of the Parties shall review, not later than 31 December 1998, 
available information with a view to taking decisions regarding such 
amendments to the lists in Annexes I and II as may be appropriate, with the 
approval of the Party concerned. 
UNFCCC 
1992: Art. 
4.2(f) 
VS 24 Significant reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions are technically 
possible and economically feasible by utilizing an array of technology policy 
measures that accelerate technology development, diffusion and transfer; 
and significant no-regrets opportunities are available in most countries to 
reduce net greenhouse gas emissions. 
UNFCCC 
1996: 1 
VS 25 Each Party included in Annex I shall submit the information required under 
paragraph 1 above annually, beginning with the first inventory due under the 
Convention for the first year of the commitment period after this Protocol 
has entered into force for that Party. 
UNFCCC 
1997: Art. 
3.4 
VS 26 These consequences [of non-compliance] shall be the following: For the first 
commitment period, deduction at a rate of 1.3; [...] Development of a 
UNFCCC 
2000: 13 
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compliance action plan to be submitted to the enforcement branch for 
review and assessment; [...] Suspension of the eligibility to make transfers 
under Article 17.  
VS 27 The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-
proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to 
uphold the Treaty’s integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.  
NPT 2010: 
31 
VS 28 The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty 
and full compliance of all parties with all its provisions are the best way to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. 
NPT 2000: 
8 
VS 29 States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the 
safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such 
concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA to 
consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in 
accordance with its mandate.  
NPT 2010: 
9  
VS 30 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and effective 
procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-
compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, including through the 
development of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the 
cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance.  
UNFCCC 
1997: Art. 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
